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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit präsentiert eine neue effiziente und flexible Architektur für kryptographi-
sche Co-Prozessoren für den Einsatz in Servern. Die neue Architektur ist SoC-basiert
und nutzt HW/SW Co-Design. Ein mögliches Einsatzszenario ist die Entlastung eines
Servers, der mit vielen verschiedenen Client-Geräten, die unterschiedliche kryptographi-
sche Protokolle benutzen, sicher kommunizieren muss.
Da im Server-Einsatz ein hoher Durchsatz wichtiger ist als eine niedrige Latenz einer
einzigen Operation, bezieht sich die Effizienz des Co-Prozessors auf einen möglichst ho-
hen Durchsatz. Die Flexibilität gilt dabei bezüglich der unterstützten kryptographischen
Verfahren und einer einfachen Erweiterbarkeit.
Die beiden heute verbreitetsten Verfahren RSA und Elliptische Kurven Kryptographie
(ECC) unterscheiden sich unter anderem durch die verschiedene Länge der verwendeten
Zahlen. Zwar lassen sich Berechnungseinheiten, die für die langen RSA-Zahlen optimiert
sind, auch für Berechnungen mit den kürzeren ECC-Zahlen nutzen. Allerdings bleiben
dann große Teile der eingeplanten Ressourcen ungenutzt, was wiederum einen hohen
Durchsatz behindert.
Deshalb führen die beiden Design-Ziele hoher Durchsatz und Flexibilität zu einer
Beschränkung des Parallelisierungsgrades auf der untersten Abstraktionsebene, d.h. in-
nerhalb der modularen Multiplikation. Dies kann durch Parallelisierung auf höheren
Ebenen ausgeglichen werden, z.B. durch die parallele Nutzung mehrerer modularer Mul-
tiplizierer.
Die Verwendung von HW/SW Co-Design erlaubt die einfache Programmierung und
Wartung der verschiedenen kryptographischen Verfahren ohne die Effizienz stark zu
beschneiden. Dabei werden die zeitkritischen Operationen, die vorwiegend Datenfluss
beinhalten, in spezieller Hardware umgesetzt. Kontrollflusslastige Operationen, die
hauptsächlich die Reihenfolge der modularen Berechnungen bestimmen, werden in Soft-
ware umgesetzt. Dies ist auch deshalb günstig, da letztere Operationen für verschiedene
kryptographische Verfahren sehr unterschiedlich sind, wohingegen die modularen Oper-
ationen einander sehr ähnlich sind.
Die resultierende Architektur besteht aus folgenden Cores, die die folgenden Aufgaben
übernehmen:
• Central Core: Hauptkontrolle und Kommunikation mit dem Host Server
• Scheme Controller: Berechnung der eigentlichen kryptographischen Verfahren
• ModArith Core: Berechnung der modularen Operationen auf der untersten Ab-
straktionsebene
v
• AES Core: Berechnung von kryptographischen Hilfsfunktionen (z.B. Hash-Funktion,
Zufallszahlerzeugung)
Dabei erhält ein Scheme Controller vom Central Core einen Befehl zur Berechnung
eines kryptographischen Verfahrens. Dieses berechnet er unter zu Hilfenahme eines ihm
zugeordneten ModArith Cores. Weiterhin teilen sich alle Scheme Controller den AES
Core, der die kryptographischen Hilfsfunktionen berechnet.
Die Nützlichkeit der Architektur wird anhand einer prototypischen Implementierung
demonstriert. Diese beherrscht RSA, ECC und Pairing-basierte Kryptographie (PBC).
Die Durchsatzwerte sind vergleichbar oder besser zu solchen aus der Literatur, die aber
meist keine vergleichbare Flexibilität zur Verfügung stellen können.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
Today’s client-server networks become increasingly heterogeneous concerning the spe-
cifics of the involved devices and protocols. The amount of different client and server
platforms is expanding with the accelerating spread of electronic devices, be they mobile
or not.
Unfortunately, the utilized communication channels are not secure from attackers on
their own. The electronic transfer makes eavesdropping and insertion or substitution
of false data relatively easy. However, for many applications, in particular business
transactions, a secure communication channel is absolutely necessary.
To obtain such secure channels, the utilized protocols must incorporate cryptography
as a building block. This, however, produces a certain computational overhead, because
the cryptographic operations have to be executed before the data is transmitted. This is
especially true for the computationally expensive public key cryptography, which is often
necessary to solve the problem, how to securely exchange the keys, see Chapter 4.
Furthermore, as the networks become increasingly heterogeneous, it is also to be ex-
pected that the diversity of the cryptographic approaches grows, too. Thus, a server
communicating with different client types, likely, has to support a wide range of cryp-
tographic schemes, too.
1.1. Basic co-processor framework
This work focuses on public key operations on servers. The servers must communicate
with multiple client devices virtually at the same time and for each of the clients, they
must compute an expensive public key operation, at least at the beginning of the session
to negotiate a session key. This key may then be used to secure the communication
with secret key cryptography, which is computationally less expansive. Thus, a possible
scenario would be a bank server, which receives bank transfer orders in a secure fashion
from client devices.
The proposed cryptographic co-processor architecture is intended to help the server
to shoulder this load. It aims for a realization as System-on-a-Chip (SoC) design on an
FPGA. The intended application of the proposed architecture in servers results in two
main consequences:
1. The server should be able to communicate with different client types. Because
the different clients may also utilize different cryptographic approaches, the co-
1
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processor should be flexible regarding the supported cryptographic algorithms.
This also includes that it should be relatively easy to incorporate new crypto-
graphic protocols, which also aids long-term security.
2. For servers the most important performance criterion is throughput. Thus, low
latency of a single operations is less important than a high amount of executed op-
erations per time. However, the latency should not be noticeable for the user, i.e.,
it should only be a fraction of a second. Otherwise, the cryptographic operations
may become the bottleneck of the communication process.
The design of the co-processor as SoC aids both its security as well as its reusability.
The security, on the one hand, benefits from the decreased eavesdropping risk of a single-
chip design, where all computations are executed on-chip. Thus, secret information
does not have to leave the chip, where it could be read directly from the circuit paths.
Furthermore, it makes side channel attacks1 more difficult. This is because the power
usage and the electromagnetic emissions of the secret computations are partly blinded
by the calculations of other cores, in particular, in the proposed architecture, which
features several identical cores in parallel. The reusability, on the other hand, is aided
because an SoC design encapsulates all required functions. This simplifies the control
tasks for the host server.
1.2. Common public key approaches
The most common public key approach today is RSA. It is around for a long time and,
therefore, features a high trust in its security. However, RSA is computational expensive
and its computational complexity increases exponentially with the security level.
A different variety of public key cryptography is elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
Although its mathematical foundations are more complex, it operates on numbers of
smaller bit-width. Thus, ECC is computational less expensive than RSA and its com-
plexity increases only linearly with the security level. Therefore, it is to be expected
that ECC will substitute RSA in most applications in the future.
A server, which has to communicate with a wide range of – maybe – different clients,
should at least support RSA and ECC. Fortunately, both utilize modular arithmetic on
the lowest level, thus, it is possible to speed up both with the same dedicated hardware.
However, because the algorithms of RSA and ECC are quite different on higher levels,
it is beneficial to exploit HW/SW co-design. That way, the time-critical modular cal-
culations may be executed in specialized hardware, while the less time-critical control
tasks may be realized in software, which is easier to program and debug.
To highlight the flexibility of the proposed co-processor architecture, this work also
includes pairing-based cryptography (PBC). This third variety of public key cryptogra-
phy builds on the same foundations as ECC, but utilizes so called pairings, too, see
Section 3.4. Therefore, it is possible to realize PBC operations using the hardware and
software of a combined RSA/ECC design by just including new software functions.
1See [32] for an overview on side channel attacks
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Note in this context that ECC and PBC are realized over finite fields. For both, it is
possible to exploit either prime fields GF(p) or binary fields GF(2m). However, in this
work only GF(p) is considered, because dedicated hardware for GF(2m) is not usable for
RSA. Furthermore, literature offers designs supporting both fields with so called unified
architectures, see for example [21, 31].
1.3. Parallelization in cryptography
In recent years the increase in possible cycle frequencies has decelerated. However,
Moore’s Law, which predicts a doubling of the available amount of transistors per area,
seems still to be valid. Therefore, nowadays the performance increase does mostly stem
from higher parallelization of the calculations. Thus, to benefit from better hardware,
cryptographic implementations have to take advantage of these parallel resources by
exploiting parallel algorithm variants.
The easiest way for this is to parallelize the most important modular operation,
namely, the modular multiplication. However, the calculations for RSA typically need
numbers with more than 1000 bits, while computations for ECC operate on numbers
with only around 200 bits. Although it is possible to reuse the large multipliers intended
for RSA, the operations of ECC do not exploit the full width of these multipliers, which
leads to unused resources.
This collides with the design goal of high throughput, because high throughput re-
quires the available resources to work as continuously as possible. Therefore, the degree
of parallelization within the modular arithmetic is limited, if throughput is of importance
and the architecture must be able to work with a wide range of possible bit-widths.
To compensate for the low degree of parallelization in the modular arithmetic, paral-
lelization is also exploited on higher levels, namely, by parallelizing the modular multi-
pliers in each core for modular arithmetic and by also parallelizing those cores. This is
explained in more detail in Chapter 6.
Most previous designs from literature did not include ideas how to handle calculations
for RSA and ECC at the same time. Furthermore, this work seems to be the first to
suggest the exploitation of parallel executions of complete cryptographic schemes, e.g.,
ECDSA signature generation or RSAES-OAEP encryption.
Note that above only RSA and ECC were considered. This is because the bit-widths
of the realized PBC scheme lies somewhere in between these extremes. Thus, a design
evenly accelerating the bit-widths range between RSA and ECC also accelerates the
bit-widths required for PBC.
1.4. Short overview on the proposed architecture
Figure 1.1 depicts the proposed architecture consisting of several cores, which communi-
cate with each other. The communication with the host server is executed by the central
core, which controls the other cores, too. In the prototype implementation this role is
3
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assumed by a PowerPC processor and its functionality is realized only partly, because
its program just contains functions to test the functionality and the speed of the other
cores.
...
Bus
Controller
Scheme
Central
Functions
Auxiliary
Core
Scheme ModArith
CoreController
Controller
Scheme
Core
ModArith
ModArith
Core
Core
Figure 1.1.: Simplified view of the proposed co-processor architecture
The ModArith core is responsible for the calculations in the modular arithmetic. The
modular multipliers are pipelined and each ModArith core contains two of these multi-
pliers to accelerate the computations.
The execution of the cryptographic operation is controlled by cores called scheme
controllers, which each are assigned a single ModArith core to accelerate the modu-
lar operations. The scheme controllers are issued commands to execute cryptographic
schemes by the central core. In combination with the ModArith cores, the scheme con-
trollers may be parallelized as often as the available resource allow. In the prototype
implementation the scheme controllers are realized using MicroBlaze soft-core proces-
sors.
Although the modular operations take up the majority of the computational load of
a single scheme, some auxiliary cryptographic functions are also required. These are
symmetric en-/decryption, hash function, and random number generation. To minimize
the resource usage of these functions, they are realized in their own core, which is shared
between all scheme controllers.
Design history
The idea for the proposed architecture emerged in a vague form in 2005 during the
implementation leading to [15]. During the writing of [58], it crystallized in a more
concrete form, which was, subsequently, refined and published in [59]. At this point
many realization details were still missing. This was changed in a further refinement
period, in which the separate parts of the architecture were implemented: Firstly, the
4
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core for the auxiliary functions was developed and presented in [61]. Secondly, the inter-
processor communication between central core and scheme controllers including code
for RSA and ECC was realized, see [79]. Thirdly, the pipelined version of the modular
multiplier was created, see [95]. These parts were then integrated, further optimized, and
extended by code for PBC leading to the first complete realization, which was presented
in [62]. The prototype implementation introduced in this work is mainly the same as in
[62]. However, some minor optimizations led to better results.
1.5. Remainder of this work
Chapter 2 presents literature related to this work. However, it is restricted to designs,
which exhibit similar aspects to this work. Approaches and algorithms utilized in the
proposed architecture or the prototype implementation are referenced at the position in
the text they are used. Furthermore, the overview on parallelization in cryptography is
deferred to Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 introduces the mathematical foundations necessary for the understanding
of this work. These are mainly the definitions of the algebraic structures used for the
cryptographic algorithms and how calculations in these structures are executed. The
chapter concludes with a basic introduction to pairings, which are required for PBC.
Chapter 4 builds upon the mathematical foundations and details the cryptographic as-
pects of this work. This centers on Public-Key Cryptography in the three varieties RSA,
ECC, and PBC. Furthermore, a classification of these approaches in different abstraction
levels is introduced. This is followed by an overview on parallelization possibilities in
cryptography. Finally, the auxiliary cryptographic functions necessary for the execution
of complete schemes are presented.
Chapter 5 provides a rough overview on the utilized hardware platform, namely, the
XUP Virtex-II Pro Development System with the Virtex-II Pro FPGA as central el-
ement. The chapter concludes with a short introduction of the design flow used to
generate the prototype implementation.
Based on the fundamental information and considerations provided by the previous
chapters, Chapter 6 presents the novel flexible and efficient co-processors architecture
for server applications. This starts with the constraints, which lead to the architectural
decisions. Then, the actual architecture and its individual parts are explained in more
detail. This explanation, however, does still abstract from implementation details.
Chapter 7 illustrates the prototype implementation realized to evaluate the validity
of the proposed architecture. It starts with the implementation constraints and, subse-
quently, presents details about all parts of the architecture, i.e., the different cores and
how they interact.
Chapter 8 introduces the results of the prototype implementation. This includes the
resource usage and the timing figures for different design variants. The chapter closes
with a comparison with other realizations from literature.
Chapter 9, finally, concludes this work summarizing the important points. Addition-
ally, some ideas are motivated, which may be considered in future work.
5
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Chapter 2.
Related work
This chapter presents literature introducing approaches and ideas similar to those of this
work. In the following, these are divided into RSA/ECC combinations, cryptographic
HW/SW combinations, and single-chip solutions, which all three are aspects of this
work. Although some of the publications fit into all three categories, most introduce or
improve techniques of just one aspect.
This work also utilizes related work beyond these three aspects. This is mainly lit-
erature containing cryptographic algorithms, which were utilized in the design of the
architecture and for the prototype implementation. Therefore, they are introduced later
on in the context of the concrete aspects they were used in. A special case are the
proposals for parallelization of algorithms in cryptography. Those are deferred to Sec-
tion 4.3, because they are presented according to the abstraction level classification,
which is given in that chapter, too.
2.1. RSA/ECC combinations
Both RSA and ECC are based on modular arithmetic and it is likely that both ap-
proaches will stay with us for the foreseeable future. From the point of view of the
modular arithmetic, however, the major difference between both approaches is the huge
difference in the utilized bit-widths. For common security levels RSA requires calcu-
lations with values of 1000 or more bits, while for ECC the bit-widths range around
200.
Still, because of the similarities between RSA and ECC, many dedicated hardware
designs for modular arithmetic over GF(p) from literature consider them both. In most
cases, however, this is done by keeping the designs scalable in terms of the bit-width.
This means that the design may be instantiated with any arbitrary bit-width, while its
execution time and its resource usage increase only linearly with the bit-width. Examples
for such designs may be found in [93, 103, 90, 87, 31, 8].
Thus, the designer may use the architecture to instantiate it as needed, i.e., either
for an RSA or an ECC realization. [8] addresses the problem of combined RSA/ECC
implementations. Its goal is to extend an already existing RSA implementation by the
required ECC functionality: The modular multiplier is reused for ECC and additional
modular operation like addition and subtraction are provided in form of a co-processor.
Then, it is sufficient to extend the module controlling the modular arithmetic by the
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algorithms for the EC operations, which build upon the modular operations. The authors
also suggest to instantiate and utilize a second modular multiplier allowing to parallelize
point addition and doubling. Thus, [8] already allows RSA and ECC on the same
hardware. However, the authors do not examine the fact that, while the multiplier is
able to operate with small and large bit-widths, large parts of the multiplier will stay
unused for operations with smaller bit-widths. Thus, this design does not allow an even
and continuous exploitation of all resources.
A solution for this problem is presented in [26]. Its authors propose a hardware module
for modular multiplication utilizing pipelining. Similar to previous designs this multiplier
is able to operate on values with small or large bit-widths. However, as a specialty the
complete multiplier is build up from several smaller modules. Thus, if RSA is to be
used, all smaller modules work together like a multiplier of a large bit-width. But for
ECC calculations the smaller cores can work in parallel and independently from each
other. This way, the amount of unused resources is decreased considerably. However, if
RSA and ECC should be possible with different bit-widths, resources are still unused for
all computations, which do not operate with a multiple of the bit-width of the smaller
cores. Furthermore, a continuous exploitation of the design from [26] also requires a
scheduling of the RSA and ECC operations, as during an RSA multiplication no ECC
multiplication is possible and vice versa.
2.2. Cryptographic HW/SW combinations
By utilizing HW/SW co-design the data and control flow intensive parts of the cryp-
tographic operations are separated and implemented in hardware and software, respec-
tively. This allows to exploit the respective advantages of hardware and software: The
data flow intensive parts, which are time-critical, are realized in hardware leading to
a fast and efficient implementation. The control flow intensive parts, which often wait
for the completion of the calculations, are implemented in software. This allows easier
design and maintenance for the parts realized in software, as they are easier to program
and debug.
An early design using the HW/SW approach can be found in [64]. It proposes an
Arithmetic Logic Unit in hardware, which is controlled by a microcode program, thus,
reducing design effort and resource usage compared to a pure hardware design. The
decrease in resource usage stems from the fact that the microcode stored in memory
replaces the otherwise required finite state machine. In [48] an HW/SW design for the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is introduced. Its authors employ a combination of general
purpose processor and FPGA, where the FPGA is used to implement the arithmetic
operations and the EC addition and doubling. The scalar multiplication is realized on
the general purpose processor. This contrasts with the microcode implementation from
[64], which implements only the arithmetic in hardware.
A more elaborate approach is presented in [102]. Its architecture allows the exploita-
tion of several Modular Arithmetic Logical Units in parallel, which are controlled by a
microcode program or directly by a general purpose processor. Former variant shortens
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the communication path and, thus, increases throughput. Using different configurations
of this architecture, the authors have realized computations for ECC and HECC1.
Note that above solutions consider ECC over GF(2m) and not over GF(p) as done
in this work. A design for GF(p) is presented in [101], which consists of one Modular
Arithmetic Logical Unit controlled by an 8051 µ-controller. The authors note that this
architecture may be used for RSA, too.
HW/SW implementations for just RSA are presented in [28, 117]. Both realize the
modular multiplication in hardware, while the exponentiation algorithm is executed in
software. In [28], the authors compare this mixed implementation with a pure hardware
and a pure software realization of their design concluding that the HW/SW combination
is superior to the two other design. The more elaborate design from [117] uses a pipelined
approach based on [113] for the modular arithmetic, while the exponentiation is executed
on a NIOS soft-core processor. Note that this is somewhat similar to the design proposed
in this work. However, because this work also considers ECC, it employs shorter pipelines
and parallel modular multipliers, which are not beneficial in the application environment
of [117]. Additionally, [117] lacks the on-chip realization of the auxiliary cryptographic
function enabling it to execute complete schemes on-chip.
2.3. Single-chip solutions
Single-chip solutions for cryptographic realizations allow the encapsulation of complete
cryptographic schemes. This, of course, eases the reuse of such designs, as they contain
all the needed functionality and free the host system from the low level control task.
Additionally, this approach also increases security by reducing the eavesdropping risk, as
the secret data – e.g., private keys – does not have to leave the chip. Thus, an attacker
is not able to measure the secret data directly from the circuit paths.
The authors of [17], who offer contemplations on design strategies for secure embedded
networking, come to similar conclusions. They also identify better support for long-
term security as a special advantage of such integrated co-processors on reconfigurable
hardware. This way, it is relatively easy to adjust to new standards and algorithms.
As an early single-chip cryptography solution [73] encapsulates the symmetric cryp-
tographic functionality required for IPSec2 on an FPGA. The design from [67] provides
similar functionality, but exploits the HW/SW approach to decrease the resource usage
of the control flow intensive parts by realizing them on-chip in software. [25], in contrast
– while also offering IPSec functionality using HW/SW co-design, this time including
an RSA core – executes the software off-chip, thus, increasing the eavesdropping risk.
Single-chip solutions more aimed at public key cryptography are presented in [120, 38,
89]. All three are implemented as SoC consisting of a single general purpose processor
and several optimized cores for modular arithmetic and for auxiliary functions. Thus,
they all apply HW/SW co-design executing the time-critical operations on the optimized
1Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography
2Internet Protocol Security, see [53]
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cores, while the general purpose processor is responsible for the control of the different
cores utilizing them to compute a cryptographic scheme.
Note that these designs, especially [120], are similar to this work as they also allow
the execution of RSA and ECC schemes on a single chip. In contrast to this work,
however, parallelization is only considered to a certain degree, the synergies between
RSA and ECC are not exploited to the same degree, and the general purpose processors
are utilized to a lesser degree.
In [38] a co-processor for secret and public cryptography is introduced. The authors
propose a system consisting of several cores for cryptographic functions like RSA, ECC,
AES, and hash function. A NIOS soft-core processor is used to control the execution of
cryptographic schemes using above cores. In contrast to this work, [38] does not consider
parallelization in a significant way. Furthermore, there are separate cores for RSA and
ECC, which are only geared to a single bit-width each. They execute a complete modular
exponentiation or a point multiplication, respectively, including the control flow intensive
parts in hardware. Thus, the design is not as flexible and upgradeable as this work. It
does not allow to operate on arbitrary bit-widths required for the desired security level.
To change the bit-widths, the design from [38] would have to be modified and synthesized
again. Furthermore, it would be more complicated to incorporate a new cryptographic
approach like PBC. Note that [38] uses ECC over GF(2m), thus, there are no synergies
between ECC and RSA on the modular arithmetic level to be exploited as done in this
work. Overall, [38] leaves the impression to be build up form separate cores, which,
originally, were not intended as part of an integrated cryptographic co-processor.
The design from [89] features a general purpose processor and separate cores for sym-
metric encryption, RSA/ECC, random number generation, MPEG encoding, and MPEG
decoding. Because the aim of the authors was the introduction of a new design methodol-
ogy and their realization includes MPEG capability, [89] seems to be less suited for pure
cryptographic applications than this work. In contrast, this works exhibits a compact
single core for the cryptographic auxiliary functions, focuses on the modular operations,
and considers parallelization to a larger degree. Finally, the performance of scheme
executions is not given in [89]. Thus, comparisons with this work are not possible.
The cryptographic co-processor from [120] is an ASIC design optimized for energy
and area featuring a RISC CPU, a core for random number generation, and a core for
modular arithmetic. The execution of signature and verification schemes is controlled by
the CPU, which uses the hardware cores. The core for modular arithmetic is word-based
and may be used for both RSA and ECC up to a bit-length of 2048. This flexibility
promises a relatively easy upgradeability for new approaches like PBC as done in this
work. In contrast to this work, [120] does not feature cores for symmetric en-/decryption
or hash. Furthermore, the algorithms for modular multiplication and elliptic operations
are included as microcode in the word-based RSA/ECC core. Finally, the design is aimed
for application in clients making the considerations about throughput less important.
This may also be the reason that parallelization is included to a smaller degree only.
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Mathematical foundations
For the understanding and the implementation of public key cryptography, a firm grasp
of its mathematical foundations is necessary. Thus, this chapter presents the algebraic
structures required by the cryptographic schemes examined in this work. This includes
an introduction to the operations in these structures and some additional algorithms.
3.1. Algebraic structures
The cryptographic schemes examined in this work are based on finite groups and/or finite
fields. A general definition of these two algebraic structures is provided in the following,
while the specifics for their implementation over integers are given later. Note that
the definitions are restricted to the information needed in this work. A more thorough
introduction to algebraic structures may be found in [41].
3.1.1. Groups
A mathematical group consists of a set of elements and an operation ◦ defined over
these elements. It is called an additive or multiplicative group, depending on whether ◦
denotes the addition or the multiplication operation, respectively.
Definition 3.1 A group is a non-empty set G with a binary operation ◦ : G×G→ G
and the following properties.
1. The operation ◦ is associative, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ G it holds that a ◦ (b ◦ c) =
(a ◦ b) ◦ c.
2. There exists an identity element e ∈ G such that for all a ∈ G it holds that
a ◦ e = e ◦ a = a.
3. For each a ∈ G there exists an inverse element a−1 ∈ G with a ◦a−1 = a−1 ◦a = e.
In the context of groups the following additional definitions are used in this work.
• G is called an abelian or commutative group, if the operation ◦ is commutative,
i.e., for all a, b ∈ G it holds that a ◦ b = b ◦ a.
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• A group G is called cyclic, if it may be generated by a single element a ∈ G, i.e.,
if G = {an|n ∈ N} holds. The element a is called a generator of G.
• The order of a group G denoted by #G is the amount of different elements in the
set G. If the amount of elements is infinite, then #G = ∞. The group is called
finite, if the order of the group is finite.
• The order of an element a is defined as the least integer n ∈ N, for which an = e
holds. an denotes the n-times repeated application of the operation ◦. The order
of a is referred to as infinite, if such an integer n does not exist.
If G is the cyclic group generated by a, the order of the element a is equal to the
order of the group G.
• Let G1 and G2 be two groups, where the group operations are defined identically.
If G1 ⊂ G2 holds, then G1 is called a subgroup of G2.
3.1.2. Fields
A field F can be seen as a set of elements and the two binary operations addition and
multiplication defined over these elements, where the set is an abelian group in respect
to each of these operations. An exception is that there exists no multiplicative inverse
element for the multiplicative identity element 0, i.e., the division by 0 is not defined.
Furthermore, addition and multiplication follow the distributive law.
Definition 3.2 A field is a non-empty set F with two binary operations + : F ×F → F
and · : F × F → F and the following properties.
1. Both operations + and · are associative, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ F it holds that a +
(b+ c) = (a+ b) + c and a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c.
2. Both operations + and · are commutative, i.e., for all a, b ∈ F it holds that
a+ b = b+ a and a · b = b · a.
3. The multiplication · is distributive over the addition +, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ F it
holds that a · (b+ c) = (a · b) + (a · c).
4. There exists an additive identity element 0 ∈ F such that for all a ∈ F it holds
that a+ 0 = 0 + a = a.
5. There exists a multiplicative identity element 1 ∈ F such that for all a ∈ F it
holds that a · 1 = 1 · a = a.
6. For each a ∈ F there exists an additive inverse element −a ∈ F with (−a) + a =
a+ (−a) = 0.
7. For each a ∈ F with a 6= 0 there exists a multiplicative inverse element a−1 ∈ F
with a−1 · a = a · a−1 = 1.
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In the context of fields the following additional definitions are used in this work.
• The order of a field F denoted by #F is the amount of different elements in the
set F . If the amount of elements is infinite, then #F = ∞. The field is called
finite, if the order of the field is finite. Finite fields are also called Galois Fields.
• Let F1 and F2 be two fields, where addition and multiplication are identically
defined. If F1 ⊂ F2 holds, then F1 is called a subfield of F2 and F2 is called an
extension field of F1.
3.2. Modular arithmetic
All public key algorithms examined in this work are based on modular arithmetic, which
allows them to share a common hardware core. The computations within the modular
arithmetic are executed on positive integers x in the range [0, q − 1], where q is an
integer number depending on the used cryptographic approach. Therefore, the results
of operations like addition and multiplication have to be reduced modulo q.
For RSA the modulus is the product of two large prime numbers, thus, the algebraic
structure in this case is a multiplicative abelian group. For ECC and PBC q is chosen
as a large prime, thus, the algebraic structure the operations work on is the finite field
GF(q). Note that for PBC an additional extension field GF(qk) is required. In this work
only a simple pairing case is considered utilizing extension fields with the embedding
degree k = 2. The operations in GF(q2) are reviewed in Section 3.4.4.
It is also possible to implement ECC and PBC based on finite fields GF(2m) with
m ≥ 0, which are called binary finite fields. Operational units for these fields, however,
may not be reused for RSA. Because this work focuses on parallelization, operations in
binary fields are not examined. For designs, which have to support calculations in both
GF(q) and GF(2m), so called unified architectures may be used, see [21, 31].
3.2.1. Modular operations
For a realization the modular operations have to be mapped to actual hardware units.
As described in Chapter 6, the elementary computational units in this work operate on
words. Thus, long integers must be split into parts of word-length each, which is also
called µ-radix representation, where µ = 2w is the amount of different values one word
with the word-length w may represent. In this representation, a long integer a – also
called multi-precision integer – is stored in n words ai, for which the following equation
holds.
a = an−1 · 2w(n−1) + an−2 · 2w(n−2) + · · ·+ a1 · 2w + a0
Modular addition and subtraction
The algorithms for modular addition and subtraction are relatively straight-forward,
because the intermediate result is at most off by (q−1), which may be corrected by simply
subtracting or adding q, respectively. This is shown in Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2.
13
Chapter 3. Mathematical foundations
Algorithm 3.1 Modular addition
Input: integers a, b ∈ [0, q − 1], modulus q
Output: integer c = a+ b mod q
1: c := a+ b
2: if c ≥ q then
3: c := c− q
4: end if
5: return c
Algorithm 3.2 Modular subtraction
Input: integers a, b ∈ [0, q − 1], modulus q
Output: integer c = a− b mod q
1: c := a− b
2: if c < 0 then
3: c := c+ q
4: end if
5: return c
Modular multiplication
The modular multiplication is the most critical modular operation in the examined public
key algorithms, mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, it is more complex, because the
not-yet-reduced result may have the double bit-length of q. Secondly, it is executed
frequently in all considered cryptographic schemes.
Therefore, an extensive body of research concerning the increase in efficiency may be
found in literature. Probably the most common algorithm is the Montgomery multi-
plication, see [80, 74], which is also used in this work and described in more detail in
Section 3.2.2. Other important approaches are the Barrett multiplication [7, 74], which
may be improved using Quisquater’s variant, see [29], and the modular multiplication
utilizing reduction for special moduli, e.g., Pseudo-Mersenne primes, see [74]. Other
examples are the use of residue number systems, shortly described in Section 4.3.1, and
a novel modular multiplication algorithm realized by the author, see [15].
Modular inversion
Because modular division is very difficult, it is usually substituted by a modular multi-
plication with the multiplicative inverse. However, this inversion is still more expensive
than a modular multiplication. Thus, this must be taken into account by the algorithms
on higher abstraction levels and leads, e.g., to the use of projective coordinates instead
of affine coordinates, see Section 3.3.2.
The modular inverse a−1, with a−1 ·a ≡ 1 mod q, is usually computed using Fermat’s
little theorem or the Extended Euclidean algorithm, see [74]. Former one is composed
of modular multiplications only, while latter one uses normal integer operations and
exhibits a more complex control flow. However, although the Extended Euclidean al-
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gorithm is more resource consuming, it is also more efficient, i.e., faster to compute.
Because the inversion is executed only occasionally and the Extended Euclidean algo-
rithm does not easily allow resource sharing with the modular arithmetic, the algorithm
according to Fermat’s little theorem is utilized in this work.
Fermat’s little theorem states that if q is prime and a and q are relatively prime to
each other, then the following equation holds.
aq ≡ a mod q
From this follows that
aq−2 ≡ a−1 mod q
and, thus, the inverse a−1 mod q may be computed by calculating aq−2 mod q.
Modular division by 2
A special case of the modular division is the division by 2, which may be calculated
efficiently and is required for the elliptic curve point addition and doubling algorithms,
see Section 3.3.2. Its computation is based on the fact that for the result c, the following
equivalence holds.
c+ c ≡ a mod q.
However, it may be that 2c > q, in which case this intermediate result is reduced by q,
i.e., a = 2c − q. Because q is odd and 2c even, this may only the case, if a is also odd.
This fact is exploited in Algorithm 3.3.
Algorithm 3.3 Modular division by 2
Input: integer a ∈ [0, q − 1], modulus q
Output: integer c = a/2 mod q
1: if a is odd then
2: t = a+ q
3: else
4: t = a
5: end if
6: c := t÷ 2 {implemented with right-shift by 1 bit}
7: return c
Modular exponentiation
The modular exponentiation c = ab mod q is realized as sequence of modular multipli-
cations. Because it is an important operation, many different algorithms with different
advantages and disadvantages exist, see [36] for a survey. In this work the Montgomery
Powering Ladder is utilized, as it supports parallel execution, see Section 4.3.3. There-
fore, only the most basic algorithm, namely “Square and Multiply” is presented here.
This algorithms traverses the exponent b bit-by-bit. For each inspected bit, the inter-
mediate result is squared and for each bit equal to 1 the intermediate result is also
multiplied with the base a. This is shown in Algorithm 3.4 in detail.
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Algorithm 3.4 Modular exponentiation “Square and Multiply” (from [74])
Input: base a ∈ [0, q − 1], modulus q, exponent b ≥ 1 in binary representation with
bit-length l (i.e., b = (bl−1bl−2 . . . b1b0))
Output: result ab mod q
1: t := 1
2: for i := l downto 0 do
3: t := t · t mod q
4: if bi = 1 then
5: t := t · a mod q
6: end if
7: end for
8: return t
Modular square root
The algorithm for the calculation of a modular square root used in this work is taken
from [42]. It provides different sub algorithms for the three cases q ≡ 3 mod 4, q ≡ 1
mod 8, and q ≡ 5 mod 8. However, in this work the square root operation is only
needed for the PBC scheme as part of the Hash-to-point operation, see Section 4.4.6.
Because the PBC scheme realized in this work is restricted to a simple parameter set,
only the case q ≡ 3 mod 4 needs to be considered, see Section 3.4.3. Fortunately, this
is the most simple case in which the square root may be computed by calculating a
modular exponentiation with the exponent k + 1, where 4k + 3 = q holds. Thus, the
square root is computed by √
a = ak+1 mod q
Note that this approach only generates a solution
√
a, if one exists. Thus, to check
whether the solution exists,
√
a
2 ≡ a mod q should be tested.
3.2.2. Montgomery multiplication
The Montgomery multiplication, see [80, 74], is based on the Montgomery reduction,
which computes a ·R−1 mod q, where q is the modulus and R > q is coprime to q. If R
is chosen to be a large power of 2, the division can be executed using right shifts, thus,
simplifying the reduction operation. Therefore, normally and also in this work, R is set to
2wn, where w denotes the word-width and n refers to the word-count of q. Furthermore,
by interleaving the multiplication and reduction phase the amount of necessary memory
accesses is reduced. A word-based variant of the Montgomery multiplication is depicted
in Algorithm 3.5.
The Montgomery multiplication calculates ab · R−1 mod q instead of ab mod q. To
deal with this drawback, the operands have to be transferred into the so called Mont-
gomery space before the computations and out of it afterwards. In the Montgomery
space an input value a is substituted by aR.
How the computations within the Montgomery space fit together is shown in the
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Algorithm 3.5 Montgomery multiplication (from [74])
Input: factors a = (an−1, . . . , a1, a0), b = (bn−1, . . . , b1, b0), modulus q =
(qn−1, . . . , q1, q0), q′ = −q−1 mod 2w, R = 2wn
Output: ab ·R−1 mod q
1: t := 0 {t = (tn, tn−1, . . . , t1, t0)}
2: for i := 0 to n− 1 do
3: u := (t0 + aib0)q′ mod 2w
4: t := (t+ aiy + uq)/2w
5: end for
6: if t ≥ q then
7: t := t− q
8: end if
9: return t
following. Thereby, the Montgomery multiplication is denoted by ×¯ and values in the
Montgomery space are marked as a¯. Note that the result of a multiplication of the
factors a¯ and b¯ is again in Montgomery space.
a¯×¯b¯ mod q = (a ·R)×¯(b ·R) mod q
= a ·R · b ·R ·R−1 mod q
= (ab) ·R mod q
= ab mod q
This means that conversions into and from Montgomery space are only needed at the
beginning and at the end of the computations, respectively. Both conversions may be
executed utilizing the Montgomery multiplication:
• For the transformation into the Montgomery space, an integer a is multiplied with
R2 mod q, which has to be precomputed and stored.
a×¯R2 mod q = a ·R2 ·R−1 mod q
= a ·R mod q
= a¯ mod q
• The transformation out of the Montgomery space may be done by a Montgomery
multiplication with 1.
a¯×¯1 mod q = a¯ · 1 ·R−1 mod q
= a ·R ·R−1 mod q
= a mod q
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3.2.3. Chinese Remainder Theorem
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) states that there exists an unique solution
modulo m =
∑n
i=1mi for a system of simultaneous congruences
a ≡ b1 mod m1
a ≡ b2 mod m2
...
a ≡ bn mod mn,
where the moduli mi are relatively prime to each other. This may be used to improve
the modular exponentiation in RSA, where computations are executed modulo n = p · q.
Furthermore, residue number systems, which offer a possibility to massively parallelize
computations with multi-precision integers, are based on the CRT, see Section 4.3.1.
To find the unique solution a for a system of simultaneous congruences, Gauss’s or
Garner ’s algorithm may be used. Latter algorithm is more efficient for practical imple-
mentations, because its calculations are executed modulo the small moduli, which is less
costly for multi-precision integer computations, see [74]. Algorithm 3.6 details Garner’s
algorithm.
Algorithm 3.6 Garner’s algorithm (from [74])
Input: positive integer m =
∑n
i=1mi with mi relatively prime to each other, modular
representation (b1, b2, . . . , bn) for a
Output: positive multi-precision integer a
1: for i := 2 to n do
2: Ci := 1
3: for j := 1 to i− 1 do
4: t := m−1j mod mi
5: Ci := t · Ci mod mi
6: end for
7: end for
8: t := b1, a := t
9: for 0 := 2 to n do
10: t := (bi − a) · Ci mod mi
11: a := a+ t ·∏i−1j=1 ·mj
12: end for
13: return a
3.3. Elliptic curve group
This section offers a short introduction to elliptic curves (EC), sufficient for the under-
standing of this work. For more information, see [12, 39].
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An elliptic curve is defined over a finite field and can be used as foundation for public
key algorithms. Although an elliptic curve may be defined over both GF(q) or GF(2m),
only former case is considered and explained here.
An elliptic curve E is a set of points P = (x, y), where the coordinates x, y ∈ GF(q)
satisfy the Weierstraß-equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b.
The Weierstraß-coefficients a, b ∈ GF(q) must satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 6≡ 0 mod q.
Together with a point at infinity denoted O as identity element the points of such
an elliptic curve E form an additive abelian group called E(GF(q)). As shown in Fig-
ure 3.1(a) the addition R = P+Q may be interpreted geometrically. For the case P = Q
a special doubling operation is needed, because the calculation of the gradient would
result in a division by 0. Its geometrical interpretation is depicted in Figure 3.1(b).
Q
P
R=P+Q
−R
ladd1ladd2
(a) Point addition
P
R=2P
−R
ldbl1
ldbl2
(b) Point doubling
Figure 3.1.: Geometric interpretation of point addition and doubling
The first step is to draw the line ladd1 through the points P and Q or the tangent ldbl1
to the curve at point P , respectively. The point of intersection with the curve E is the
negative of the resulting point R, which, in turn, is found as the point of intersection
between E and the line ladd2 or ldbl2 , respectively. If ladd1 or ldbl1 are parallel to the Y-axis,
the resulting point is defined as the point at infinity O. The amount of points on the
curve E(GF(q)) is called order of the curve E and is denoted #E(GF(q)).
Note that for cryptographic applications only the points of a cyclic subgroup of E
with a generator point G are used. To ensure a suitable security level, the order of this
subgroup n – which is also the order of the generator point G – must be a prime number
with a large enough bit-length. The relation between the order of the curve #E(GF(q))
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and the order of the subgroup n is given by #E(GF(q)) = h · n, where h is denoted
cofactor. For ECC, n and q should have a similar bit-length and the cofactor should be
a very small integer, i.e., h = 1 in the best case. For PBC q and h may be larger than
n.
3.3.1. Additive operations in affine coordinates
The 2-dimensional coordinates used in above geometric representation are called affine
coordinates. The concrete algorithms for addition and doubling of points are composed
of modular operations and shown in the following.
In the general case the addition of the points P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ) results
in the point R = (xR, yR) as follows.
s =
yP − yQ
xP − xQ
xR = s
2 − xP − xQ
yR = −yP + s · (xP − xR)
In the doubling case P = Q the resulting point R may be computed as follows.
s =
3x2P − a
2yP
xR = s
2 − 2xP
yR = −yP + s · (xP − xR).
Note that from O = P + (−P ) = (xP , yP ) + (xP ,−yP ) follows that the negative of a
point P = (xP , yP ) can be computed by toggling the sign of yP , i.e., −P = (xP ,−yP ).
Because the points of E compose an additive abelian group, there is no multiplication
operation between points. However, the repetitive addition of a point onto itself is called
point multiplication, see Section 3.3.3
3.3.2. Additive operations in projective coordinates
Both algorithms for point addition and doubling in affine coordinates need one modular
inversion each, which is a very costly operation. To avoid this, alternative coordinate
systems with additional coordinates were proposed. Their basic idea is to keep track of
numerators and denominators separately and to execute the inversion only once at the
end. In this work the Jacobian projective coordinates are used – in the following called
projective coordinates. An overview on other common coordinate systems is given in
[24].
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Algorithm 3.7 Algorithm for point addition (from [42])
Input: P0 = (x0, y0, z0), P1 = (x1, y1, z1), Weierstraß-coefficients a, b
Output: projective coordinates of point P2 = P0 + P1 = (x2, y2, z2)
1: t1 := x0, t2 := y0
2: if ( z1 6= 1 ) then
3: t7 := z12 {SQR1}
4: t1 := t1 · t7 {MULT2}
5: t7 := z1 · t7 {MULT3}
6: t2 := t2 · t7 {MULT4}
7: end if
8: t7 := z02 {SQR5}
9: t4 := x1 · t7 {MULT6}
10: t7 := z0 · t7 {MULT7}
11: t5 := y1 · t7 {MULT8}
12: t4 := t1 − t4 {SUB9}
13: t5 := t2 − t5 {SUB10}
14: if ( t4 = 0 ) then
15: if ( t5 = 0 ) then
16: x2 := 0; y2 := 0; z2 := 0 and HALT
17: else
18: x2 := 1; y2 := 1; z2 := 0 and HALT
19: end if
20: end if
21: t1 := 2 · t1 − t4 {MULT11_ADD and SUB12}
22: t2 := 2 · t2 − t5 {MULT13_ADD and SUB14}
23: if ( z1 6= 1 ) then
24: t3 := z0 · z1 {MULT15}
25: else
26: t3 := z0
27: end if
28: z2 := t3 · t4 {MULT16}
29: t7 := t24 {SQR17}
30: t4 := t4 · t7 {MULT18}
31: t7 := t1 · t7 {MULT19}
32: t1 := t25 {SQR20}
33: x2 := t1 − t7 {SUB21}
34: t7 := t7 − 2 · x2 {MULT22_ADD and SUB23}
35: t5 := t5 · t7 {MULT24}
36: t4 := t2 · t4 {MULT25}
37: t2 := t5 − t4 {SUB26}
38: y2 := t2 ÷ 2 {DIV27}
39: return P2 = (x2, y2, z2)
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The transformation between affine coordinates (xP , yP ) and projective coordinates
(x′P , y
′
P , z
′
P ) may be done according to the following equations.
xP =
x′P
(z′P )2
, yP =
y′P
(z′P )3
Note that this representation is not unique, because
(x′P , y
′
P , z
′
P ) = (a
2x′P , a
3y′P , az
′
P )
for all a ∈ GF(q)\{0}. From this follows that affine coordinates may be easily transferred
to projective coordinates by setting x′ = x, y′ = y, and z′ = 1. The point at infinity O
has the coordinates (a2, a3, 0) for all nonzero a. For simplicity it is defined as (1, 1, 0).
Algorithm 3.8 Algorithm for point doubling for curves with a = −3 (from [39])
Input: P1 = (x1, y1, z1), Weierstraß-coefficient b
Output: projective coordinates for point P2 = 2 · P1 = (x2, y2, z2)
1: if ( y1 = 0 or z1 = 0 ) then
2: x2 := 1; y2 := 1; z2 := 0 and HALT
3: end if
4: t1 := z21 {SQR1}
5: t2 := x1 − t1 {SUB2}
6: t1 := x1 + t1 {ADD3}
7: t2 := t2 · t1 {MULT4}
8: t2 := 3 · t2 {MULT5_ADD}
9: t4 := 2 · y1 {MULT6_ADD}
10: z2 := t4 · z1 {MULT7}
11: t4 := t24 {SQR8}
12: t3 := y3 · x1 {MULT9}
13: t4 := t24 {SQR10}
14: t4 := t4 ÷ 2 {DIV11}
15: t4 := t22 {SQR12}
16: t1 := 2 · t3 {MULT13_ADD}
17: x2 := x2 − t1 {SUB14}
18: t1 := t3 − x2 {SUB15}
19: t1 := t1 · t2 {MULT16}
20: y2 := t1 − t4 {SUB17}
21: return P2 = (x2, y2, z2)
The use of projective coordinates results, of course, in different algorithms for point ad-
dition and doubling. These are shown in Algorithm 3.7 and Algorithm 3.8, respectively.
For better readability the projective coordinates are not marked with ′ anymore. To
better distinguish between the operations, they are numbered serially. Multiplications
with small constants like MULT11_ADD are substituted with one or several subsequent
additions for efficiency, which is reflected by the naming scheme.
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Note that Algorithm 3.8 is intended for a special case, where theWeierstraß-coefficient
a = −3. This allows a faster doubling operations on special curves used in this work,
see Section 7.1, and does not sacrifice security. An algorithm for point doubling in the
general case may be found in [42].
3.3.3. Point multiplication
The point multiplication – also called scalar multiplication or EC multiplication – is a
repetitive addition of a point onto itself. Thus, the point multiplication kP with k ∈ N
is defined as
kP = P + P + . . .+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−times
.
This is similar to the (modular) exponentiation, with the difference that the expo-
nentiation uses multiplicative group operations, while the point multiplication utilizes
additive group operations. Thus, the counterpart to the “Square and Multiply” expo-
nentiation algorithm, see Algorithm 3.4, is the “Double and Add” point multiplication.
For this, all multiplications and squarings are substituted by additions and doublings,
respectively. Using the same approach all other algorithms for (modular) exponentiation
may also be utilized for point multiplication.
3.4. Pairings
Originally, pairings were used in cryptography as tool of cryptanalysts to decrease the
complexity of possible attacks. But in recent years they were also employed as foundation
of the relatively new pairing-based cryptography (PBC).
This section offers a short overview on the necessary mathematical background, which
allows a basic understanding of the scheme presented in Section 4.1.3. For more infor-
mation, see for example [13, 70].
The most common pairings in literature are the Weil pairing and the Tate pairing.
Because the implementation of latter pairing is usually more efficient, only the Tate
pairing is considered in this work.
3.4.1. General pairings
Generally, schemes of pairing-based cryptography are independent from the actual pair-
ing variant, if the pairing exhibits certain properties, see [13]. In this context a pairing
is a bilinear function
e : G1 ×G2 → G3.
G1 and G2 are additive abelian groups, whose elements have the order n, i.e., for all
P ∈ G1 it holds that nP = OG1 and for all Q ∈ G2 it holds that nQ = OG2 , where
OG1 and OG2 are the additive identity elements of the groups G1 and G2, respectively.
G3 is a multiplicative cyclic group with order n. Furthermore, the pairing satisfies two
additional properties:
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Bilinearity For all P, P ′ ∈ G1 andQ,Q′ ∈ G2 the equations e(P+P ′, Q) = e(P,Q)e(P ′, Q)
and e(P,Q+Q′) = e(P,Q)e(P,Q′) hold.
Non-degeneracy
• For all P ∈ G1, where P 6= OG1 , there exists Q ∈ G2 with e(P,Q) 6= 1.
• For all Q ∈ G2, where Q 6= OG2 , there exists P ∈ G1 with e(P,Q) 6= 1.
From the property of bilinearity follows:
• e(P,OG2) = e(OG1 , Q) = 1, because e(P,Q) = e(P +OG1 , Q) = e(P,Q)e(OG1 , Q)
• e(−P,Q) = e(P,Q)−1 = e(P,−Q), because 1 = e(OG1 , Q) = e(P + (−P ), Q) =
e(P,Q)e(−P,Q)
• e(jP,Q) = e(P,Q)j = e(P, jQ) for all j ∈ Z
3.4.2. Tate pairing
The Tate pairing is implemented using Miller’s algorithm, see [76], which is shown in
Algorithm 3.9 in a variant from [70]. It expects the points P ∈ G1 = E(GF(q)) and
Q ∈ G2 = E(GF(qk)) as input values and uses a basic “Double and Add” approach to
produce an element of the extension field G3 = GF(qk).
Algorithm 3.9 Miller’s Algorithm (according to [70])
Input: point P ∈ E(GF(q)), point Q ∈ E(GF(qk))
Output: pairing e(P,Q) ∈ GF(qk)
1: choose suitable point S ∈ E(GF(qk)) {choose S randomly or S := Q [13, page 197]}
2: Q′ := Q+ S
3: T = P
4: f := 1
5: for i := dlog2(n)e − 1 to 0 do
6: compute lines ldbl1 , ldbl2 for the doubling of T
7: T := 2T
8: compute f := f 2 l
dbl
1 (Q
′)ldbl2 (S)
ldbl1 (S)l
dbl
2 (Q
′)
9: if ni = 1 then
10: compute lines ladd1 , ladd2 for the addition T + P
11: T := T + P
12: compute f := f l
add
1 (Q
′)ladd2 (S)
ladd1 (S)l
add
2 (Q
′)
13: end if
14: end for
15: return f
ldbl1 (Q
′) denotes the evaluation of the point Q′ at the line ldbl1 . The derivation of the
necessary equation is beyond the scope of this work, but can be found in [70, 46]. The
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line equations for the doubling R = 2T with R = (xR, yR, zR) and T = (xT , yT , zT ) are
as follows.
ldbl1 (x,y) = (zRz
2
Ty − 2y2T )− (3x2T + az4T )(z2Tx− xT )
ldbl2 (x,y) = z
2
Rx− xR
The line equations for the addition R = T + P with R = (xR, yR, zR), T = (xT , yT , zT ),
and P = (xP , yP , zP ) are given as:
ldbl1 (x,y) = zR(y − yP )− (yP z3T − yT )(x− xP )
ldbl2 (x,y) = z
2
Rx− xR
For the evaluation of a point at a line, the coordinates (x,y) of the point are put into
the corresponding line equation.
Note that the result f of Algorithm 3.9 is only defined up to a multiple by an n-th
power in GF(qk). Therefore, f is raised to the power (qk − 1)/n, which eliminates all
n-th powers and provides an unique final value.
3.4.3. Variant of Tate pairing used in this work
Because the focus of this work does not lie on PBC in general, it is restricted to a
simple case taken from [13, page 204] using supersingular curves with the embedding
degree k = 2. Only such curves E(GF(q)) are considered, where q ≡ 3 mod 4 holds
and which satisfy the Weierstraß-equation of y2 = x3 + x, i.e., with the Weierstraß-
coefficients a = 1 and b = 0. Then the curve order is #E(GF(q)) = q + 1 and the
structure of the curve E(GF(q2)) over the extension field is (Z/(q + 1)Z)2, i.e., can be
expressed as extension field GF(q2) = GF(q) ∪ {i}, where i = √−1. This also means
that #E(GF(q2)) = (q + 1)2.
Finally, as described in [13] a distortion map φ : E(GF(qk)) → E(GF(qk)) may be
used to define symmetric pairings utilizing the Tate pairing. For this, φ is used to map
a point on the curve E(GF(q)) to a point on the curve E(GF(qk))1, so it can be used
as input Q in Algorithm 3.9. This allows on the one hand to use points on the curve
E(GF(q)) as both inputs. On the other hand, the distortion map restricts the pairing
to a cyclic subgroup of GF(qk). Thus, if R,S ∈ E(GF(q)), m ∈ N and S = mR, then
the following equation holds.
e(S, φ(R)) = e(mR,φ(R)) = e(R,mφ(R)) = e(R, φ(S))
The distortion map used in the work is defined as φ : (x, y) → (−x, iy), see [13, page
204].
1Note that a point on E(GF(q)) may be used as input of φ, because every point on E(GF(q)) is also
a point on E(GF(qk)), just with all dimensions except the first set to 0.
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3.4.4. Operations in the extension field
Some of the calculations in Miller’s algorithm have to be executed in the extension field,
which is strictly speaking GF(q2) = GF(q)∪{i} with i = √−1 in this work. An element
f of this extension field can be represented by f = a+ bi with a, b ∈ GF(q). Operations
between the elements f1, f2 ∈ GF(q2) of the extension field may be mapped to modular
operations in GF(q). How this is done for the different operations is explained in the
following. Note that in the following all operations between a(i) and b(i) are modular
operations in GF(q), although this is omitted for better readability.
Multiplication
The mapping of the multiplication in the extension field may be done straight forward.
With help of the Karatsuba multiplication the number of multiplications in GF(q) may
be reduced to three at the cost of an increase in additions. This is shown in the last of
the following equations.
f1 · f2 = (a1 + b1i) · (a2 + b2i)
= a1a2 + a1b2i+ a2a1i+ b1b2i
2
= (a1a2 − b1b2) + (a1b2 + a2a1)i
= (a1a2 − b1b2) + [(a1 + b1)(a2 + b2)− a1a2 − b1b2]i
Squaring
The squaring operation is provided independently from the general multiplication, be-
cause it may be realized more efficiently. The corresponding algorithm utilizing modular
operations is shown in the following. Note that the equation in the last line requires
only two modular multiplications, if the doubling is executed using an addition.
f 2 = f · f = (a+ bi) · (a+ bi)
= a2 + 2abi+ b2i2
= a2 − b2 + 2abi
= (a+ b)(a− b) + 2abi
Inversion
Because the inversion in the extension field needs one inversion in GF(q), it is compu-
tationally expensive. Therefore, it is usually used only at the end to calculate the final
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result. It may be executed with operations in GF(q) as follows.
f−1 = (a+ bi)−1
=
1
a+ bi
=
a− bi
(a+ bi)(a− bi)
=
a− bi
a2 + b2
=
a
a2 + b2
+
−b
a2 + b2
i
= a · (a2 + b2)−1 − bi · (a2 + b2)−1
Exponentiation
For the exponentiation in the extension field any algorithm used for the modular expo-
nentiation may be utilized. For this, the modular multiplication and squaring operations
have to be substituted with the corresponding operations in the extension field.
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Cryptographic aspects
In today’s telecommunication infrastructure a large amount of communication is done
via electronic and insecure channels. In this context, insecure means that the channels
are not secure from eavesdropping and that it is possible to substitute transported
data with different data. Thus, to enable secure communication, which is necessary
for many applications, e.g., business transactions, the communication protocols must
include cryptography as a building block. According to [108], security is defined by the
following properties:
Confidentiality Except for the sender and the receiver of a message, nobody should be
able to read this message. This is usually done by encrypting the message – which
is also called plaintext – into unreadable code – which is also called ciphertext –
before it is send. The receiver then decrypts the ciphertext to recover the original
message.
Authentication The receiver should be able to infer the sender of a message, i.e., it
should not be possible for an intruder to masquerade himself as somebody else.
Integrity The receiver of a message should be able to perceive any modification of the
original message. Thus, it should not be possible for an intruder to replace a
genuine message – as whole or partially – with a false message.
Non-Repudiation For the sender of a message it should not be possible to falsely dispute
that he is the sender of that message.
Although it is possible to use completely different en-/decryption algorithms for ev-
ery user pair, the common approach is to parametrize these operations with keys. This
allows all users to utilize the same cryptographic algorithms, while only users possessing
the proper keys are able to read the plaintext. Furthermore, because the cryptographic
algorithms are publicly known, they may be extensively examined for possible vulnera-
bilities.
In the so called secret key or symmetric cryptography both sender and receiver must
possess the same key. However, because nobody else must know this key, a problem for
the initial key exchange between both parties arises. As they do not yet have a common
key, they can not communicate confidentially. Thus, the key has to be established using
a different communication channel, e.g., a personal meeting.
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To solve this key exchange problem, public key or asymmetric cryptography was in-
troduced. In this approach every user possesses a key pair consisting of a public key
and a private key. The public key can only be utilized to encrypt a message, while an
encrypted message can only be decrypted using the private key. Therefore, the public
key may be known to anybody, as it can not be used to decrypt the ciphertext. The
private key, however, must be kept confidential by the owner of the key pair.
Public key cryptography may also be utilized to ensure the additional properties au-
thentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. For this, the sender may utilize his private
key to sign a message. Then, the receiver may verify the signature using the public
key1. Because a valid signature can only be created with the knowledge of the private
key and only the sender knows this private key, the receiver can be sure that the message
is legitimate.
Note that above descriptions are very superficial. To provide a framework withstand-
ing attacks both on a theoretical and on a practical level, additional problems have to
be solved. However, a more thorough introduction is beyond the scope of this work and
may be found in [108].
Furthermore, there are many possible realization variants for en-/decryption in both
secret and public key cryptography. For public key cryptography, this work covers only
the most common, namely, RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and the not so
well-known paring-based cryptography (PBC). These are described in more detail in the
following. Secret key cryptography is considered only as part of public key schemes. In
this context, the block cipher AES is used, which is shortly described in Section 4.4.1.
4.1. Public key cryptography
As described above, public key cryptography was introduced to solve the difficulties
arising from the exchange of keys. Although there are many proposals for public key
algorithms, they all share a basic relationship between private and public key. After the
private key is chosen – often randomly – an one-way function is used to derive the public
key from the private key. Such a function has the property that it is relatively easy to
compute in one direction, but computational infeasible in the other direction. Because
of this one-way-property, the private key may not be derived from the public key.
The first fully-fledged and still most common system is RSA. Also well-known is
ECC, which has outgrown its research phase some years ago and now gains a foothold
in industry after the introduction of several standards.
Both RSA and ECC are based on modular arithmetic. This similarity of ECC to
RSA may be one of the reasons for its success, as the well-researched background of
RSA lends some credibility to the security of ECC. Compared to RSA, ECC has the
advantage that it uses numbers with shorter bit-lengths and, therefore, its operations
are faster to calculate. However, ECC has a more complex mathematical background,
which requires the study and realization of more algorithms by the implementer.
1Note that there are algorithms allowing just en-/decryption or just signing/verifying. However, it
seems that only systems allowing both applications are used in practice.
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The third public key algorithm covered in this work is PBC, which has not yet out-
grown its research phase. Its main application are identity-based schemes, which promise
a further simplification of the key exchange problem. This is because the public key may
be derived from some unique identifier, e.g., an email-address. Thus, the public key must
not be transmitted at all. PBC is based on similar mathematical foundations as used
in ECC. Therefore, the research community hopes that it shows itself as resistant to
attacks as ECC. Furthermore, many optimizations developed for ECC may be reused in
PBC.
This was also the main reason PBC was chosen in this work as third public key
algorithm besides RSA and ECC. The hardware core calculating the modular arithmetic
may be utilized for all three approaches. Furthermore, some of the algorithms working
with modular operations are needed in all three approaches and, thus, may be reused.
Note that all three public key algorithms get their security from a complex mathe-
matical problem, which bestows the one-way function its special property. However, in
all three cases, the complexity of the problem has not yet been proven or disproven. But
because after years of cryptanalysis no solution for the respective problem is known, the
algorithms are believed to be secure.
4.1.1. RSA
Notation for RSA
p, q prime factors for RSA; large primes with equal bit-length
n RSA modulus; n = pq
e RSA public exponent; positive integer relatively prime to (p− 1)(q − 1)
d RSA private exponent; positive integer with d = e−1 mod ((p− 1)(q − 1))
M message; bit string of arbitrary length
m message representative; positive integer with m ∈ [0, n− 1]
c ciphertext; positive integer with c ∈ [0, n− 1]
s signature; positive integer with s ∈ [0, n− 1]
dp p’s CRT exponent; dp = d mod (p− 1)
dq q’s CRT exponent; dq = d mod (q − 1)
qinv q’s CRT coefficient; qinv = q−1 mod p
(n, e) public key; consists of modulus n and public exponent e
(n, d) private key; consists of modulus n and private exponent d
RSA was introduced in [96]. This work utilizes it according to the standard described in
[100]. The security of RSA stems from the integer factorization problem. Thus, although
it is easy to calculate the product of large numbers, it is computational infeasible to find
the prime factors of a large number n, which are p and q in case of RSA. The fastest
known solution for the factoring problem is the Number Field Sieve, see [82].
For the creation of a key pair, two large primes p and q with equal bit length are
randomly chosen. The product of these numbers is defined as n = pq. As depicted in
Table 7.2, typical bit-lengths for n are 1024 and longer. The public exponent e is chosen
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randomly and relatively prime to (p−1)(q−1). Then, the private exponent is calculated
such that ed ≡ 1 mod ((p− 1)(q − 1)) holds.
The public key contains the modulus2 n and the public exponent e. In a simple form,
the private key consists of the modulus n and the private modulus d. The private key
may also be given in an extended form, which allows an optimization using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem as described in Section 7.5.4. Then, it also contains the prime
factors p and q, the CRT exponents dp and dq, and the CRT coefficient qinv. Note that
in the following the private key is given in the not extended form for simplicity.
The basic operation to encrypt the plaintext m into the ciphertext c is
c = me mod n.
Since d is the multiplicative inverse of e modulo ((p−1)(q−1)), the decryption operation
may be computed by
m = cd mod n.
Because RSA is relatively old and in spite of extensive research no possibility for an
attack was found, it features a high confidence in its security. Furthermore, it is relatively
easy to understand and implement and its computation is not prohibitive expensive.
According to [57], the public exponent e may be chosen as 216 + 1 = 0x00010001
without sacrificing security. This accelerates the encryption and verification operation
without decelerating decryption and signing. Therefore, the public exponent e is also
called short exponent and the private exponent d is also called long exponent in this
work.
Although no short-cut is known for the basic en-/decryption operation, they alone
do not provide sufficient security. For example chosen-ciphertext or dictionary at-
tacks would still be possible. Therefore, the cryptographic schemes use operations like
padding, hash function, and random number generation to modify the plaintext before
encrypting it with the basic encryption operation. This way, the same plaintext is en-
crypted into different ciphertexts each time, thus, not allowing direct conclusions from
the ciphertext to the plaintext.
RSA Encryption and Decryption (RSAES-OAEP)
The RSA Encryption Scheme with Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-
OAEP) uses the OAEP encoding method to randomize the message before encryption.
This way, the actually deterministic RSA encryption is transformed into a probabilistic
one. Furthermore, OAEP makes the encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext
attacks.
The OAEP encoding operation uses the mask generation function (MGF) from [100].
Such a function takes a seed of arbitrary lengths as input and deterministically generates
a bit string of the desired length. Additionally, the MGF is pseudo-random, i.e., without
knowledge of the seed, it is infeasible to compute any portion of the output.
2Note that while n is published, p and q must stay secret.
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The encryption operation is shown in Algorithm 4.1. It encrypts the message M with
the public key (n, e). The label L is an optional input introduced in [100], which is set to
the empty string, if it is not provided. Note that RSAES-OAEP is only able to encrypt
messages with a length of up to |n| − 2hLen − 2 bytes, where |n| is the length of n in
bytes and hLen is the output length of the hash function in bytes.
Algorithm 4.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption operation (according to [100])
Input: recipient’s RSA public key (n, e), message M , optional: label L
Output: ciphertext c
1: if label L is not provided then let L be the empty string
2: lHash := Hash(L)
3: apply OAEP encoding (Figure 4.1): m := OAEPEncode(lHash,M)
4: c = me mod n
5: return c
MGF
XOR MGF
XOR
maskedDBmaskedSeed
0x00
m :=
000 . . . 01 M
random seed
lHash
0x00
DB =
Figure 4.1.: Outline of the OAEP encoding (from [100])
The decryption operation is depicted in Algorithm 4.2. It may be utilized to regain
the message M from the ciphertext c using the private key (n, d).
RSA Signature and Verification (RSASSA-PSS)
The RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix - Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-
PSS) exploits the PSS encoding method to introduce randomness into the signature
operation. For this, a number called salt is randomly chosen and used to modify the
message representative. This way, two signatures for the same message are different and
the scheme is provable secure, see [100]. The MGF needed for the PSS encoding and
verification the same as utilized in the OAEP en-/decoding.
33
Chapter 4. Cryptographic aspects
Algorithm 4.2 RSAES-OAEP decryption operation (according to [100])
Input: recipient’s RSA private key (n, d), ciphertext c, optional: label L
Output: message M
1: if label L is not provided then let L be the empty string
2: lHash := Hash(L)
3: m := cd mod n
4: apply OAEP decoding (Figure 4.2): (lHash ′,M) := OAEPDecode(m)
5: if lHash ′ = lHash then
6: return message M
7: else
8: return decryption error
9: end if
XOR
MGF XOR
MGF
0x00 maskedSeed
lHash ′ M000 . . . 01
maskedDBm =
DB ′ :=
Figure 4.2.: Outline of the OAEP decoding (from [100])
The operation for the signature generation is shown in Algorithm 4.3. Using the
private key (n, d) it generates a signature s for a message M of arbitrary length.
Algorithm 4.3 RSASSA-PSS signature operation (according to [100])
Input: signer’s RSA private key (n, d), message M
Output: signature s
1: apply PSS encoding (Figure 4.3): m := PSSEncode(M)
2: s := md mod n
3: return s
The signature verification operation is depicted in Algorithm 4.4. It calculates, whether
the signature s is valid for the message M and the public key (n, e).
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Figure 4.3.: Outline of the PSS encoding (from [100])
4.1.2. Elliptic curve cryptography
Notation for ECC
q prime number; size and modulus of the underlying finite field GF(q)
a, b coefficients of the Weierstraß equation; a, b ∈ GF(q)
G generator point generating a cyclic subgroup with order n; G ∈ E
E elliptic curve over GF(q)
#E order of the curve E
n prime divisor of #E and order of G
h cofactor to n; h = #E/n
x private key; positive integer with x ∈ [0, n− 1]
Q public key; point on E with Q = xG
M message; bit string of arbitrary length
(c, d) signature; tuple of two positive integers with c, d ∈ [0, n− 1]
(V, c, t) ciphertext; tri-tuple of point V ∈ E, bit string c, and authentication tag t
Elliptic curve cryptography was developed independently from each other in [77, 56].
It uses the additive group consisting of points on an elliptic curve as described in Sec-
tion 3.3. The security of this approach stems from the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. Thus, given the point P ∈ E(GF(q)) and an integer x ∈ [0, n − 1], it is rel-
atively easy to compute the point multiplication Q = xP . However, given the points
P,Q ∈ E(GF(q)), it is computational infeasible to find the integer x with xP = Q. The
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Algorithm 4.4 RSASSA-PSS verification operation (according to [100])
Input: signer’s RSA public key (n, e), message M , signature s to be verified
Output: “signature is valid” or “signature is invalid”
1: m := se mod n
2: apply PSS verification (Figure 4.4): result := PSSVerify(M,m)
3: if result =consistent then
4: return “signature is valid”
5: else
6: return “signature is invalid”
7: end if
best known attack is Pollard’s rho algorithm, which is described in [39]. In this work
ECC is realized according to the standard in [42, 43]. For more thorough introductions,
see [39, 13].
To utilize ECC, the communication partners have to decide on an elliptic curve on
which, in turn, the keys are defined and the operations are executed. In the following,
such a curve is defined by a parameter set written as a tuple (q, a, b, G, n, h). q is a large
prime number and modulus of the finite field GF(q). a, b are the Weierstraß-coefficients.
The generator point of the elliptic curve group is given a G = (xG, yG). The order of G
is provided as n, which should be a large prime with a size similar to q. h, finally, is the
cofactor with h = #E/n.
Note that in this work a is always set to q−3 for ECC. As mentioned in Section 3.3.2,
this allows an optimization for the elliptic curve doubling. This does not limit security
and the parameter sets used in the prototype also exhibit this property, see Section 7.1.
In spite of this, a is included in the domain parameters, because the scheme algorithms
depicted below also work for the general case.
To generate a key pair, an integer x ∈ [0, n − 1] is randomly chosen. This number is
also the private key. The public key is computed as Q = xG. In contrast to RSA, there
are no basic en-/decryption operations.
ECIES
The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme is taken from [43, 39] and may be used
to encrypt a message M . It is special in the way that it actually is a hybrid scheme
utilizing both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. The elliptic curve operations
are used to derive a temporary key, which, in turn, is used to en-/decrypt the message
with a symmetric algorithm. In this work, AES with counter-mode is exploited as this
symmetric algorithm, see Section 4.4.2.
In the algorithms for ECIES, auxiliary functions are utilized. The function MACk(·)
denotes a Message Authentication Code as described in Section 4.4.5, where k is used as
key. The functions Enck(·) and Deck(·) refer to the symmetric encryption and decryption
with the key k, respectively. KDF(·), finally, is a Key Derivation Function, which derives
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Figure 4.4.: Outline of the PSS verification (from [100])
two temporary keys3 form a bit string input. In case of ECIES, the coordinates of V
and the coordinate xT are interpreted as bit strings and concatenated to be utilized as
this input string. Internally, a MGF is exploited to compute the desired keys, see [43,
page 79]. The derived key k1 is utilized in the symmetric encryption, while the key k2
is used for the computation of the MAC.
The encryption according to the ECIES is shown in pseudo-code in Algorithm 4.5. It
encrypts a message m with the public key Q into the ciphertext (V, c, t).
Algorithm 4.5 ECIES encryption algorithm (according to [39])
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), public key Q ∈ E, message M
Output: ciphertext (V, c, t)
1: select u ∈ [1, n− 1] randomly
2: V := uG
3: T := uQ = (xT , yT ); if T = O then go to step 1
4: (k1, k2) := KDF(xT , V )
5: c := Enck1(M)
6: t := MACk2(c)
7: return (V, c, t)
Its counterpart, i.e., the decryption is shown in Algorithm 4.6. It decrypts the cipher-
text (V, c, t) with the private key x and regains the original message M .
3Actually, just one bit string is returned, which is then split into two parts interpreted as keys.
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Algorithm 4.6 ECIES decryption algorithm (according to [39])
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), private key x ∈ [0, n−1], ciphertext (V, c, t)
Output: message M
1: T = xR = (xT , yT )
2: if T = O then return reject ciphertext
3: (k1, k2) := KDF(xT , V )
4: t′ := MACk2(c)
5: if t′ 6= t then return reject ciphertext
6: M := Deck1(c)
7: return M
ECDSA
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is taken from [42] and allows the gen-
eration and verification of signatures. It is based on the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA), which operates on modular numbers. These are substituted by their elliptic
curve counterparts leading to an elliptic curve variant of DSA.
The signature operation is depicted in Algorithm 4.7 and results in a signature for
the message M , which is a tuple consisting of two integers (c, d). The operation Hash(·)
denotes a hash function as described in Section 4.4.3.
Algorithm 4.7 ECDSA signature algorithm (according to [39])
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), private key x ∈ [0, n− 1], message M
Output: signature (c, d) with c, d ∈ [0, n− 1]
1: select u ∈ [1, n− 1] randomly
2: V := uG = (xV , yV )
3: c := xV mod n; if c = 0 then go to step 1
4: f := Hash(M)
5: d := u−1 · (f + x · c) mod n; if d = 0 then go to step 1
6: return (c, d)
The verification operation is shown in Algorithm 4.8. It verifies, whether the signature
(c, d) is valid for the message M .
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Algorithm 4.8 ECDSA verification algorithm (according to [39])
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), public key Q ∈ E, signature (c, d) with
c, d ∈ [0, n− 1], message M
Output: “signature is valid” or “signature is invalid”
1: if c 6∈ [1, n− 1] or d 6∈ [1, n− 1] then
2: return “signature is invalid”
3: end if
4: f := Hash(M)
5: h := d−1 mod n
6: h1 := f · h mod n
7: h2 := c · h mod n
8: P := h1G+ h2Q = (xP , yP )
9: if P = O then
10: return “signature is invalid”
11: end if
12: c′ := xP mod n
13: if c′ = c then
14: return “signature is valid”
15: else
16: return “signature is invalid”
17: end if
4.1.3. Pairing-based cryptography
Notation for PBC
q prime number; size and modulus of GF(q); q ≡ 3 mod 4
a, b coefficients of the Weierstraß equation; a, b ∈ GF(q)
G generator point generating a subgroup with order n; G ∈ E(GF(q))
E(GF(q)) elliptic curve over GF(q)
#E(GF(q)) order of the curve E(GF(q)); #E(GF(q)) = q + 1
n prime divisor of #E(GF(q)) and order of G
h cofactor to n; h = #E(GF(q))/n
E(GF(q2)) elliptic curve over GF(q2)
#E(GF(q2)) order of the curve E(GF(q2)); #E(GF(q2)) = (q + 1)2
x private key; integer with x ∈ [0, n− 1]
Q public key; point on E(GF(q)) with Q = xG
M message; bit string of arbitrary length
S signature; point on E(GF(q))
Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) is a relatively new, but lively research area in cryp-
tography. The pairings are used to create new schemes exhibiting different advantages
compared to previous approaches. For example, the identity-based schemes promise a
simplification of the key management, as it allows to derive the key from some unique
39
Chapter 4. Cryptographic aspects
identifier like an email-address. For a survey concerning PBC schemes, see [30].
An advantage of PBC is that it does not need a completely new mathematical founda-
tion, but is partly based on the well-researched elliptic curves. Thus, the mathematical
foundation is relatively well understood, which promises a relatively high confidence in
the security of the developed schemes. Because the research on PBC is relatively new,
there exist no standards for schemes yet. Thus, the scheme realized in the prototype is
based upon the description in the research publication, see below.
In this work PBC is only intended as proof-of-concept. Thus, only a simple case
based on curves with the Weierstraß-equation y2 = x3+ x according to [13, page 203] is
considered with the security level of just 80 bit. The needed bit-lengths for the modular
operations may be deduced from the conditions in [13, page 203]. It states that for a
security level of 80 bit it must hold that n > 2160 and qk > 21024. Thus, the size of n is
similar to the size of the bit length of ECC and the size of qk is similar to the size of the
bit length of RSA. Because k = 2 in this work, q should have a bit length of 512.
BLS Short Signature Scheme
The BLS Short Signature Scheme from [16] allows short signatures compared to RSA
or ECDSA4. However, its verification routine is somewhat expensive, because it needs
two pairing computations. The security of the BLS scheme relies, similarly to the ECC
schemes, on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
Key Generation Choose a random integer x ∈ [0, n−1] as private key. Then, the public
key Q is calculated as Q = xG, where G is the generator point of the elliptic curve.
Signing Given a message M and the private key x, compute S = x · HashToPoint(M),
where HashToPoint(M) is a hash function, which hashes the message M of arbi-
trary length to a point on the elliptic curve E(GF(q)), see Section 4.4.6. This is
depicted in Algorithm 4.9.
Algorithm 4.9 BLS signature algorithm
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), private key x ∈ [0, n− 1], message M
Output: signature S ∈ E(GF(q))
1: H := HashToPoint(M)
2: S := xH
3: return S
Verification Given a message M , a signature S, and a pairing operation e(·, ·), check
whether e(S,G) = e(HashToPoint(M), Q). If both pairings return the same result,
the signature is valid, else it is invalid. The verification operation is shown in
Algorithm 4.10.
4Note that it is sufficient to store and transfer the x-coordinate of the signature S, see [16].
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Algorithm 4.10 BLS verification algorithm
Input: domain parameters (q, a, b, G, n, h), public key Q ∈ E(GF(q)), signature S ∈
E(GF(q)), message M
Output: “signature is valid” or “signature is invalid”
1: H := HashToPoint(M)
2: t1 := e(S,G)
3: t2 := e(H,Q)
4: if t1 = t2 then
5: return “signature is valid”
6: else
7: return “signature is invalid”
8: end if
4.2. Abstraction levels
Figure 4.5 shows a classification of above public key approaches into different abstraction
levels. It is taken from [60] and extended by PBC. All three considered public key systems
share properties and build upon similar operations. Thus, they may be classified into
the same abstraction levels. However, ECC and PBC share some parts not needed for
RSA. PBC, in turn, exhibits properties not present in RSA and ECC.
System
Cryptographic
Scheme
Cryptographic
Main Operation
Intermediate
Algebraic Structure
Modular
Arithmetic
RSA ECC PBC
Application Application Application
En−/Decrypt/Sign/VerifyEn−/Decrypt/Sign/VerifyEn−/Decrypt/Sign/Verify
Modular Exponentiation Point Multiplication Point Multiplication Pairing
Extension FieldElliptic Curve GroupElliptic Curve Group
Finite FieldMultiplicative Group Finite Field
Figure 4.5.: Abstraction levels for different public key algorithms
The modular arithmetic is the lowest abstraction level for all three approaches. It
contains modular operations like addition, subtraction, and multiplication, which are
then utilized by the algorithms on higher abstraction levels. For ECC and PBC the
modular arithmetic must be a finite field, i.e., in this work GF(q), where the modulus q
is a prime number. For RSA the modulus n is not a prime, but the product of the large
primes p and q, see Section 4.1.1. Thus, the modular arithmetic for RSA is not a finite
field, but just a multiplicative group.
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The second abstraction level exists only for ECC and PBC and comprises operations
in the intermediate algebraic structures. For ECC, this is just the elliptic curve group,
which offers operations to add and double points on an elliptic curve. For PBC there
also exists the extension field, thus, operations like addition or multiplication in this
field are also needed.
The next abstraction level is the cryptographic main operation. For RSA, this is
the modular exponentiation, which builds directly on the modular arithmetic using its
properties as a multiplicative group. For ECC and PBC, the point multiplication uses
the additive group properties of the elliptic curve group. The pairing, finally, is part of
this abstraction level just for PBC and uses operations of the elliptic curve group and
of the extension field.
On the fourth abstraction level a complete cryptographic scheme is formed by merging
the cryptographic main operation(s) with some cryptographic auxiliary functions like
hash function and/or random number generation. For simplicity the auxiliary functions
are not shown in Figure 4.5. On the system level, finally, the cryptographic schemes are
used for some meaningful application.
4.3. Parallelization for public key cryptography
In today’s hardware, parallelization is an important approach to improve performance,
especially because the amount of available resources still follows Moore’s law – doubling
every 18 month – but the increase in typical cycles frequencies is declining. Furthermore,
doubling the performance by doubling the resources is less power-consuming than by
doubling the cycle frequency.
In the following several parallelization techniques for public key algorithms proposed
in literature are explained. The presentation of the different approaches is structured
according to the abstraction levels introduced above. Note that the parallelization tech-
niques for different abstraction levels do not exclude each other, but an implementation
may exploit several of them, as done in this work. Another example for this may be
found in the RSA implementation from [86], which utilizes parallelization on both the
levels of the modular arithmetic and of the cryptographic main operation.
4.3.1. Parallelization on modular arithmetic level
Hardware modules for modular arithmetic are build up from elementary computational
units, which operate on bits or words. To decrease the execution time, multiple in-
stances of these units can be employed in parallel. Because the modular multiplication
is the most time consuming operation, there are many proposals to speed it up with
parallelization. Parallelizing the remaining modular operations is usually not effective,
because those are less time-critical. However, some parallel architectures for the multi-
plication also require parallelization for the other operations, e.g., buses of full bit-width,
see below. Note that the following methods do not form an exhaustive list and do not
exclude each other.
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Buses of full bit-width In general, the complexity of the multiplication is quadratic
with respect to the calculated bit-width. This may be reduced to a merely linear
complexity, if all bits are considered at once. This approach, of course, results
in a proportional increase of the required resources. An example may be found
in [93], where the systolic array used to compute a modular multiplication needs
about twice the resources, if the bit-width is doubled. Further implementations
with buses of full bit-width may be found for example in [97, 9, 87, 90].
The utilization of buses of full bit-width has as main advantage the linear speed-up,
which comes at relatively low costs, because only a small amount of control logic
has to be parallelized as well. However, this approach exhibits a certain inflexibility
regarding the bit-widths range it may compute. If the current bit-width is smaller
than the maximum, resource stay unused. The operation on larger bit-widths than
the maximum is not easily possible. The design from [26] solves these problems to
some degree by building up an RSA-core with a large bit-width from several ECC-
cores with a smaller bit-width each. This solution, however, does not completely
avoid above problems, as it still leads to unused resources, if the current bit-width
is different from the bit-width of a single ECC-core or multiples of it.
On FPGAs, where the size and structure of the memory is subject to some limita-
tions, buses of full bit-width exhibit a further drawback. To obtain a memory fea-
turing a data bus with sufficient width, several memory blocks have to be utilized
in parallel. This often results in a memory size larger than needed for the crypto-
graphic calculations. Although memory realized in the logic cell of the FPGA is
more flexible regarding its size and structure, it is usually a poor solution, because
the required logic cells are then not available for other tasks.
Pipelining Pipelining may be viewed as counterpart to buses of full bit-width, as it
also allows a trade-off between execution time and resource usage. But with this
approach the input and output buses may have a width of just one bit or one word.
Most propositions for pipelining build upon the Montgomery multiplication, which
allows two possible pipelining strategies.
• As proposed in [118], one pipeline stage is assigned to each step of the inner
loop. Because the first step is more complicated than the following steps, this
allows the stages except the first one to be kept relatively simple. However,
one usually has to employ at least as many stages as the operands have words,
because of a data feedback in the algorithm. This also results in unused
pipeline stages and, thus, unused resources, if the bit-width is smaller than
the maximum.
• [114] presents a more flexible design, which allows the utilization of an arbi-
trary number of stages and, therefore, a more fine-grained trade-off between
execution time and resource usage. This is achieved by assigning one pipeline
stage to each step of the outer loop. This keeps the data feedback within
a single stage. However, using this approach, each stage must compute all
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steps of the inner loop including the more complicated first step. Thus, all
stages have to be as complex as the first, although the additional resources
are needed only seldom.
Residue number systems Residue number systems (RNS) are a somewhat unorthodox
approach, as the values are not represented in the µ-radix representation. Rather
values are represented relative to a base consisting of several prime moduli, which
are prime to each other. If {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} is such a base, then for every a ∈
[0,M − 1], where M = ∏ni=1mi, there exists an unique representation consisting
of n smaller integers ai = a mod mi. Thus, using the abbreviation x mod mi =
〈x〉mi , an integer a may be written
a⇒ 〈a〉M = (〈a〉m1 , 〈a〉m2 , 〈a〉m3 , . . . , 〈a〉mn).
The existence of the unique mapping between both representations is ensured by
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The representation in an RNS has the advan-
tage that it is possible to calculate the addition, subtraction, and multiplication
operations on the residue level. Therefore, as depicted in following equations, these
three operations may be parallelized on up to n arithmetical units.
〈a± b〉M = (〈a1 ± b1〉m1 , 〈a2 ± b2〉m2 , 〈a3 ± b3〉m3 , . . . , 〈an ± bn〉mn)
〈a · b〉M = (〈a1 · b1〉m1 , 〈a2 · b2〉m2 , 〈a3 · b3〉m3 , . . . , 〈an · bn〉mn)
Note that these operations are implicitly calculated modulo M .
A drawback of RNS is that comparison and, therefore, division/reduction can not
be easily calculated in the RNS representation. Fortunately, this constitutes no real
disadvantage for public key algorithms, because the Montgomery multiplication
allows to substitute the reduction by a multiplication with the inverse. A detailed
description of the mathematical foundations is beyond the scope of this work,
but may be found in [4]. Furthermore, several hardware implementations for this
approach exist, see for example [20, 107].
4.3.2. Parallelization on intermediate algebraic structure level
Parallelization on this level concerns mainly point addition and doubling, but also oper-
ations in the extension field. All of these may be accelerated by executing the modular
operations they consist of in parallel. This acceleration, however, is limited by the data
dependencies within the algorithms. Note that the algorithms on this level are indepen-
dent of the bit-widths. Thus, parallelization on this level does not lead to the problems
of the modular arithmetic level, namely, resource utilization for different bit-widths and
the inflexibility concerning the bit-widths.
There exist several proposals concerning the parallelization of point addition and
doubling. This is not the case for the operations in the extension field, because, firstly,
the research area is relatively new and, secondly, these operations are relatively simple
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and straight forward. In literature, see [104, 1], the exploitation of 2 or 3 parallel
multiplier instances is usually proposed for realizations of point addition and doubling.
Beyond this number, the increased resource requirements can not be justified by the
speed-up anymore.
An interesting way of handling the point operations is proposed in [34], as it combines
point addition and doubling into a single atomic operation. The resulting algorithm
contains more modular multiplications than each point addition and doubling alone.
Therefore, more parallel modular instances may be used, while still providing a signif-
icant benefit, see [60]. Furthermore, the atomic operation consists of only 19 modular
multiplications. This is less than point addition and doubling together, which exhibit
16 and 10 modular multiplications, respectively. As reason for this is that some inter-
mediate results have to be computed only once in the atomic variant.
Finally, this abstraction level is well-suited for parallelization in realizations using
hardware supporting SIMD5, see [1, 47]. This is because this architecture may only
execute identical operations in parallel, thus, making parallelization on the level of the
modular arithmetic difficult.
4.3.3. Parallelization on cryptographic main operation level
This abstraction level contains modular exponentiation and point multiplication on the
one hand and the pairing on the other hand. This division is useful, as former two
use only their respective underlying group, i.e., the modular arithmetic and the elliptic
points, respectively. Besides this difference, both operations are very similar and may
be parallelized by analog approaches.
Using the Montgomery Powering Ladder, two parallel instances of the group operation
may by exploited, see [50]. It is depicted as modular exponentiation in Algorithm 4.11,
but may be used for the point multiplication as well, as motivated in Section 3.3.3. As
described in Chapter 7 it is used for these two operations in this work.
If precomputation may be exploited, [65] proposes a very effective approach reducing
the complexity of a modular exponentiation, thus, allowing a trade-off between memory
usage and execution time. This may also be used to parallelize a modular exponentiation
or a point multiplication. For this, every parallel hardware instance is initialized with
one (or more) precomputed value(s) and calculates an intermediate result using a part
of the exponent or scalar, respectively. These intermediate results are then combined
together in a final calculation leading to the final result.
Because in most schemes the exponent or scalar, respectively, must stay secret, paral-
lelization on this level is often proposed as counter measure against side channel attacks
(SCA). The parallel execution of both group operations helps to make the computa-
tion time independent from the private key, see [50] ([45] for SIMD). In [78] the point
addition and doubling is split into pipeline stages, which allows a partly overlapping
calculation of two consecutive operations. Besides a possible speed-up, this also grants
better resistance to SCA.
5Single Instruction, Multiple Data
45
Chapter 4. Cryptographic aspects
Algorithm 4.11 Montgomery Powering Ladder (from [50])
Input: modulus m = (mn−1mn−2 . . .m0), base g < m, exponent e ≥ 1 in binary repre-
sentation with bit-length l (i.e., e = (el−1el−2 . . . e1e0))
Output: result ge mod m
1: a := 1, b := 1
2: for j = l − 1 down to 0 do
3: if ej = 0 then
4: b := a · b
5: a := a2
6: else
7: a := a · b
8: b := b2
9: end if
10: end for
11: return a
For PBC this abstraction level also includes the pairing. The most common approach
for its calculation is Miller’s algorithm, whose fundamental buildup follows the point
multiplication including several additional operations. Therefore, Miller’s algorithm may
be parallelized with the same techniques possible for the point multiplication, e.g., the
Montgomery Powering Ladder. However, parallelization does not aid resistance against
SCA, because the order of the group, which is publicly known, is utilized as “scalar” of
the algorithm.
4.3.4. Cryptographic scheme and system levels
These two abstraction levels are addressed mainly because of completeness. Paralleliza-
tion on these two levels is done only seldom, because it offers smaller improvements than
parallelization on lower levels, as the amount of control logic, which has to be paral-
lelized as well, is higher. It is still used in this work, because beyond a certain threshold
an increased parallelization on lower levels does not grant a matching acceleration. This
is described in detail in Section 6.1.
4.4. Auxiliary cryptographic functions
Within the different cryptographic schemes described in Section 4.1, the auxiliary cryp-
tographic functions symmetric en-/decryption, hash function, and Cryptographically Se-
cure Random Number Generator (CSRNG) are employed. However, their execution
time constitutes only a small part of the overall execution time of such a scheme, thus,
the resource usage of the auxiliary functions should be kept small, too. In this work,
this was done by instantiating each auxiliary function only once and sharing it between
the parallel public cryptography scheme modules.
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As motivated in Section 6.3 the algorithms for the auxiliary functions are based on
a block cipher as core operation, which further decreases their resource usage. This
allows to reuse the resources for the block cipher and makes only a relatively small
auxiliary module for each function necessary. In the following, a short introduction to
the Advanced Encryption Standard and the algorithms used to implement the auxiliary
functions is given. This also includes a Message Authentication Code and a Hash-to-
point operation, which both use the other auxiliary functions as building blocks.
4.4.1. Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), see [83], is based on the block cipher Rĳndael
from [27] and specifies it with the key-lengths 128, 192, and 256 bit and a block length
of 128 bit. The encryption operation updates an internal state in several rounds, whose
number depends on the key-length. The final state is then put out as result. Each round
consists of the four transformations SubBytes, ShiftRows,MixColumn, and AddRoundKey
in this order. SubBytes substitutes the value of each byte of the internal state with a
value gained from a look-up table called S-Box. ShiftRows rotates the four 32-bit rows,
in which the state is represented, by different amounts of bytes. MixColumns updates
each of the columns using a matrix multiplication with a predefined matrix from [83].
AddRoundKey, finally, XORes the internal state with the current round key, which is
generated based on the secret key.
The decryption contains, basically, the inverse operations executed in reverse order.
This is complicated by the fact that round keys are also needed in reverse order. There-
fore, they must be calculated in advance, thus, making the decryption operation more
costly than the encryption. In this work, however, this is taken into account by utilizing
the counter-mode encryption, which executes both encryption and decryption using the
encryption operation of the block cipher.
4.4.2. Counter-mode encryption
A block cipher alone encrypts the same plaintext always into the same ciphertext. Thus,
if an attacker knows at least some pairs of plain- and ciphertexts, he could generate a
dictionary, which could be used on other ciphertexts. Thus, usually a cryptographic
mode is utilized, in which the block cipher is embedded. As suggested in [66], this work
exploits the counter-mode to realize symmetric encryption with AES as block cipher.
The approach of the counter-mode is illustrated in Figure 4.6. At first, a sequence
of numbers is generated, beginning with a nonce6 and continued with values each time
increased by 1.
This sequence is put into the block cipher and the blocks Ci of the ciphertext are
obtained by XORing the blocks of the resulting output bit stream with the blocks Mi of
the message. Because the XOR operation is its own inversion, the decryption uses the
6The nonce is an often randomly chosen number, which makes the current en-/decryption unique.
Otherwise the same plaintext would always be encrypted into the same ciphertext. Note that
because of this, a nonce must not be reused for a different en-/decryption of the same plaintext.
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same operations with M and C exchanged. Therefore, the counter-mode exhibits a rela-
tively low resource usage, as it features a general simplicity and because the decryption
functionality of the block cipher may be omitted.
Block Block
· · ·Cipher CipherKK
M1⊕ Mn⊕
C1 Cn
nonce+ n− 1nonce
(a) Encryption
· · ·
Block Block
Cipher CipherK K
C1⊕ Cn⊕
M1 Mn
nonce nonce+ n− 1
(b) Decryption
Figure 4.6.: Illustration of en-/decryption in counter-mode
4.4.3. Hash function
A cryptographic hash function is an one-way function, which may be used to indicate the
uniqueness of a message by providing a “fingerprint”. In particular, the cryptographic
schemes for signature and verification make use of them. A general hash function H =
Hash(M) takes a bit stringM of arbitrary length as message and outputs the hash value
H of fixed length. A cryptographic hash function additionally needs to have the one-way
property, see [108], which may be expressed as follows.
• If the message M is known, the hash value H is easy to compute.
• If the hash value H is known, it is computational infeasible to compute an M with
Hash(M) = H.
• If the message M is known, it is computational infeasible to find another message
M ′ with Hash(M) = Hash(M ′).
For use in digital signature generation, collision resistance is necessary in addition to the
one-way property. Otherwise, it would be possible to find some pair of messages M and
M ′ with Hash(M) = Hash(M ′). This is known as birthday attack, because it is similar
to finding two persons with the same birthday in a given group. For finding a message
by brute-force to a given hash value H, one has to compute 2n random messages on
average. But for finding two messages with the same hash value the calculation of 2n2
random messages is sufficient on average. This, essentially, halves the effective security
bit length: If one needs 128 bits for security (probability of 1 in 2128), a hash function
with an output length of 256 bits is needed.
To implement a hash function based upon a block cipher, the Davies-Meyer method
described in [71] may be used. This is proposed in [23] employing AES. However, AES
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in its standardized form features only a block length of 128 bit, which would lead to 128
bit as output length of the hash function. This is too short, because of security reasons,
see above. Thus, in [23] the general Rĳndael block cipher7 from [27] is used, where both
key and block length were set to 256 bit.
Following [23], the input stream is divided into n blocks x1, x2, . . . , xn with a length
of 256 bit each. Subsequently, the hash value H is calculated according to
H0 = 2
256 − 1 (4.1a)
Hi = Encxi(Hi−1)⊕Hi−1, 0 < i ≤ n (4.1b)
H = Hn+1 = EncHn(Hn)⊕Hn, (4.1c)
where Enca(b) denotes the encryption of b with the key a using the block cipher.
4.4.4. Cryptographically secure random number generator
Compared to general random number generators, the output of a Cryptographically
Secure Random Number Generator (CSRNG) has to feature a higher quality. Otherwise,
attackers could guess random bits and use certain statistical approaches to reduce the
amount of possible secret keys. This may be expressed by two properties, see [108]:
1. The output of a CSRNG must look random, i.e., it must be impossible to distin-
guish it from an actual random stream.
2. The output must be unpredictable, i.e., it must be computational infeasible to
predict the next bit, even if the algorithm and the previous bits are known.
Thus, designing a new algorithm demands extensive examinations. This may be
avoided by employing a standardized algorithm for the implementation of a CSRNG.
[6] proposes a method utilizing a block cipher as core element. In this work, this was
used to implement a CSRNG based upon the AES core, which allowed to reuse these
resources.
According to [6], an important element of the RNG is its internal state, which consists
of an internal key and a value V . In each operation the state is updated, i.e., substituted
by new values. These new values and the generated random bits are computed based on
the old state using the block cipher. The state needs to be initialized and periodically
reinitialized using some seed numbers.
4.4.5. Message Authentication Code
AMessage Authentication Code (MAC) is an one-way hash function, which also depends
on a secret key. Thus, the hash value can only be verified by owners of this key. This can
be used to authenticate messages between users of a group without providing secrecy. A
simple way to implement a MAC function is to encrypt the hash-value with a symmetric
algorithm.
7Note that in this work the term AES is used, although it may be Rĳndael in a strict sense.
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In the prototype implementation for the co-processor the keyed-Hash Message Authen-
tication Code (HMAC) from [84] is used. An HMAC is a MAC, which is calculated based
on a hash function. This simplifies the creation of new MACs featuring high confidence
in their security, because of the trust in the underlying hash function. Furthermore, this
may also allow reuse of the code for the hash function.
4.4.6. Hash-to-point
The Hash-to-point operation is similar to the normal hash function, but maps a message
to a point on the elliptic curve and not to an integer value. This is needed in the
pairing-based scheme described in Section 4.1.3.
Internally, the Hash-to-point operation first uses a standard hash function to map the
message M to an integer value H := Hash(M), which is then uniquely mapped to a
point P on the elliptic curve E. This unique mapping is realized in two consecutive
steps:
1. The integerH := Hash(M) is interpreted as coordinate x′P of a point P ′ = (x′P , y′P ),
for which a suitable coordinate y′P is needed. Because the Weierstraß-equation for
the pairing-based cryptography in this work is y2 = x3 + x, this may be done by
calculating y′P =
√
H3 +H mod q. Note that this square root may not exist, in
which case a different point must be found deterministically. According to [109],
this can by done by choosing P ′ = (−H,√−H3 −H mod q) instead.
2. Although the point P ′ is on the elliptic curve E, it is not necessarily a part of
the cyclic subgroup of E used in the cryptographic computations. Therefore, P ′
is multiplied with the cofactor h resulting in a point P = hP ′, which is part of the
cyclic subgroup of E.
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The prototype implementation introduced in this work was realized on an FPGA de-
velopment board, which is described in this chapter. FPGAs contain many elementary
hardware components, whose connection can be changed allowing the “(re)programming”
of arbitrary circuitry. The Boolean logic and the registers are realized by a large amount
of basic configurable logic blocks distributed over the whole device. Today’s FPGAs
usually also provide more specialized components for tasks the basic blocks are not so
well-suited for, e.g., memory, arithmetical operations, or input/output. The connections
between the components are established using a wire-grid called routing resources.
FPGAs are useful for applications neither pure software or pure hardware solutions
are well-suited for. Compared to pure hardware implementations like ASICs1, FPGAs
are slow. However, the development of applications for FPGAs is cheaper, because their
programming and debugging is easier. Thus, FPGAs are usually used instead of ASICs
for small batch productions, where the cheaper costs per unit of ASICs can not offset
their increased development costs. Compared to pure software realizations, FPGA de-
signs are of course faster, but also more expensive to develop. Thus, FPGAs are usually
only used, if the speed of a software implementation is not sufficient. Furthermore,
FPGAs are often utilized for prototyping in the design phase of hardware solutions.
The basic design flow for the development of an FPGA realization starts with the
description in a hardware description language (HDL) like VHDL. With the help of
several software tools, this description is translated into a bit stream, which is needed
for the actual configuration of the FPGA. In the synthesis the Boolean logic is translated
into the elementary component types available on the particular FPGA platform. Then,
the step place and route maps these instantiated components to physical components of
the FPGA, i.e., it is decided, which actual existing component is used to implement a
particular Boolean function. This step also decides the routing, i.e., how the components
are connected via the routing resources. This is of special importance, because it may
not be possible to maintain the desired cycle period, if the physical placement of two
elements is too far apart. From the description produced by the place and route, the bit
stream is generated, which may be used to program the FPGA. After loading this bit
stream into the FPGA, it finally exhibits the desired functionality. For a more detailed
description, see [111, 119].
Thanks to Moore’s law, today’s FPGAs have reached a size, where it is possible to
1Application Specific Integrated Circuit
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instantiate multiple cores and the buses connecting them on the same device. Because of
their reconfigurability allowing the reuse of one physical device for different designs, FP-
GAs are a relative cheap development platform for (Multi-processor) System-on-a-Chip
((MP)SoC) designs. This is also widely exploited in the research of such architectures,
as done in this work.
5.1. XUP Virtex-II Pro Development System
The prototype implementation was realized on an XUP2 Virtex-II Pro Development
System from Digilent, Inc. This platform is an external board for the development
of applications using a Virtex-II Pro FPGA from Xilinx. The board is depicted in
Figure 5.1.
The main component of the board is of course the Virtex-II Pro FPGA, which is
described below in more detail. Besides this, the board features many components
allowing the development of a wide range of applications. For this work, only the
following components were utilized: The DDR SDRAM slot was equipped with 256
MByte of RAM and was used as off-chip memory. The communication between FPGA
and host system was executed via the RS-232 port. The USB2 port was also needed, but
only for loading the bit stream onto the FPGA and the program code for the PowerPC
into the off-chip memory.
Furthermore, the board features a 10/100 Ethernet port, a Compact Flash card slot,
an XSGA Video port, an Audio Codec, a SATA interface, and PS/2 ports for a mouse
and a keyboard. Together with standard PC Hardware, this allows for example the
use of uCLinux, which is a Linux derivative intended for smaller micro controllers, see
[2]. Finally, the board exhibits expansion connectors allowing the attachment of custom
expansion boards containing additional ports or hardware.
5.2. Virtex-II Pro FPGA
The FPGA on the XUPV2P board is a Virtex-II Pro (xc2vp30ff896-7), see [123]. It
contains as central building block 13,696 slices, which are important building blocks for
the reconfigurable logic. Furthermore, the FPGA features on-chip memory arranged as
block RAM, dedicated word multipliers, 3-state buffers, Digital Clock Managers (DCM)
easily allowing different clock domains, and fast IO-ports called RocketIO with a speed
of up to 3,125 GBit/s.
Not all of these basic components present in the FPGA were utilized in the prototype
implementation. Therefore, only the required components are described in more detail
below. On a higher abstraction level the basic components are utilized to form the
elements of a SoC architecture, which are explained subsequently.
2Xilinx University Program
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Figure 5.1.: XUP Virtex-II Pro Development System (from [122])
5.2.1. Basic components
The basic components are those components, which are native to the FPGA. Phrased
differently, they are available independently from the concrete application. Here, only
those components are explained, which are utilized in the prototype implementation.
Slice This is perhaps the most important building block of the reconfigurable logic. Each
slice consists mainly of two function generators realized as Look-up-Tables (LUT)
and two storage elements, which may be used in different ways. Furthermore, it
contains several 2:1-multiplexers (MUX) and special arithmetical logic.
Besides their basic application realizing Boolean functions, the LUTs may also be
used as distributed RAM and shift registers. If configured as distributed memory,
16 bit of storage with a data bus width of 1 bit can be stored in 1 or 2 LUTs,
respectively, depending on whether the memory should be single- or dual-ported.
However, note that distributed memory does not allow two truly independent
ports, as only one of them may be used for write access. Similarly, each LUT may
be configured as shift register with a width of 16 bit.
Each of the storage elements of a slice may be used either as register or as latch,
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respectively, with a size of 1 bit. The multiplexers may be used to interconnect
the LUTs into larger function generators or to form larger multiplexers. The
arithmetical logic allows the realization of a 2-bit full-adder in one slice3. As each
slice also contains special ports for the creation of fast carry-chains, several slices
may be configured to compose fast and wide adders.
Finally, the reconfigurable building block on the next abstraction level is the con-
figurable logic block (CLB). Each CLB consists of four slices together with two
3-state buffers, see below.
3-state buffer For the realization of on-chip buses, the FPGA contains 3-state buffers
with a width of 1 bit. Each 3-state buffer may be controlled independently, because
each features its own 3-state control port and its own input port. As described
above, a CLB contains two 3-state buffers together with four slices.
Block RAM The Virtex-II Pro features 2,448 Kbit of block RAM (BRAM) arranged in
136 blocks each with a size of 18 Kbit. Each of this blocks may be accessed via two
truly independent ports. The access ports can be configured to exhibit different
data word sizes ranging from 1 to 36 bit.
Dedicated multiplier The FPGA features 136 dedicated word multipliers. Each mul-
tiplier has two inputs with a width of 18 bit each and an output with a width
of 36 bit. Thus, it may compute the product of two signed 18-bit numbers or
of two unsigned numbers with a width of up to 17 bit each. If both inputs and
the output are connected to registers, the multipliers can be used in a pipelined
version, computing one multiplication in each clock cycle.
PowerPC core The Virtex-II Pro FPGA contains two embedded PowerPC PPC405
cores. Especially for SoC realizations, this is very advantageous, as it provides a
fast general purpose processor, which does not take up resources of the reconfig-
urable components.
Because of the dedicated word multipliers and the BRAM, which also allows memory
access on a word-basis, the prototype implementation is realized on a word-basis. This
allows the calculation of numbers with several bits in one clock cycle. Furthermore, the
arithmetical logic in the slices together with the carry-chains also allows the creation of
word adders.
5.2.2. Derived SoC architecture
The basic components of the FPGAmay be used to implement nearly every functionality.
For applications, where the FPGA plays the role of a fast computational unit mainly
executing data flow operations, e.g., utilized as digital signal processor (DSP), it is
3Note that the arithmetical logic also contains elements to improve the efficiency of multiplier imple-
mentations. This is, however, not used in this work, because the dedicated multipliers are utilized
instead.
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possible to design the circuits in VHDL and to use the conventional design flow. But as
mentioned above, today’s FPGA are large enough to realize complete (MP)SoC. For the
design of such complex systems more powerful design tools with components on higher
abstraction levels are needed.
Xilinx also provides such design tools, as described in Section 5.3. With them, it
is possible to instantiate an architecture consisting of general purpose processors, their
instruction and data storage, and additional pre-configured IP-cores like buses and in-
terfaces. It is even possible to integrate custom hardware cores into this architecture. In
the following, the two available processor types and the available bus types are described
shortly. For more details and information about other available IP-cores, consult the
documentation available on [121].
PowerPC
The Virtex-II Pro FPGA features two PowerPC PPC405 cores. These are powerful
general purpose processors also suitable for complex application requiring a full-blown
operating system. The PowerPC cores are a 64 bit architecture with a 32 bit subset and
may be clocked with up to 300 MHz.
MicroBlaze
The second type of general purpose processor available for the design of SoC is a soft-core
processor type called MicroBlaze. It is build up from the reconfigurable elements of the
FPGA and may be instantiated in customized variants providing different amounts of
computing power, e.g., with or without dedicated word multiplication. The MicroBlaze
processors support 32 bit operations and may be clocked with up to 100 MHz.
Buses
The Xilinx design environment also provides several bus types allowing the general
purpose processors to communicate with the memory, other cores, and/or each other.
These are explained in the following.
On-Chip Memory Bus The On-Chip Memory Bus (OCM) may be utilized by a Pow-
erPC core to communicate with its instruction or data memory. Each PowerPC
core possesses one port for the Data-Side On-Chip Memory Bus (DSOCM) with
a width of 32 bit and one port for the Instruction-Side On-Chip Memory Bus
(ISOCM) with a width of 64 bit.
Processor Local Bus The Processor Local Bus (PLB) is a general bus for the PowerPC
cores. Each PowerPC possesses one port to connect to a PLB, which may be used
to communicate with other IP-cores or memory attached to the PLB. The PLB
has a widths of 64 bit, which, however, is only fully exploited, if the bus is cached.
To access components attached to the PLB, the PowerPC uses memory-mapped
I/O.
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Local Memory Bus The Local Memory Bus (LMB) may be utilized by a MicroBlaze
core to communicate with its instruction or data memory. Each MicroBlaze core
possesses one port for the Instruction Local Memory Bus (ILMB) and one port
for the Data Local Memory Bus (DLMB) with a width of 32 bit each allowing to
access instruction and data storage, respectively.
Open Processor Bus The Open Processor Bus (OPB) is a general bus for the Micro-
Blaze cores. Each MicroBlaze core possesses one port to connect to an OPB and,
thus, to communicate with other IP-cores or memory attached to the OPB. The
OPB has a width of 32 bit. The access of components by the MicroBlaze is realized
with memory-mapped I/O. Communication between cores attached to a PLB and
cores connected to an OPB is possible using a PLB-OPB-bridge.
Fast Simplex Link The Fast Simplex Link (FSL) is a relative simple bus for communica-
tion between a MicroBlaze core and a custom IP-core. Each MicroBlaze possesses
up to 8 FSL ports. This is a powerful tool to realize instruction code extensions.
The communication is port-mapped and there are specific processor instructions
for the access of the FSL. Those instructions allow the MicroBlaze to write and
read 32 bit integers to and from an attached core. The communication may be
synchronous or asynchronous, facilitated by a FIFO-queue.
5.3. Design flow
Besides the hardware devices, Xilinx also provides the software tools needed for the
development of FPGA designs. The Integrated Software Environment (ISE) contains all
the tools necessary to develop a design in an HDL and, subsequently, synthesize it. The
final result is a bit stream, which can be loaded into the FPGA.
This, however, allows only the realization of systems on a basic hardware level, where
the designer is responsible for all cores and their connections. To ease this task for the
designer, he may use the Embedded Development Kit (EDK) bundle with its central suite
Xilinx Platform Studio (XPS), see [121]. It allows to easily instantiate IP-components
like cores, buses, and memory and to configure their behavior. This way, the hardware
architecture for embedded applications may be created easily. The XPS is also able to
compile software written by the designer and assign it into the appropriate instruction
and/or data storage of an instantiated general purpose processor.
The XPS does also help with the integration of custom hardware cores by providing
wizards, which create hardware descriptions for customized bus connections. This way,
the designer must only write little additional code connecting the custom core to the
customized bus interface.
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architecture for server applications
To support a server in today’s increasingly heterogeneous networks, the design of the
public key cryptographic co-processor follows two main goals.
• Because the co-processor is aimed at server-based applications, it should be primar-
ily optimized for high throughput. The latency of a single cryptographic scheme
calculation has a low priority as long as the delay is not noticeable. However, the
latency should still be decreased as long this does not restrict the throughput.
• The co-processor should support different cryptographic schemes to allow the com-
munication with a wide range of different clients. Furthermore, to be able to cope
with technology changes, it should be relatively easy to upgrade the supported
schemes.
A consequence of the goal to support different cryptographic schemes is a wide range
of possible bit-widths for the modular operations. RSA requires computations with
relatively large numbers with a lengths of up to several thousand bits, while ECC is
based on calculations with numbers of only a few hundred bits. The bit-widths for the
numbers operated on in PBC lies somewhere in between these two extremes. In the
following the bit-widths range from 160 to 3072 is used as an example, because it is
considered in the prototype implementation, see Section 7.1.
Finally, for the execution of the complete schemes some auxiliary functions like hash
function and random number generation are needed. Because the cryptographic co-
processor shall be realized as a single-chip design to reduce eavesdropping risk, these
functions have to be implemented on-chip.
6.1. Architectural decisions
The co-processor is to be geared for high throughput, while low latency of a single scheme
execution is not as important. To gain high throughput the available resources have to
be exploited as continuously as possible, i.e., the architecture should allow an execution
order, which minimizes the amount of unused resources at all times. However, although
latency is of secondary importance, it should still be decreased as long as this does
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not restrict throughput. In combination with high flexibility this leads to the following
architectural decisions.
6.1.1. HW/SW co-design
The HW/SW co-design approach allows to combine the goal of continuously used re-
sources with the goal of flexibility. Firstly, the realization of the control flow intensive
parts of the different schemes in software supports the flexibility, because software is more
suited to this task. Furthermore, the control flow intensive tasks are not time-critical,
but often have to wait for the time-critical parts to finish. Therefore, this results only
in small costs in terms of execution time, as the data flow intensive parts responsible
for the majority of the running time may still be implemented in hardware. Secondly,
unused resources are avoided, if control flow intensive parts are implemented in software.
As described in Section 4.2, RSA, ECC, and PBC all build upon similar basic func-
tions, in particular, modular arithmetic. Thus, the modular arithmetic may be supported
by a common hardware core shared by the computations of all schemes. The algorithms
on higher abstraction levels, however, are quite different. A realization of those algo-
rithms in software generally costs less than a hardware implementation, because both
programming and debugging overhead are smaller.
The implementation in software may even lead to an increased throughput: Although
there is a small increase in execution time, it allows a better resource reuse, thus, leaving
more resources for additional parallel calculation instances. This better resource reuse
stems from the fact that an implementation in software consists of a general purpose
processor and memory to store the program code. An increase in functionality may
be achieved by a memory upgrade to store the additional program code for this new
functionality. Thus, except for the increase in memory size, the resource usage stays the
same. By comparison, a pure hardware realization requires one finite state machine for
each supported scheme. However, only one of these finite state machines is running at
each point in time. The remaining state machines – thus, their resources – stay unused.
Note that for few and/or simple schemes, a pure hardware implementation variant
could be less costly, if the amount of resources needed for all state machines is less than
the amount of resources needed for the processor. However, in the prototype realization
this was not the case: One MicroBlaze processor requires about double the resources the
finite state machine for the point multiplication alone would need, which does not yet
include the functionality for EC schemes or for any RSA or PBC computation at all.
6.1.2. HW/SW partitioning
An important decision for an HW/SW co-design implementation is the so-called HW/SW
partitioning. It describes which parts are realized in hardware and which in software.
Usually, it is beneficial to execute the data flow intensive parts in hardware, because they
bear the major part of the actual calculations. Thus, they are rather time-critical and
contain less exceptions complicating the algorithm flow. In contrast, the control flow
intensive parts are usually executed in software, which is more suited to handle special
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cases in the program flow. Also, these parts of the implementation normally contain
less calculations and, therefore, do not suffer as much from the speed disadvantage of a
software realization.
This division of the different parts is also valid for the co-processor architecture de-
veloped in this work. The most data flow intensive part is the modular arithmetic on
the lowest abstraction level. The higher levels contain mainly control flow, as they
mainly control the order, in which the modular operations are executed. Therefore,
the modular operations should be realized in dedicated hardware cores, while the re-
maining algorithms from all abstraction levels above the modular arithmetic should be
implemented in software.
An exception pose the cryptographic auxiliary functions, which are not included in
the abstraction level view in Figure 4.5. They are time-critical, but only utilized during
a small part of the overall execution time of a single scheme. Thus, they must be fast
to prevent them from becoming the bottleneck. However, they should also be compact
leaving the majority of resources to the modular arithmetic, which bears the majority
of the computational work. These two properties are taken into account by sharing the
core from [61] between the different processors executing the cryptographic schemes.
This core employs a compact block cipher module as central element, which is shared
for the execution of the auxiliary functions, see Section 6.3.
The HW/SW partitioning is shown in Figure 6.1. The cores for modular arithmetic
and auxiliary functions are implemented in hardware, while the actual schemes are
executed in software together with some functionality providing input/output and main
control over the scheme executions.
6.1.3. Modular arithmetic core
The modular operations, in particular the modular multiplications, are time-critical.
Thus, the core for the modular arithmetic has to be highly efficient, while avoiding
unused resources, which would decrease throughput. The efficiency may be increased
by utilizing parallelization to speed-up the calculations. In this context, the main focus
is on the multiplication, as the remaining modular operations are much faster to begin
with. Note that in this work the computations are executed in a word-based manner,
because the FPGA as intended platform is well-suited for this. The basic contemplations
are, however, also valid for calculations on bit-basis.
Generally, the fastest implementation for the multiplication module is achieved by
optimizing it for operations of a single bit-width only. Then, however, one multiplier
instance is required for each supported bit-width and the instances for other bit-widths
than that currently needed – i.e., the resources used for them – stay unused. On FPGAs,
the reconfigurability may be utilized to load modules optimized for the needed bit-length
on demand, thus, avoiding unused resources. Unfortunately, this approach exhibits some
drawbacks. Loading a module into the FPGA takes a significant amount of time, during
which the concerned parts of the FPGA can not compute anything useful. Furthermore,
additional resources are needed for the functionality to load and access different modules.
Finally, the size of the different module designs depends on the bit-width. Thus, one
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Figure 6.1.: HW/SW partitioning
would have to find a schedule utilizing all FPGA resources at all times.
Instead, to achieve continuously used resources this work proposes to utilize a design,
which allows to calculate operations of different bit-widths using the same hardware. For
this, the common approach in literature suggests a module optimized for the maximum
bit-width, which is also able to operate on shorter bit-widths. This, however, leads
to unused resources for calculations with bit-widths smaller than the maximum. The
solution from [26] somewhat alleviates this problem by proposing a systolic array with
a bit-width suitable for RSA, which is build up from several smaller systolic arrays each
featuring a bit-width suitable for ECC. This, however, still leads to unused resources, if
the currently calculated bit-width is not a multiple of the shorter bit-length.
Pipelining according to [114] allows a more fine grained trade-off between paralleliza-
tion degree and usage of resources. It allows an arbitrary amount of pipeline stages and
the multiplication module may be optimized for shorter bit-lengths still accelerating
longer bit-lengths. As advantage of this approach the resources are utilized relatively
evenly for many different bit-lengths. Note that with this pipelining strategy the com-
puted word-count is always a multiple of the amount of stages. Therefore, different
numbers of stages lead to different trade-offs between resource usage and acceleration
for shorter and longer bit-widths. To minimize unproductive execution time, the number
of stages should be as close as possible to factors of all possible bit-lengths, thus, small
amounts of stages promise a small overhead for many different word-counts. Unfortu-
nately, this leads to a somewhat low parallelization degree, which may be compensated
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by also considering parallelization on higher abstraction levels.
6.1.4. Parallelization on higher abstraction levels
On the abstraction level above the modular arithmetic, parallel instances of the modular
multiplier may be utilized. As described in Section 4.3.3, RSA is able to exploit two
parallel modular multipliers using the Montgomery Powering Ladder. Because RSA –
in contrast to the point operations of ECC and PBC, see Section 4.3.2 – is not able to
take advantage of a third multiplier instance, only two parallel instances are instantiated
in each core for the modular operations. These two multipliers may also be utilized in
parallel for the modular exponentiation used for the modular inversion and the modular
square root, see Section 3.2.
It would also be feasible to parallelize the cryptographic main operation of ECC and
PBC, e.g., by exploiting one instance of point addition and doubling each and applying
the Montgomery Powering Ladder. However, the resources necessary for these operations
could not be exploited for RSA. Thus, this parallelization is not done in the proposed
architecture.
On the level of the cryptographic scheme, finally, parallelization is not restricted,
because there are no data dependencies between different scheme executions. Therefore,
the only limitation for the degree of parallelization on this level are the available resources
needed for the parallel cores computing the cryptographic schemes.
The concrete decisions on the number of pipeline stages and on the number of cores
for the scheme execution are left open for now. Additional pipeline stages allow faster
computation of modular multiplications and come at a relatively small price in terms of
resources. But calculations with smaller bit-widths are not able to take full advantage of
too many pipeline stages. Additional cores for the scheme execution, in contrast, double
the resource usage, but also double the execution speed for all supported bit-widths.
Thus, different trade-offs between the length of the pipelines – i.e., parallelization
degree on the lowest level – and the number of parallel scheme executions – i.e., paral-
lelization degree on the level of the cryptographic scheme – are possible. This is examined
in Chapter 8 by experimenting with different variants, which feature different pipeline
lengths and resulting numbers of parallel scheme executions.
Note that parallelization using precomputation was completely ignored, because it is
not easy to combine the concept of precomputation with the co-processor’s flexibility.
Additionally, it would have increased the required memory space, which is already in
short supply on the used FPGA.
6.1.5. Resulting co-processor architecture
Above considerations result in the proposed co-processor architecture, which is depicted
in Figure 6.2. Note that this is a simplified representation abstracting from specifics of
a realization. An illustration incorporating concrete implementation details is deferred
to Chapter 7.
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Figure 6.2.: Proposed co-processor architecture
The time-critical modular operations are executed by specialized cores for the modular
arithmetic called ModArith. They consist of two pipelined modules for modular multi-
plication and one module for the remaining modular arithmetic. This allows to execute
the multiplications in parallel to each other and in parallel to the remaining modular
arithmetic. A further parallelization of latter one is not useful, because those opera-
tions are already very fast compared to the multiplications. The arrangement of these
modules within the ModArith core together with the associated memory architecture is
explained in more detail in Section 6.2 and depicted in Figure 6.6.
Each ModArith core is assigned to and controlled by a general purpose processor
named scheme controller. These processors are responsible for the control flow of the
cryptographic schemes present on the higher abstraction levels.
The less important but still time-critical auxiliary functions, namely, symmetric en-
cryption, hash function, and random number generation are provided by an additional
core, which is shared by the scheme controllers in a time-multiplex manner. As pro-
posed in Section 6.1.2 the calculation of the auxiliary functions is based on a block
cipher module. Because the AES algorithm is utilized for this block cipher, the core for
the auxiliary functions is denoted AES core in Figure 6.2,
Communication with the host server and main control is carried out by a further
general purpose processor named central control. All cores are connected via a bus,
which allows communication between them.
Each cryptographic scheme is calculated according to the following basic execution
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order, which is also depicted in Figure 6.3:
1. The host server issues a request to compute a cryptographic scheme operation to
the co-processor, which is received by the central core. The request contains the
data to en-/decrypt or sign/verify, respectively, and the parameters for the crypto-
graphic scheme, e.g., curve parameters and key pair. Note that parameters for the
scheme and the key pair should normally already be stored in the co-processor and
only referenced to by the host system. This reduces the eavesdropping risk, because
the sensible information, i.e., the private key, does not leave the co-processor.
2. The central core, then, stores the request and dispatches its computation to a
scheme controller as soon as one is idle, i.e., not executing another scheme at the
moment.
3. Subsequently, the scheme controller starts to calculate the necessary operations
for the particular scheme using its own ModArith core (3a) and the shared AES
core (3b).
4. After the completion of the scheme execution, the scheme controller returns the
result to the central core and waits for the next command from the central core.
5. Finally, the central core returns the result received from the scheme controller to
the host server.
Bus
Central
AES
Host−
Server Core
Core
Scheme
Controller Core
ModArith
Scheme
Controller Core
ModArith
3a3
4
3b
1
5
2
...
Figure 6.3.: Basic execution order
6.2. Modular arithmetic core
This section presents a more in-depth description of the internals of the ModArith core
providing the modular arithmetic. It starts with details on the modular multipliers using
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short pipelines. This is followed by the presentation of the utilized parallel memory
architecture allowing parallel access for multiple multipliers, thus, enabling a continuous
execution. At the end, the remaining modular operation besides the multiplication are
covered.
6.2.1. Modular multiplication using short pipelines
Because of above described restrictions to parallelization, pipelining according to [114]
with only a few stages is employed for the modular multiplication. As described in
Section 4.3.1, this pipelining strategy utilizes the Montgomery multiplication and assigns
each step of its outer loop, see line 2 to 5 of Algorithm 3.5, to one stage. This allows to
use less pipelining stages than the number of words.
Figure 6.4 shows a simplified depiction of the data paths of the pipelined modular
multiplier. A variant including the realization specifics is deferred to Chapter 7. The
variable names are taken from the description in Algorithm 3.5. The main difference to
the design from [114] is the lack of a queue caching the results from the last stage until
they are needed again by the first stage. The functionality of this queue is also executed
by the memory used to store the input values.
Stage 2 Stage sStage 1Memory · · · t
b, q, tb, q, t
a, q′
b, q, t
Figure 6.4.: Basic pipeline architecture of the modular multiplication
Each stage executes one step of the outer loop of the Montgomery multiplication.
After a stage has completed its calculation, it starts the execution of another step of
the outer loop not yet executed by another stage. Thus, stage 1 computes the steps
i = 0, s, 2s, . . ., while stage 2 calculates the steps i = 1, s+1, 2s+1, . . ., where s denotes
the number of available stages.
The words of the variables b, q, t are fed into the first stage, which passes it on to
the next stage with the necessary timing delay. This is repeated by the following stages
until the values reach the last stage, which writes the words of the intermediate value t
back into the memory. The value q′ is needed by all stages for their computations, thus,
fed to them via a special input port. As the words of the value a are also needed in a
different order, they are transferred via these connections, too. Note that because of the
memory architecture, see Section 6.2.2, the utilized memory may be accessed each clock
cycle with a data-width of just one word. Thus, each execution of one step of the inner
loop in one stage takes several cycles needed to read and write the data in addition to
the actual calculations.
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6.2.2. Parallel memory architecture
Because the computation modules inside the ModArith core must be able to run in
parallel, a suitable memory architecture is required. This parallel memory architecture
for the modular arithmetic was proposed by the author in [58, 60]. It is intended for
FPGAs, scales well with the number of modular multipliers, and allows for low overhead
concerning runtime.
Constraints for the memory architecture
By deciding on an FPGA as realization platform, the designer is also restricted to the
memory types available on this FPGA. As described in Chapter 5 the Virtex-II Pro offers
two kinds of memory: Firstly, the FPGA comprises 136 blocks of dedicated RAM with
a size of 16 Kbit1 each, which is called Block RAM (BRAM). Secondly, the slices in the
FPGA may be configured as distributed memory, which allows a better customization
of size and data-width of the memory.
For the proposed co-processor the BRAM is used because of the following reasons. Two
BRAMs provide enough storage space for the necessary parameter values. Using dis-
tributed memory with an equivalent size would require 2048 slices, which would then not
be available for computations. Furthermore, this memory is needed for each ModArith
core, which makes the utilization of distributed memory even more prohibitive. Addi-
tionally, the modular multiplication exploits pipelining, which does not need buses of
full bit-width, but may be done with buses of word-width only. Thus, an especially
tailored data bus for the memory, which would make more BRAMs or the utilization of
distributed memory necessary, is not required. Finally, as noted in Section 5.2.1, dis-
tributed memory, in contrast to BRAM, does not offer two truly independent memory
ports, which are needed as described below.
After deciding on the memory type, the constraints for the memory structure have
to be examined. As described above, each ModArith core features two parallel multi-
plier modules and – parallel to the multipliers – one module for the remaining modular
arithmetic. For an even resource usage, the memory architecture must allow these mod-
ules, in particular the multipliers, to run as continuously as possible. This means that
the architecture must be able to continuously feed data into all modules. Otherwise, a
module would be stalled in its execution, because the necessary data is not available in
time.
Conventional memory architecture
The conventional solution for such a memory architecture is depicted in Figure 6.5: Every
module is equipped with input and output registers, which are fed from a single central
memory, see [9, 10]. This way, the control logic is able to write/read values into/from the
registers of one arithmetical module, while the others keep on running. The advantage of
1The size of one BRAM is actually 18 Kbit, but it is difficult to exploit the upper most bits for other
tasks besides parity bits.
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this approach is its high simplicity. However, it requires additional hardware in form of
the input and output registers containing only redundant data. Furthermore, additional
cycles are needed for copying this data, during which the concerned module is stalled.
...RAM Mult 1 Mult n ALU
Figure 6.5.: Conventional memory architecture
As example for the overhead, consider modules supporting a maximum width of 3072
bit, which is the maximum supported in this work. For the two input and the output
registers, a total of 9216 flipflops – i.e., 4608 slices – would be needed, which is about
34% of the flipflops available on the FPGA used for the prototype2. Assuming a word-
width of 32 bit, copying the input values to the registers takes at least 192 cycles and
96 cycles for copying the results back to memory.
Utilized parallel memory architecture
This work rather employs the memory architecture from [58, 60], which allows to fetch
the values directly from memory when needed. For this, each modular multiplier module
is assigned its own storage, which is connected via the first memory port of the BRAMs.
Therefore, the multiplier modules do not have to share their memory accesses with each
other and registers to store values from memory in are not required. The module for the
modular arithmetic besides the multiplication utilizes the second port of each BRAM to
access the data independently from the multiplier modules. Note that this would not be
possible using distributed memory, as it does not offer two truly independent memory
ports.
Resulting from the direct memory connection the resource usage is kept low and no
cycles are needed for copying. Instead the architecture exploits BRAMs, which are
utilized anyway to store the input values and the final results. Furthermore, because
the multiplier modules do not compete for memory access, the execution time may scale
with the number of multipliers. Thus, by adding additional modular multiplier modules,
the execution time is reduced as long as this is not prohibited by data dependencies of
the algorithms.
However, because of the direct memory connection each multiplier module can only
access its own memory block. Intermediate results needed by one multiplier, but gen-
2It is also possible to use BRAMs as registers, in which case the percentage of the resource usage is not
as high. However, the data in these registers can not be accessed as flexibly and is still redundantly
stored.
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erated by another one, have to be copied between memory blocks by the module for
the remaining modular arithmetic. Therefore, copying is needed to keep the different
memory blocks consistent. However, because the storage for temporary values does not
always have to be consistent, the amount of copying can by kept reasonably low. For
example, no copying is needed, if the result of a multiplication is used on the same
multiplier it was generated on. Furthermore, the scalability is not affected by this copy-
ing, because all memory blocks may be accessed in parallel by the modular arithmetic
performing the copying. Additionally, in the prototype implementation the algorithms
for point addition and doubling and most algorithms for the operations in the extension
field could be scheduled in a way that avoids copying except for that during modular
additions and subtractions, which already contain copying anyway. In these modular
operations, both the not-reduced and the reduced results are computed and stored into
different memory blocks in parallel and copying is required to write the correct result
over the incorrect one, see Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2, respectively.
The direct memory connection results in an increase of the amount of required BRAMs,
as each parallel multiplier features its own memory. This is, however, preferable to the
large amount of registers the conventional approach would need. Furthermore, the algo-
rithms on the next higher level become slightly more complicated as they have to employ
the modular operations in parallel and must keep the memory blocks roughly consistent.
But this increase is not very high, as the control logic for the conventional architecture
has to copy data into the proper registers and employs the operations in parallel, too.
Besides, this increase in complexity concerns mainly software, where the effects are only
minor. Note that the additional work load does usually not affect runtime, because it
may be executed in parallel to the multiplications.
Figure 6.6 shows the ModArith core, also highlighting the memory architecture in-
cluding its connections to the controlling scheme controller. The scheme controller may
read and write data into/from the two memories. Furthermore, it can issue commands
to and read out the status from the module for the remaining modular arithmetic, which
is explained in more detail in Section 6.2.3. Thus, the modular arithmetic provides an
unified interface for the processor, which, therefore, does not have to access the modular
multipliers ModMult directly. Instead, the commands to the multipliers are received by
the remaining modular arithmetic, which sends them on. The same is true in the oppo-
site direction for the status signals from the multipliers. Thus, for example, the scheme
controller may start parallel multiplications on both multipliers, then execute two mod-
ular additions in sequence using the modular arithmetic, wait for the multiplications to
finish, and continue with further operations.
Both modular multipliers are directly connected to one Memory, allowing it to read
data from it anytime. The second port of the memory is shared via the multiplexer
MUX by the modular arithmetic and the scheme controller. This is possible, because
the scheme controller does not need to – and in fact should not – access the memory
during the runtime of the modular arithmetic. This is reflected by using the Busy-signal
of the modular arithmetic to control the multiplexer.
Note that it would be possible to utilize time division multiplex access to provide the
memory with a third or even a fourth port as described in [106], thus, allowing concurrent
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Figure 6.6.: ModArith core highlighting the memory architecture
access from both the processor and the modular arithmetic. But, by disconnecting the
processor from the memory while the modular arithmetic is working the robustness is
increased.
6.2.3. Remaining modular arithmetic
The module for the remaining modular arithmetic provides the unified interface of the
modular arithmetic core to the outside world, i.e., the scheme controllers, see Section 6.4.
For this, it controls the parallel multiplier instances and, furthermore, realizes some basic
modular functions. The modular operations not contained in the modular arithmetic
module are implemented in software utilizing modular operations.
Copying
The copy operation is one of the most basic functionalities of the module for the remain-
ing modular arithmetic. It copies data from a memory block to the same or another
memory block. In particular, this is necessary to copy intermediate results between the
memories of different multipliers, because each multiplier is only able to access its own
memory.
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Comparison
The comparison operation executes an “is equal”-comparison of two different sections of
data in memory. The scheme controller may read the result, i.e., whether the contents
of both are the same or not, from the appropriate status bit.
Modular multiplication
The interface provided by the modular arithmetic module for the multiplication con-
sists of one separate opcode for each multiplier instance and one status bit indicating
whether the multiplier is currently busy or not. To allow fast restart of consecutive
multiplications on the same multiplier, it is possible to issue a multiply-command before
the corresponding multiplier is finished. Then the modular arithmetic module “goes to
sleep” and waits exclusively for this multiplier to end its execution and, then, directly
starts the new multiplication. Note that in this state the module for the remaining mod-
ular arithmetic module is not accessible. This behavior also prevents problems which
could otherwise arise from the start of a multiplication before the last one is finished.
Modular addition and subtraction
The modular addition and subtraction is realized roughly according to Algorithm 3.1
and Algorithm 3.1 from Section 3.2, respectively. Contrary to above algorithms, the not-
reduced result c = a ± b and the reduced result c = a ± b ∓ q are computed in parallel
at the same time and stored in the memories of different multipliers. The if -instruction
is then substituted by copying the correct result over the incorrect one.
Modular division by 2
The realization of the modular division by 2 is according to Algorithm 3.3 from Sec-
tion 3.2. The result is directly written to the designated memory location.
Modular inversion
The modular inversion is not implemented in the ModArith core, but on the scheme
controller using modular multiplications. It is only included here, because it is a mod-
ular operation and it is important, how those are realized. The modular inversion is
substituted by a modular exponentiation, see Section 3.2, which is rather control flow
intensive, as it does not operate on the words of the integer values directly, but rather
utilizes modular multiplications.
Modular square root
Similar to the modular inversion, the modular square root is calculated by a modular
exponentiation, see Section 3.2. Therefore, it is implemented on the scheme controller,
too, using the same approach.
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6.3. Auxiliary function core
For the complete execution of public key schemes, some cryptographic auxiliary func-
tions are required. In Section 6.1.2, it was decided to realize these functions, namely,
symmetric en-/decryption, a hash function, and a random number generator together as
a compact core. To gain this compactness the block cipher AES, see [83], is used as basis
for all three functions. By sharing a module for AES between the auxiliary functions,
they may be realized with a smaller resource usage than by implementing them inde-
pendently. By choosing an area-optimized AES-design from literature the compactness
of the auxiliary function core is further aided.
6.4. Scheme controllers
In the proposed co-processor architecture, all operations above the abstraction level
of the modular arithmetic, which are needed during a cryptographic scheme, are real-
ized in software, see Section 6.1. For this task, general purpose processors are utilized
controlling the ModArith cores. Thus, these processors realize the three middle ab-
straction levels intermediate algebraic structures, cryptographic main operation, and
cryptographic scheme in software.
As shown in Figure 6.2 each ModArith core is assigned to one general purpose pro-
cessor. Generally, however, it would be possible to utilize one processor to control two
ore more of these cores, thus, saving hardware resource. Given enough computational
power of the processor, this could be possible without a big increase in execution time,
because the processor waits most of the time anyway.
But then, the software needs to be able to support the concurrency of the hardware.
The usual solution for such problems, namely, exploiting multiple software threads,
proves prohibitive expensive, because a thread switch requires too many cycles. For
example, a thread switch on the PowerPC on the FPGA used for the prototype imple-
mentation with the supplied xil_kernel library needs more than 1000 cycles. This is too
long, because most modular operations are shorter. Thus, a customized program would
be needed, which somehow keeps track of multiple parallel command sequences. This,
in turn, would complicate the realization of the schemes in software and waste one of its
main advantages, namely, the ease of implementation and maintenance. Furthermore,
this approach does not allow truly simultaneous starts of modular operations, because
the communication via the bus takes at least a few cycles.
6.5. Central core
To handle communication with the outside world and to control all other modules, a
further general purpose processor is used as central core. Although these tasks could in
theory be distributed over the scheme controller, it is beneficial to exploit one dedicated
instance instead. Firstly, this way the outside world has one fixed communication partner
and it helps hiding implementation details. Secondly, the additional tasks for the scheme
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controllers would hinder the execution of the cryptographic schemes and lead to a certain
overhead. Thirdly, this clear division of the functionality eases implementation and
maintenance.
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Prototype implementation
This chapter describes the prototype implementation used to evaluate the feasibility of
the proposed co-processor architecture. It was realized on an XUP2P board as described
in Chapter 5. For design and synthesis the Xilinx EDK and ISE software tools were used,
both in version 9.1. Single building blocks and a prior variant of the implementation
were already published in [58, 59, 61, 95, 79].
This chapter starts by presenting the supported functionality of the prototype and by
providing an overview on its architecture. Then, the inner workings of the different cores
types are explained in more detail. Finally, the execution flow of an RSA encryption is
described as an example.
7.1. Supported functionality
The prototype implementation is restricted to common public key cryptography schemes
for RSA and ECC with security levels between 80 and 128 bit, see below. In this context
a security level of 80 bit means that the probability to find the correct key by guessing is
1/280. Table 7.1 shows the RSA and ECC schemes supported in this work. As example
for the flexibility of the architecture and its upgradeability, a PBC scheme, namely the
BLS scheme, was also implemented. However, because the PBC scheme was intended as
proof-of-concept only, the prototype supports PBC just with a security level of 80 bit.
Table 7.1.: Public key schemes realized in the prototype
Function RSA ECC PBC
Encryption/Decryption RSAES-OAEP[100] ECIES[42] −
Signing/Verification RSASSA-PSS[100] ECDSA[43] BLS[16]
Today, the recommended security level ranges from 80 bit for medium term to 128
bit for long term security, see [116, 37]1. This range of security levels was chosen for
the prototype implementation of the co-processor. An increase of the range is possible
with relatively small changes, mainly, in the ModArith cores, in the software parts, and
1Note that [63] offers more precise numbers, however, those may not be mapped as easily to the usual
standard recommendations.
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in the size of the memory2. Table 7.2 shows the respective key-lengths required by the
different cryptographic approaches to guarantee the desired security level.
Table 7.2.: Different security bit-lengths and the resulting key-length
Security Symmetric Hash Public key cryptography(bit) cryptography RSA ECC PBC
80 80 160 1024 160 160 and 512
96 96 192 1536 192 −
112 112 224 2048 224 −
128 128 256 3072 256 −
As can be seen from Table 7.2, the required bit-widths for the modular operations are
between 160 bits and 3072 bits. Thus, the hardware core for the modular arithmetic
needs to be able to support computations on integers in this range. Note that the bit-
lengths for PBC is 160 for n and 512 for q, respectively, as explained in Section 4.1.3.
For a complete scheme execution, some auxiliary functions are needed besides the
modular calculations, namely, symmetric encryption, hash function, and random number
generation. Table 7.3 shows which auxiliary functions are required in the supported
schemes.
Table 7.3.: Auxiliary functions needed for different public key schemes
Scheme Symmetric Hash Random numberencryption function generation
RSAES-OAEP − X X
RSASSA-PSS − X X
ECDSA − X X
ECIES X X X
BLS − X X
Parameters sets for ECC and PBC
In contrast to RSA, the mathematical background of ECC and PBC is more complex and
these two approaches require parameters defining valid elliptic curve. These parameters
are different to the parameters of RSA, as they are independent from the key generation
and may even be shared by several users. Because the generation of these parameter
sets describing elliptic curves is not a central topic of this work, such sets from literature
were used.
2Note that the prototype implementation is already able to compute ECC over the NIST curves P-384
and P-521, i.e., over numbers with bit-widths of 384 and 521, respectively. This was, however, not
examined further, because the equivalent bit-widths for RSA are beyond the maximum bit-width of
the prototype implementation.
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For ECC the most common coordinate system is the Jacobian projective coordinate
system, which is standardized in IEEE P1363, see [42]. This standard also contains the
necessary algorithms for ECC. In particular, the algorithm for point addition is taken
from [42], see Algorithm 3.7. The algorithm for point doubling shown in Algorithm 3.8,
however, is taken form [39]. This is because special curves with the Weierstraß-coefficient
a = −3 were used in the prototype allowing a faster doubling.
This fits well, as the parameter sets defining the elliptic curves were taken from [85],
where this optimization is suggested, too. Unfortunately, for curves with a bit-lengths
of 160 bit, [85] does not provide parameters sets. Therefore, the LiDIA-library, see [44],
was used to generate a suitable parameter set.
In contrast to ECC, PBC is still in its research phase, thus, there is not yet a stan-
dardized form. The parameter set utilized to execute the BLS scheme is taken from the
PBC Library, see [68], where this type of curve is denoted Type A curves. This and
the corresponding mathematical background are described in the PhD thesis [69] from
the same author. The concrete parameter values may be found in Appendix A. Note
that the code of the PBC Library was extremely helpful for understanding many aspects
concerning the implementation of PBC, although it was not possible to reuse it in its
original form, because of the different realization platforms.
7.2. Co-processor architecture
Figure 7.1 provides an elaborate view on the concrete architecture of the prototype
implementation of the proposed co-processor. In contrast to Figure 6.2, it also contains
realization details, e.g., the different core types for the general purpose processors or
how the instruction and data storage is arranged. Note that Figure 7.1 shows a design
variant with four parallel scheme controllers, because this was the maximum number
fitting onto the available resources. As explained below, variants with two and three
parallel scheme controllers were also tested. It would also be possible to instantiate five
or more parallel scheme controllers on a larger FPGA type featuring more reconfigurable
logic and, in particular, more on-chip memory.
For each parallel scheme execution, the co-processor comprises one modular arithmetic
core (ModArith), which is responsible for the operations on the lowest abstraction level.
The scheme controller assigned to each ModArith core is realized by a MicroBlaze pro-
cessor (MB), which is the soft-core type available on the Virtex-II Pro platform, see
Chapter 5. For the connection between a MicroBlaze processor and its ModArith core
the Fast Simplex Link (FSL) is exploited. Note that the MicroBlaze processor was uti-
lized to implement the scheme controllers, because it may be instantiated multiple times.
This way, different configurations with different numbers of parallel scheme executions
may be examined. In contrast, the exploitation of the PowerPC cores would allow a
maximum of only two schemes in parallel.
The instruction and data memories for the MicroBlaze processors (IM and DM, re-
spectively) are connected via the Local Memory Bus (LMB). They consist of BRAMs,
whose dual-ported nature allows to share a single instruction memory between two soft-
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Figure 7.1.: Detailed view on the new co-processor architecture
cores. This reduces the amount of memory blocks necessary for a single scheme con-
troller. A similar sharing is not possible for the data memory because of two reasons:
Firstly, to allow independent scheme execution in all soft-cores, each needs its own inde-
pendent data memory. Secondly, because the data memory operates as shared memory
between the scheme controllers and the central core, the second memory port is utilized
to allow access by the central core, namely the PowerPC. The size of a single instruction
memory is 64 KByte, while one data memory contains only 16 KByte. Note that for
design variants with an odd amount of parallel scheme controllers, a full instruction
memory is still needed for the last controller, although only one port is exploited while
the other one stays unused.
For the auxiliary functions needed during the scheme execution, the MicroBlaze cores
utilize the AES core. It may be accessed via the second Open Processor Bus (OPB2).
The central core of the co-processor is realized using one of the two available PowerPC
cores. Although an additional MicroBlaze processor should be fast enough to take over
the control tasks, the exploitation of a PowerPC core saves slices. The instruction and
data memory of the central core resides in the off-chipDDR-RAM, which may be accessed
via the DDR-RAM Controller connected to the Processor Local Bus (PLB). For the
communication with the Host-System, the PowerPC utilizes the UART-Interface, which
may be accessed using the first Open Processor Bus (OPB1) via the PLB-OPB-Bridge.
The communication with the soft-cores is possible by accessing their data memories.
This allows to provide them with new parameters and to send them commands.
Note that some design decisions make sense for a proof-of-concept realization only.
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Firstly, no off-chip memory should be used, as this opens additional avenues of attack.
This, however, would require additional on-chip memory or the removal of some func-
tionality. A previous version of the co-processor presented in [79], which only offers RSA
and ECC schemes does fit completely into the available on-chip memory of the exploited
Virtex-II Pro FPGA. The inclusion of PBC for the variant described in this work re-
quired more memory and made the use of the off-chip memory necessary. It would also
be possible to utilize a larger FPGA offering more on-chip memory. Secondly, the com-
munication with the host system should rather be implemented with a faster interface,
e.g., an Ethernet connection. This was, however, not done, as this connection did not
constitute a bottleneck.
7.3. Modular arithmetic core
The realization of the ModArith core follows the proposed design very tightly, see Fig-
ure 6.6. Therefore, this depiction should be used to gain an overview on the realization
of the core. The main difference is that the communication between scheme controller
and ModArith is realized with an FSL.
Using this FSL connection to its ModArith core, the associated MicroBlaze processor
may read from and write to the internal memory of the ModArith core. Furthermore,
the FSL may be utilized to issue commands the ModArith core, thus, starting modular
operations working on the values stored in the internal memory. Finally, the status, i.e.,
whether an operation is still running and the result of a comparison, may be read using
the FSL.
The communication interface between MicroBlaze processor and the ModArith core is
explained below in detail. This is followed by an overview on the memory configuration,
which is slightly different for RSA and ECC and must handle the two memory banks
belonging to the two multiplier instances. Then, the realization of the modular opera-
tions is explored, starting with the modular multiplication featuring short pipelines and
concluded by the remaining modular operations.
7.3.1. Interface of the ModArith core
The connection via the FSL allows 32 bit words to be written to and read from the
ModArith core. Thus, the interface of the ModArith core has to enable the processor to
read and write from/into the memory, to send commands, and to check the state using
just 32 bit words.
All access types to the ModArith core consist of two words transferred over the FSL.
The first word is always written by the MicroBlaze processor and initiates the access. The
second word is either written or read, depending on the type of the access. Figure 7.2(a)
shows the structure of the first word send to the ModArith core. The bits write, read,
or status, of which at most one may be set, result in the execution of the associated
operation. In that case, the content of the opcode is ignored. If none of these three bits
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is set, the access is interpreted as command for a modular operation. Then a second
word is expected, which is depicted in Figure 7.2(b).
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081624
destination source1
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rit
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(a) First command word
8 bit 11 bit 11 bit
source2
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word count modulus
(b) Second command word
Figure 7.2.: Structure of the command words for the ModArith-core
In the following the behavior of the possible access types is explained in more detail.
Read Access For this access type, the bit read has to be set. The address from which
the data is to be read is expected in bits 0 to 9 of the field source1. The bits waitA
and waitB may be set, but are ignored. The actual data word is returned in the
next read operation of the FSL. Note that bit 10 of the field source1 is ignored,
because only memory bank A may be read as described in Section 7.3.2.
Write Access For this access type, the bit write has to be set. The address to which the
data is to be written is expected in bits 0 to 9 of the field source1. The bits waitA
and waitB may be set, but are ignored. The actual data word to be written must
be send as the next write operation of the FSL. Again, bit 10 of the field source1
is ignored, because the data is written into both memory banks, see Section 7.3.2.
GetStatus For this access type, the bit status has to be set. The actual status word
is returned in the next read operation of the FSL. In case the bits waitA and/or
waitB are set, the following read operation of the FSL delays the execution of
the MicroBlaze code until the multiplier instance ModMultA and/or ModMultB,
respectively, finishes execution.
The structure of the status word returned by the ModArith core is depicted in
Figure 7.3. Bit 0 signifies, whether the modular arithmetic besides the multipliers is
currently running, see Section 7.3.4. Because the FSL should delay execution of the
MicroBlaze code until these operations are finished, it should never occur that this
bit is set. Bit 8 and bit 16 indicate, whether the modular multipliers ModMultA
and/or ModMultB, respectively, are currently running. Although waiting for the
completion of a multiplication may be realized this way using busy waiting, it is
more elegant to set the bit waitA and/or waitB and leave the actual waiting to the
FSL as described above. Bit 24, finally, contains the result of the last comparison
operation. It is set, if the numbers compared were equal and not set otherwise.
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081624
result of comparison ModMultB busy ModMultA busy ModArith busy
Figure 7.3.: Structure of the status word of the ModArith core
Command For this access type, the three bits write, read, and status must not be set.
The bits waitA and waitB may be set, but are ignored. Because the necessary pa-
rameters for a command do not fit into a single word, a subsequent write operation
to the FSL is necessary providing the ModArith core with the second command
word, see Figure 7.2(b). The fields destination, source1, source2, and modulus
have to be filled with the 11 bit addresses of the respective value in the memory
of the ModArith core. Not all of these fields are needed for all commands, which
is detailed in Table 7.4.
After the second command word is read, the opcode is forwarded to the finite state
machine actually executing the modular operations. Furthermore – except for
multiplications – the acknowledgment of the write operation to the FSL is delayed
until the issued modular operation is finished. This delay has the advantage that
the FSL is doing the actual waiting and it has not to be implemented as busy
waiting in the MicroBlaze code. The immediate acknowledgment of the write
operation in case of a multiplication enables a continuation of the MicroBlaze
code and allows to execute operations in parallel to a multiplication.
Figure 7.4 depicts the finite state machine controlling the FSL connection. The start
state is ReadOne. Note that “FSL does not accept word” means that the associated
queue is full and the ModArith core has to wait until the MicroBlaze processor reads
something from the FSL. This case is only included for robustness, as it does not occur
in practice, but the soft-core is rather waiting for the ModArith core to transfer control
back.
The different operations the ModArith core is able to execute are depicted in Table 7.4.
The first column contains the bit string to be used as opcode in the first command word,
see Figure 7.2(a). The operation associated with each bit string is provided in the second
column. An “X” in columns three to six illustrates that the address of the destination,
of first and second source, and of the modulus, respectively, is expected as parameter. If
“–” is given, the value of the respective parameter is ignored. The last column, finally,
describes the command, in particular, whether it changes the data at the destination
address of only one or both memory banks. The internal workings of the different
operations are explained in more detail in Section 7.3.3 for the multiplication and in
Section 7.3.4 for the remaining modular operations.
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Figure 7.4.: FSM for the FSL connection of the ModArith core
7.3.2. Memory configuration
As described in Section 6.2.2, the ModArith core comprises its own storage for the values
its operations work on. This storage is the memory directly assigned to the modular
multipliers. Because the prototype implementation utilizes two parallel modular multi-
pliers, the storage in the ModArith core consists of two memory banks as illustrated in
Figure 7.5(a).
As both memory banks should essentially contain the same data, only the first bank is
visible to the outside, i.e., the MicroBlaze processor. Thus, with a write access from the
soft-core the corresponding address in both banks is written. A read access, however,
returns only the content of this address in bank A. Internally, most modular operations
are able to access both memory banks. Therefore, it is possible to transfer data between
both banks for the modular multiplications, which are the only operations not able to
access both banks. In this context, it is also important that the modular addition and
subtraction write their result to the output memory location in both banks, while all
other operations change only one bank, see Section 7.3.1. For the creation of feasible
schedules, this has to be kept in mind, see Section 7.5.5.
For a feasible memory configuration, it is important that it enables all supported
schemes. Thus, Figure 7.5(b) shows the configurations for RSA and ECC/PBC. Each
memory location for RSA has a size of 3072 bit, while each location for ECC contains
only 1024 bit. Thus, 3 ECC memory locations fit into a single RSA memory location.
The naming scheme allows to use the same addresses for both cases with additional
addresses for the smaller memory areas of ECC/PBC.
The addresses DX and SX are mainly used as destination and source, respectively.
For ECC, these addresses are split into three smaller locations used to store the three
coordinates of a point. The addresses T? are used for temporary values. Note that the
temporary values T11 to T15 are only needed for the PBC scheme.
80
7.3. Modular arithmetic core
Table 7.4.: Commands supported by the ModArith core
Op- Is parameter needed?
code Command dest src1 src2 mod Function
0000 ModNop − − − − no operation
0001 reserved − − − − −
copies data from scr1 to dest0010 ModCopy X X − − changes only one memory bank
compares data of src1 and src20011 ModCmp − X X − result may be read using GetStatus
modular addition0100 ModAdd X X X X changes both memory banks
modular subtraction0100 ModSub X X X X changes both memory banks
0110 reserved − − − − −
modular division by 20111 ModDiv2 X X − X changes only one memory bank
1000-
1011 reserved − − − − −
modular multiplication on multiplier A1100 ModMultA X X X X changes only one memory bank
modular multiplication on multiplier B1100 ModMultB X X X X changes only one memory bank
1110-
1111 reserved − − − − −
7.3.3. Modular multiplication
The modular multiplication is the most critical operation of the ModArith core. Because
of the limitations to parallelization, it is to be implemented using the pipelined approach
according to [114], see Section 6.2. In contrast to [114], however, it should work in a
word-based manner exploiting the dedicated multipliers on the FPGA.
Such a word-based pipelined realization may be found in [52, 51]. But these designs
require a more customized memory access as available in the memory architecture used
in the prototype implementation. Thus, a different design was needed, which features the
desired word-based pipelining while complying to the memory interface of the ModArith
core. The resulting realization may be found in [95] and is described shortly in the
following.
As described in Section 6.2.2, the multiplier has exclusive access to the first port of
the memory in the ModArith core. This means that all values to be read and written
by the pipeline have to be transferred over this memory port. The data-width of this
port is set to 16 bit, because it is half of the word-width of the FSL. It would also be
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Figure 7.5.: Visualization of ModArith memory
possible to use a word-width of 17 bit, but then the word-borders of the multipliers and
the FSL would differ.
The connections between the memory and the pipeline stages are depicted in Fig-
ure 7.6. These connections are controlled by an FSM, which also fetches the values from
memory at the appropriate time. The register Reg in front of the first stage reduces the
longest path and, thus, decreases the minimum cycle period. Values from the register
may be fed directly into the first stage or via additional inputs directly into latter stages.
Each stage has to compute n steps of the inner loop to compute its i-th step of the
outer loop. Each step j takes five clock cycles, because five memory accesses are needed
to compute the intermediate result tj(i) := ai · bj+ui · qj+ tj+1(i−1)+ carry . The value
tj(i) denotes the j-th word of t in step i of the outer loop. Remember that n and s are
the number of words to be computed and the number of instantiated stages, respectively.
j denotes the counter required for the inner loop to calculate line 4 of Algorithm 3.5 in
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Figure 7.6.: Pipeline architecture of the modular multiplication
a word-by-word manner.
The stages after the first one could compute their results in less cycles, because they
get their input values from previous stages and not from memory. This, however, would
lead to problems with storing the results of the last stage in memory, which must be
coordinated with the read accesses. Because this has to work for all stage and word
counts, it was decided that a stage needs five cycles for the calculation of each step j.
The shift registers buffer bj and qj for ten cycles until the next stage needs them,
while tj may be directly passed on to the next stage. The ten cycles delay are required,
because the next stage needs bj and qj together with the intermediate result tj+1(i− 1),
which is calculated by the previous stage two steps of the inner loop later. As each step
of the inner loop takes five cycles, see below, the delay is ten cycles.
During the five cycles each stage executes the memory accesses listed below. Because
the structure of the stages is the same except for the last one, they do not know whether
the input values come from memory or from a previous stage. Note that the read
operation from memory actually has to be executed one cycle earlier to feed the values
into the register Reg, from where it is actually read by the stages.
1. In the first cycle the stage reads ai, if it needs it. Remember that the finite state
machine connecting the stages fetches the required ai from memory in time.
2. In the second cycle each stage reads the word bj. It is used in the multiplication
ai · bj and passed on via the shift registers to the next stage.
3. In the third cycle each stage reads the intermediate result tj+1(i− 1). This value
is added to the intermediate result the stage is calculating, which is then passed
on to the next stage.
4. In the fourth cycle the intermediate result tj(i) of the last stage is written into
memory.
5. In the fifth cycle each stage reads qj. This is needed for the multiplication ui · qj
and also passed on via the shift registers to next stage.
Note that the designated memory access is not executed in all cycles, but that this rather
represents the time slot, in which it may be done. For example each stage does read ai
only once at the beginning of its i-th step. If all stages have read their ai and are not
yet finished with their i-th step, nothing is read in the first cycle. Further note that ui
is computed together with the first result t0(i) in the first 5 cycles of each stage.
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The interior of each stages exhibits the data paths depicted in Figure 7.7 and is
controlled by its own finite state machine. Note that if the path-widths in Figure 7.7 do
not fit, the values are filled from the left with 0.
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32
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19 19
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Figure 7.7.: Data path of a single pipeline stage
The overall execution time of one modular multiplication is 5n · dn
s
e+10dn
s
e+10s− 5
clock cycles, Additionally, 3 to 5n − 2 clock cycles are required to calculate the correc-
tion in lines 6 to 8 of Algorithm 3.5, depending on how fast the comparison reaches a
conclusive result.
7.3.4. Remaining modular operations
As described in Section 6.2.3, all operations of the ModArith core – except for the
multiplication – are executed by the same finite state machine using the mathematical
algorithms introduced in Section 3.2. To provide an unified interface for all operations,
this finite state machine is responsible for controlling the modular multiplications as
well.
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The internals of the operations are presented in the following. The lengths of the
memory areas operated on must be given as word-count in the second command word,
see Figure 7.2(b), where one word has a width of 32 bit.
ModNop
This command executes no operation and changes no internal value. The state machine
stays in the waiting state and may be given another command in the next cycle.
ModCopy
This command copies the data in the memory following the address source1 to the
memory following the address destination. The copying is executed word-by-word and
only that memory bank is changed, in which destination is located.
ModCmp
This command compares the contents of the memory locations following the addresses
source1 and source2. If the contents of both memory locations are equal, the output
port cmp_result of the state machine is set to ’1’, otherwise it is set to ’0’. The value
of this port may be read out as part of the status word.
ModAdd/ModSub
The command ModAdd executes a modular addition of the contents of the memory lo-
cations source1 and source2. The data at the location modulus is used as modulus for
this operation. The result is written into the memory at the address destination in both
memory banks.
Internally, both the not-reduced and the reduced result are computed at the same
time. Former result is written into the memory location destination in memory bank A,
while latter result is written to the same address in bank B. After checking which result
is correct, this result is copied over the incorrect one. Note that this copying reuses the
parts of the state machine intended for ModCopy.
The command ModSub executes a modular subtraction of source2 from source1 using
a similar approach.
ModDiv2
This operation computes a modular division by 2 of the value at the memory location
source1 using the address modulus as modulus. For this, the state machine checks,
whether the value to be divided is odd or even. Then, either the value at the address
of the input source1 or the sum of this value and that at the address modulus is shifted
one bit to the right and, subsequently, written to the memory location destination as
result, see Algorithm 3.3.
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ModMultA/ModMultB
Essentially, these commands start the respective multiplier, if possible. For this, they
check the state of the multiplier. If the multiplier is busy, the state machine waits for
it to become idle. Then – or if it was already idle – the multiplication is started and
the state machine returns into the waiting state, thus, allowing the execution of other
operations, while the multiplier is working. This approach allows the controlling instance
to issue a multiplication while another one is still running, which leads to a minimum
idle time for the multiplier.
7.4. Auxiliary function core
For the prototype implementation in this work, the core from [61] is used to execute the
auxiliary cryptographic functions presented in Section 4.4. It provides this functionality
with a low resource usage as the following overview on other compact realizations shows.
Subsequently, the architecture of the AES core from [61] is presented.
The minimum bit-widths for the provided functions follow from Table 7.2. Thus,
the key-length for the symmetric en-/decryption must be at least 128 bit. Larger key-
lengths were also implemented, because the key-length for the block cipher must be
256 bit to allow the necessary length of the hash function. The length of an output
block of the hash function has to be at least 256 bit. For the output block-length of
the cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG), finally, there are no
critical constraints, therefore, it was set to 256 bit.
7.4.1. Overview on other realizations
Table 7.5 provides the resource usage figures of compact realizations for the auxiliary
functions from literature. Note that some tolerance is needed for the comparison of the
slice counts, because the designs were implemented on different Xilinx FPGA types.
This also concerns the size of the BRAMs, which is just 4 Kbit where marked with “*”
and 18 Kbit otherwise.
Table 7.5.: Resource usage of different AES implementations
Ref Application #slices #BRAM FPGA type
[3] AES with CCM 487 4 Spartan-3
[40] MD5/SHA-1/224/256 526 1 Virtex-II Pro
[115] RNG 307 1* Virtex-E
[94] AES (CTR-mode), Hash 823 n/a Virtex-II
[19] AES module 222 3* Spartan-II
[99] AES module 146 3 Virtex-II
[35] AES module 124 2* Spartan-II
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The design from [3] provides AES encryption with CCM-mode (Counter-Mode with
CBC-MAC). Note that the Cipher Block Chaining-mode (CBC) for the Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC) is not used in this work, thus, the AES encryption from [3]
contains functionality not present in this work. An industrial solution for a hash function
with an output bit-width of 256 (here SHA-256) geared for compactness is proposed in
[40]. A random number generator (RNG), finally, is presented in [115].
The resource costs of these three cores amount to 1320 slices and 6 BRAMs, if possible
synergies or additional overhead for buses are ignored. In contrast, the architecture from
[61], which is used in this work, centers on an AES module shared between the auxiliary
functions. Utilizing this approach, it is able to provide similar functionality using only
916 slices and 5 BRAMs.
Another example for the approach of sharing an AES module between different func-
tions may be found in [94], which offers AES encryption with counter-mode and a hash
function, see [66] and [23], respectively. The AES core utilized in this work extends this
approach by also including a CSRNG, see Section 4.4.4, and employing an AES module
optimized for area as central element. Three possible AES modules are described in
[19, 99, 35]. For the core from [61] the module from [19] was chosen. The solution from
[99] was disregarded, as it requires more memory, which is needed as instruction and
data memory in the prototype implementation. In turn, the realization from [35] was
refused, because it exhibits an about 75 times smaller throughput.
7.4.2. Architecture overview and interface
The 32 bit data path of the AES core is shown in Figure 7.8. The central element is
the AES module consisting of the key scheduler and the encrypt-unit. The dual-ported
interface memory is used to store most of the internal values and to exchange data with
the host system. Via its first port data may be fed into and read from the auxiliary
units, while the second port is attached to the bus and to the key scheduler, which has
only read access to the memory. The management of the data exchange between the
host system and the AES core is supervised by the controller, which also controls the
operations of the different hardware units.
The host system issues a command by first writing the necessary parameters into the
memory and then sending a command word to the controller. The configuration of the
memory visible from the host system is depicted in Table 7.6.
The first column displays at which address the different memory locations start, while
their length in words is given in the second column. The third column contains the
names used later on to refer to the respective memory locations. Columns four to six,
finally, indicate for which of the three functions the memory location is used.
The interface of the AES core provides the following four commands:
En-/Decrypt This command en-/decrypts the content of the memory location data.
The key, which may have a length of either 128 bit, 192 bit, or 256 bit, is expected
in the memory location key. The nonce allows to initialize the counter used in the
counter-mode encryption with an arbitrary value. Note that the host system may
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Figure 7.8.: Data path of compact AES-based architecture
only set the three most significant words, while the least significant word is always
initialized with 1 by the AES core.
If the amount of data is too big to completely fit into the available memory, the AES
core is able to perform the operation in multiple passes inspecting one fragment
of the data at a time. For this, the first fragment, which is as big as the memory
location data allows, is en-/decrypted and the internal results are kept in the AES
core until the host system provides the next fragment and orders the continuation.
The last pass, by which the final results are generated, may be indicated by a flag
in the command word.
Note that this operation is its own inverse, see Section 4.4.2. Therefore, plaintext
is converted into ciphertext and vice versa.
GenerateHash This command calculates the hash value of the content of the memory
location data. The initial value H0 = 2256 − 1 has to be written to the associated
memory location beforehand by the host system. From the same memory location
the final result may be read afterwards.
Similar to the operation En-/Decrypt, the amount of data may be split into dif-
ferent fragments, if it is too big to completely fit into the available memory.
GenerateRandom This command produces a random 256 bit number, which is provided
in the memory location result. It expects a 256 bit value of additional input in the
memory location add_input. This value may be used to additionally personalize
the random numbers or can be set to 0. The memory location internal key stores
the associated part of the internal state of the random number generator, see
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Table 7.6.: Interface memory configuration
Start Word Name Used foraddress length En-/Decrypt Hash CSRNG
0x000 464 data X X −
0x1D0 8 key X − −
0x1D8 3 nonce X − −
0x1DB 1 − − − −
0x1DC 8 seed/add_input − − X
0x1E4 4 internal key − − X
0x1E8 8 result − − X
0x1F0 8 H0/result − X −
0x1F8 8 − − − −
Section 4.4.4. The internal key must be written by the host system only during
the initialization.
Reseed This command is used to (re)initialize the CSRNG. For the initialization, the
host system writes 0 as internal key and a seed into the respective memory loca-
tions. For the reinitialization only a new seed is provided, while the internal key
is left unchanged. The reseed counter, which indicates after how many generated
random numbers a reseed is necessary, has to be handled by the host system.
A command to the AES core is issued in form of a write access to the address 0x1000.
The structure of a command word send during such a write access is depicted in Fig-
ure 7.9. Note that only the 16 most significant bits are used.
3 bit 1 bit7 bit 2 bit 3 bit
31 29 28 22 21 20 19 18 16
opcode blockcount
key
length
last
pass
processor
ID
15
unused
0
Figure 7.9.: Structure of the command word for the AES core
The field opcode denotes the command to be issued. The mapping from bit code to
command name can be found in Table 7.7. The amount of data to operate on is given
as block count in words with a width of 32 bit. The key length is provided as bit code,
which is depicted in the last column of Table 7.7. The field last pass indicates, whether
the current command is the last in a sequence working on multiple data fragments.
If the data fits into a single fragment only, last pass is set. The processor ID, finally,
identifies the processor, which issues the command. This is important, because only that
processor, which has currently acquired the AES core, is allowed to start operations.
With a read access to the address 0x1000 the host system may read out the status
of the AES core. The structure of the returned status word is depicted in Figure 7.10.
Note that only the six most significant bits are actually used.
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Table 7.7.: Commands for the AES core
Allowed Key-lengthOpcode Command key-lengths bit code
128 bit 00
000 En-/Decrypt 192 bit 10
256 bit 11
010 GenerateHash 256 bit 11
100 GenerateRandom 128 bit 00
101 Reseed 128 bit 00
3 bit
28 26
current
processor ID
25
unused
0
3 bit
31 29
status
bit code
Figure 7.10.: Structure of the status word for the AES core
The field status bit code of the status word contains the current state of the AES
core. Table 7.8 contains the mapping from bit code to meaning of the status. The
current processor ID identifies that processor, which currently has acquired the AES
core exclusively. This allows a processor to recognize, whether itself or another processor
has a lock on the AES core.
Table 7.8.: Meaning of the status values for the AES core
Value Status
0x00 idle
0x01 waiting for input data from current processor
0x02 busy
0x03 waiting for continuation by same processor
0x04 waiting for release from current processor
Algorithm 7.1 provides the general execution flow for the usage of the AES core in
pseudo-code. In line 1 to 7 the processor checks, whether the core is free and, subse-
quently, acquires it. In line 8 to 15 the processor executes the operations, if necessary
in several passes. In line 16, finally, the core is released, so it may be used by other
processors. Note that in the lines 5, 10, and 16 each time the same command word3 is
send, its concrete meaning depending on the current position in the algorithm.
3Of course, the bit last pass may be set differently, if multiple passes are required.
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Algorithm 7.1 Usage of the AES core
1: repeat
2: repeat
3: check state of the core
4: until (core is idle)
5: issue command word to core (as request)
6: check current processor ID
7: until (current processor ID = own processor ID)
8: repeat
9: write parameter/data into the memory of the core
10: issue command word to the core (as command)
11: repeat
12: check state of the core
13: until (core is waiting for continuation by same processor)
14: read result from memory of the core
15: until (no additional pass needed)
16: issue command word to core (to free core)
7.4.3. AES module
The AES module consists of the unit for the AES encryption and the unit for the key
scheduler. The AES encryption unit depicted in Figure 7.11 is designed according to the
design from [19]. However, the differences in functionality made two significant changes
necessary. Firstly, besides the key size of 128 bit, the AES core also supports key sizes
of 192 bit and 256 bit, which requires the handling of an increased number of rounds.
For the realization of the hash function a block size of 256 bit4 is required, thus, a more
fine-grained access to the folded register is introduced. Secondly, because none of the
three auxiliary functions utilizes the decryption, it is omitted, which somewhat simplifies
the data path. The folded register is a customized hardware element, which implicitly
executes the row shift operation of the AES algorithm. The element SubBytes realizes
the byte substitution by exploiting two BRAMs as look-up table.
The key scheduler unit depicted in Figure 7.12 is also designed according to [19].
Again, the differences in functionality led to some structural changes. For the additional
key length of 256 bit, the AES algorithm exhibits an anomaly in its flow, see [83]. For
this, a data path is required bypassing the XOR and the operation Rotate Word. The
shift register had to be extended to depths 5 and 7 to also handle the key-lengths of 192
bit and 256 bit, respectively. Generally, shift registers in the AES core are FIFO-like
structures with a word-widths of 32 bit, where the number of words, which may be
stored, is denoted depth. Finally, because the key schedule is – in contrast to the design
in [19] – generated concurrently, SubBytes of the encrypt unit may not be reused and
two more BRAMs are required as look-up table for the SubBytes operation of the key
4Because of this increased block size, the AES module does not conform to the AES specification in a
strict sense, but rather calculates a general Rĳndael cipher.
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7.4.4. Auxiliary unit for the counter-mode encryption
The auxiliary unit for counter-mode encryption is depicted in Figure 7.13. The nonce-
sequence to be encrypted consists of the 3-word nonce from memory concatenated with
the 32-bit value in the counter register, which is set to 1 at the beginning of each
en-/decryption. The key for the encryption is expected at the associated location in
memory.
After the current nonce value is fed into the encryption module and latter one is
working, the next 128 bit block of plain-/ciphertext is loaded into the shift register,
while its current content is XORed with the previous encryption result and, subsequently,
stored in memory. In this process, the newly generated data block is written over the
original one.
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Figure 7.13.: Auxiliary unit for counter-mode encryption
7.4.5. Auxiliary unit for the hash function
The main element of the auxiliary unit for the hash function, which is depicted in
Figure 7.14, is a shift register with a depth of 8. The hashing operation starts with
reading the 256 bit block at the memory location H0 provided by the host system into
the shift register. For each block of the data to hash, the intermediate hash value Hi is
written into this same memory location, thus, the previous value is always substituted by
the current one. At the end of the computation the final value H is computed according
to Equation (4.1c).
Shift
Register
⊕
dataFromMem
dataToMem
dataFromAES
dataToAES
Figure 7.14.: Auxiliary unit for hash function
7.4.6. Auxiliary unit for the random number generator
The auxiliary unit for the cryptographically secure random number generator (CSRNG)
is depicted in Figure 7.15. The shift register has a depth of 8 and is used to store
temporary values. The 128-bit value V , which is part of the internal state, is stored
in the value register and is increased during every update operation on the internal
state. The AES module is used with 128 bit for both the key-length and the block-
length. According to the standard from [6], this results in an output block-length of 256
bit. The standard leaves some additional implementation options. Because of the goal
of compactness, the less complicated variants were chosen. An exception is the input
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value additional_info, which is included, because this results in less exceptions in the
computational flow.
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0 . . . 0
dataFromMem
dataToMem
dataToAES
dataFromAES
Figure 7.15.: Auxiliary unit for the CSRNG
7.4.7. Performance
The performance figures for the AES core from [61] are derived from an implementation
on the XUPV2P board. Table 7.9 provides the slice counts required by the different
units of the AES core. In total, 916 slices and 5 BRAMs are needed. 1 BRAM is used
as interface memory and 4 as look-up tables in the encryption and key scheduler unit.
Note that compared to the design from [19] the AES module of the AES core is 63 slices
larger, because it needs to be able to operate on additional key and block lengths.
Table 7.9.: Resource usage for each unit
Unit #slices
Encryption unit 164
Key scheduler unit 121
Counter-mode unit 129
Hash unit 81
CSRNG unit 368
Controller 50
Bus logic 3
Sum 916
The amount of required clock cycles for the supported functions is depicted in Ta-
ble 7.10, where N denotes the number of blocks.
Table 7.11, finally, shows the throughput figures for the different functions assuming
a clock frequency of 100MHz. The performance is adequate to prevent the auxiliary
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Table 7.10.: Clock cycles needed for number of blocks N
Operation Key size Clock cycles
Counter-mode 128 bit 45 ·N
de-/encryption 192 bit 53 ·N256 bit 61 ·N
CSRNG 128 bit 188
CSRNG Reseed 128 bit 96
AES Hash 256 bit 121 · (N + 1)
functions from becoming the bottleneck for the computation of a scheme on the prototype
implementation of the co-processor.
Table 7.11.: Throughput for the different operations
Operation Key size Throughput
Counter-mode 128 bit 284.4 Mbps
de-/encryption 192 bit 241.5 Mbps256 bit 209.8 Mbps
CSRNG 128 bit 136.2 Mbps
AES Hash 256 bit 211.5 Mbps
7.5. MicroBlaze soft-cores processors
The MicroBlaze soft-core processors are utilized by the central core to compute the
cryptographic schemes and, in turn, exploit the ModArith and AES core for this. The
hardware view for the interfaces to these two cores was already illustrated above, thus,
the associated low level software, i.e., the drivers, is explained in the following.
Furthermore, this section presents details on the structure of the software for the
soft-cores. Besides the general execution flow this includes a list and description of the
supported operations and of the chosen algorithm variants for the different schemes and
their realization.
7.5.1. Driver for the ModArith core
The driver for the ModArith core encapsulates the actual access to the FSL for the
application code realizing the scheme execution. The available functions mirror closely
the available access types described in Section 7.3.1. There are, however, additional
functions performing the actual waiting for one or both multipliers to finish execution.
Note that this realization of the waiting for the completion of modular operations as
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part of the FSL significantly increases the readability and transparency of the code for
the cryptographic schemes.
ModArith_Read This function expects an address as parameter and returns the value
of the word stored at this address in memory bank A of the ModArith core, see
Section 7.3.2.
ModArith_Write This function expects an address and a 32-bit word as parameters
and writes the value of the word at the given address into the memory of the
ModArith core.
ModArith_GetStatus This function returns the status word of the ModArith core.
ModArith_Op This function expects the opcode and the addresses destination, source1,
source2, and modulus for a command to the ModArith core. It issues the command
and returns after the completion of the modular operation or immediately, if a
multiplication was started.
ModArith_Wait_A This function may be utilized to delay execution until the multi-
plier ModMultA is finished, as it does not return before this time. Internally, it
uses the command GetStatus with the bit waitA set.
ModArith_Wait_B This function may be utilized to delay execution until the multi-
plier ModMultB is finished, as it does not return before this time. Internally, it
uses the command GetStatus with the bit waitB set.
ModArith_Wait_AB This function may be utilized to delay execution until both mul-
tipliers are finished, as it does not return before this time. Internally, it uses the
command GetStatus with the bits waitA and waitB set.
7.5.2. Driver for the AES core
The software interface for the AES core provides a function for each of the four com-
mands. These use some low-level driver functions like requestCore and releaseCore
for the actual access of the AES core. Thus, the software executing the schemes does
not need to operate on the AES core directly, but via one of the following four functions,
which provide a more convenient interface.
AesCounterCrypt This function expects the data to be en-/decrypted and its length as
parameter and returns the en-/decrypted data. If the amount of data is too large
to be en-/decrypted in one pass, multiple passes are executed on the AES core as
described in Section 7.4.2.
AesHash This function expects the data to be hashed and its length as parameter
and returns the calculated hash value. If the amount of data is too large to be
hashed in one pass, multiple passes are executed on the AES core as described in
Section 7.4.2.
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AesGetRnd This function has no parameters and orders the AES core to generate a
new random number. The resulting 256-bit value may be read afterwards from
the memory location named aesRnd.
AesInitRnd This function expects the seed as parameter and (re)initializes the random
number generator as described in Section 7.4.2.
7.5.3. Software structure and interface
This section presents the coarse-grained structure of the software on the MicroBlaze
processors. Its execution starts with the initialization of the shared memory. This
is followed by a handshake with the PowerPC providing each MicroBlaze core with
its processor ID. Finally, the AES core is initialized and the soft-cores start waiting for
instructions. This waiting is realized in a busy waiting manner by the function Dispatch.
Note that a detailed description of the handshake and the inter-processor communication
between the MicroBlaze processors and the PowerPC is deferred to Section 7.7.
The function Dispatch is the central function of the scheme controllers and is re-
sponsible for receiving the instructions from the central core and for supervising their
execution. After a command is received, the associated operation is executed. When it
is completed, the final results are written into the shared memory. This is indicated to
the central core, which, in turn, acknowledges the reception. Finally, the soft-core starts
again waiting for new instructions. The commands supported by the scheme controller
are as follows.
NOP This command results in no operation. In a strict sense, it is not a command, but
a marker telling the MicroBlaze processor that no command was issued.
RSA_SET_PARAMETERS This command instructs the MicroBlaze processor to load
new RSA parameters from the shared memory area into the memory of the ModArith
core. This command must precede every RSA scheme following an ECC or PBC
operation and every RSA operation using a new parameter set.
RSA_RSASSA_SIGN This command computes the signature of an amount of data
using the previously set RSA parameters following the RSASSA standard. The
data is expected in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
RSA_RSASSA_VERIFY This command verifies a signature for an amount of data
using the previously set RSA parameters following the RSASSA standard. The
data and the associated signature are expected in the corresponding locations in
the shared memory.
RSA_RSAES_ENCRYPT This command encrypts an amount of data using the pre-
viously set RSA parameters following the RSAES standard. The data is expected
in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
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RSA_RSAES_DECRYPT This command decrypts an amount of data using the pre-
viously set RSA parameters following the RSAES standard. The data is expected
in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
ECC_SET_PARAMETERS This command instructs the soft-core to load new ECC
domain parameters from the shared memory area into the memory of the ModArith
core. It must precede every ECC scheme following an RSA or PBC operation
and every ECC operation over a new set of domain parameters. Note that this
instruction also calculates the value of the Weierstraß-coefficient a = q − 3.
ECC_KEY_GENERATE Using the current ECC domains parameters, this command
generates a new key pair as described in Section 4.1.2. For this, the scheme con-
troller creates a random number x ∈ [0, n − 1] as private key and computes the
point multiplication Q = xG as public key.
ECC_KEY_VALIDATE This command may be used to validate an ECC key. This
is done according to [39, Algorithm 4.25], however, without checking nQ = ∞,
because this is very costly computation-wise and it is not possible to import keys
from the outside in the prototype implementation.
ECC_ECDSA_SIGN This command computes the signature of an amount of data
using the previously set ECC domain parameters following the ECDSA standard.
The data is expected in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
ECC_ECDSA_VERIFY This command verifies a signature for an amount of data using
the previously set ECC domain parameters following the ECDSA standard. The
data and the associated signature are expected in the corresponding locations in
the shared memory.
ECC_ECIES_ENCRYPT This command encrypts an amount of data using the pre-
viously set ECC domain parameters following the ECIES standard. The data is
expected in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
ECC_ECIES_DECRYPT This command decrypts an amount of data using the pre-
viously set ECC domain parameters following the ECIES standard. The data is
expected in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
PBC_KEY_GENERATE Using the current PBC domain parameters, this command
generates a new key pair as described in Section 4.1.3. For this, the scheme con-
troller creates a random number x ∈ GF(q) as private key and computes the point
multiplication Q = xG as public key.
PBC_BLS_SIGN This command computes the signature of an amount of data using
the previously set PBC domain parameters according to the BLS signature gener-
ation. The data is expected in the corresponding location in the shared memory.
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PBC_BLS_VERIFY This command verifies a signature for an amount of data using the
previously set PBC domain parameters according to the BLS signature verification.
The data and the associated signature are expected in the corresponding locations
in the shared memory.
Note that there is no command PBC_SET_PARAMETERS, because the prototype
realization reuses the command ECC_SET_PARAMETERS for this task. This is pos-
sible, because PBC has nearly the same values in its parameter set: The Weierstraß-
coefficients a and b are not used, because their values are coded directly into the algo-
rithm of the pairing. Only the cofactor h is additionally needed for PBC, but just in the
software of the scheme controller, which may read it directly from the shared memory.
Thus, it was sufficient to introduce a new memory configuration layout for PBC.
The command RSA_KEY_GENERATE does not exists, because the key generation
for RSA may not be computed using the Montgomery multiplication realized in the
ModArith core. For the key generation d ≡ e−1 mod ((p−1)(q−1)) must be calculated.
However, both (p− 1) and (q− 1) are even, resulting in the modulus (p− 1)(q− 1) also
being even. For the Montgomery multiplication the modulus and R have to be relatively
prime, which is then not the case anymore.
7.5.4. Realization details for RSA
This section explains some implementation details of the important algorithms used for
RSA. This is mainly the modular exponentiation and the basic decryption operation.
Latter one exploits the optimization using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Note that
the modular exponentiation is also needed for algorithms in ECC and PBC.
Algorithm for modular exponentiation
The modular exponentiation is needed for RSA as cryptographic main operation. It
is realized using the Montgomery Powering Ladder, see Algorithm 4.11. Compared to
a simple “Square and Multiply” algorithm, it allows the exploitation of both modular
multiplier instances. For this, the parallel multiplications are mapped to the parallel
multipliers. Furthermore, the Montgomery Powering Ladder provides a better protec-
tion against side channel attacks because of its uniform execution flow. However, it is
noteworthy that in each step of the loop a copy operation of an intermediate result from
one memory bank into the other is necessary. The direction depends on whether the if-
or the else-branch is executed. The modular exponentiation is also utilized in ECC and
PBC, e.g., for modular inversion and modular square root.
Algorithm for encryption
As described in Chapter 4, the basic encryption operation for RSA consists of the simple
modular exponentiation:
m = ce mod n
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Algorithm for decryption exploiting the Chinese Remainder Theorem
The fact that the RSA modulus n is a product of the two prime numbers p and q may be
utilized to increase the efficiency of the decryption operation by exploiting the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), see Section 3.2.3. Note that this approach is not possible
for the encryption operation, because p and q must not be part of the public key.
Thus, as stated in [74] the decryption operation
c = md mod n
may be substituted by the following equations.
cp = (m mod p)
d mod (p−1) mod p
cq = (m mod q)
d mod (q−1) mod q
c = cq + ((cp − cq) · (q−1 mod p) mod p) · q
The values d mod (p − 1), d mod (q − 1), and q−1 mod p are precomputed and part
of the extended private key, see Section 4.1.1. The efficiency increase stems mainly from
the shorter exponentiations, which exhibit exponents of about half the bit-length and
also consist of modular multiplications with a modulus of about half the bit-length.
Thus, they require less multiplications, which are about a quarter as costly.
The recombination in the last step is derived from Garner’s algorithm. This algorithm,
however, requires non-modular operations, which are not provided by the ModArith
core. Fortunately, the input values of these calculations have only half the bit-length of
n. Thus, because the length of the final results does not exceed
(2
m
2 − 1) + (2m2 − 1) · (2m2 − 1) =
(2
m
2 − 1) + (2m2 · (2m2 − 1)− 2 · (2m2 − 1) + 1) =
2m − 2m2 < 2m − 1
bits in the worst case, where m is the bit-length of n, it is possible to use a Montgomery
multiplication with 2m − 1 as modulus. The R associated with this modulus is equal
to 1 making transformations to and from the Montgomery space unnecessary. However,
during the calculations before this final recombination, which are executed modulo p or
q, respectively, several transformations to and from the Montgomery space are needed.
7.5.5. Realization details for ECC
In comparison to RSA an additional abstraction level is needed for ECC, which contains
point addition and doubling. These are utilized in the point multiplication, which is the
cryptographic main operation of ECC. To exploit parallel multipliers efficiently during
the relatively complex point addition and doubling, a design space exploration was done
finding feasible schedules. Finally, the conversion back to affine coordinates requires a
modular inversion, which, however, is implemented straight forward.
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Point multiplication
For the point multiplication the prototype implementation exploits the Montgomery
Powering Ladder, see Algorithm 4.11. Although this is not as efficient as a simple
“Double and Add” algorithm, because it requires more point additions, it was still chosen,
because it exhibits an uniform execution flow and, thus, provides some protection against
side channel attacks.
Modular Inversion
The modular inversion is calculated according to Fermat’s Little Theorem, thus, it is
basically a modular exponentiation, which was explained in Section 7.5.4. Thus, both
parallel multiplier instances of each ModArith core are exploited.
Multiplier mapping for point addition and doubling
The algorithms for point addition and doubling from Section 3.3 exhibit multiple mod-
ular operations, which somehow have to be mapped to the available hardware modules
of the ModArith cores without violating any data dependencies. Thus, feasible sched-
ules have to be generated, which also keep the time small, during which the multipliers
stay unused. Because this problem is NP-hard – i.e., in general, it is not easy to find a
(nearly) optimal solution – an automated approach is utilized in this work.
For this, the high-level synthesis tool hCDM from [55, 54, 49] was utilized. By using
a genetic algorithm, this tool generates optimized realizations for embedded systems
consisting of an allocation of resources, of a binding of tasks to allocated resources, and
of a schedule deciding the execution order of the tasks. As a specialty, the optimiza-
tion of the hCDM-tool can be guided by multiple design criteria. For the prototype
implementation mainly the scheduling aspect of the hCDM-tool was used.
Figure 7.16 shows the basic work-flow of the hCDM-tool. As input the tool is given
information about tasks, resources, data dependencies, and which task may be executed
on which resource. The task graph contains the description of the tasks and their data
dependencies. The resource graph comprises the specification about the resources includ-
ing which tasks may be executed on each of them in which estimated time. Starting from
these information, a genetic algorithm is used to generate feasible allocations, bindings,
and schedules.
Genetic algorithms are heuristic search algorithms based on the theory of evolution.
They employ natural selection to incrementally increase the quality of the solutions,
which are also called individuals. As depicted in Figure 7.17, the algorithm starts with
the initialization function generating a random set of individuals called a generation.
Subsequently, each individual of this first generation is then assigned a score value by the
evaluation function according to the criteria chosen by the designer. In the next step the
selection function is used to pick individuals with high score values as foundation for the
next generation. With a low probability these solutions are then slightly modified by the
mutation function. The next generation is then created by the crossover function, which
combines the properties of two or more selected individuals to produce offspring. Finally,
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Figure 7.16.: Outline of the work-flow of the hCDM-tool
this cycle starts again with the evaluation step until a certain number of generations or
a certain score level is reached.
Genetic algorithms are well-suited to solve complex problems, as they can search
through large search spaces while avoiding local optima. For this, they rely mainly on
the quality of the solution representation and of the evaluation, crossover, and mutation
function. These are also the central parts, which have to be implemented to solve a
problem using a genetic algorithm.
In Table 7.12 the representation of a solution in hCDM is depicted. The allocation
consists of a subset of the available resources, thus, an implementation does not have to
contain all resources. The binding assigns each task to that one of the chosen resources
it is executed on. The chronological order of the tasks, finally, is stored in the schedule,
which is realized by assigning each task an unique priority.
As an example, the mutation function is depicted in the last row of Table 7.12. For
the mutation of the allocation, one resource is randomly removed. If this leads to an
allocation, which does not contain a possible resource for each task, the allocation is
repaired by randomly adding resources for the tasks in question. For the mutation of
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Figure 7.17.: Outline of a genetic algorithm
Table 7.12.: Representation of an individual
Allocation Binding Schedule
Determine set Assign a resource Assign a priorityPurpose of resources to each task to each task
(T1, R3), (T2, R1), . . ., (T1, 4), (T2, n), . . .,Example R1, R3, . . . (Tn, R5) (Tn, 1)
Mutation Remove/add Select new resource Exchange
operation resources from allocation priorities
the binding, each task is assigned a different resource out of the current allocation, if
possible. For the mutation of the schedule, the priorities of two randomly selected tasks
are exchanged.
The score values are given by the evaluation function according to the Pareto-optimal-
ity of a solution. Therefore, the score of a solution quantifies the amount of individuals
dominated by the evaluated solution. In this context, a solution dominates another one,
if it features equal or better values in all criteria. Consequently, the hCDM-tool results
in a set of Pareto-optimal individuals and the designer may choose that one, which fits
the problem best.
The hCDM-tool was used to create feasible schedules for point addition and doubling
on the ModArith core. Three resources representing the two modular multipliers and the
remaining arithmetic, timing estimates for the different modular operations, and the data
flow graphs were fed into the tool. However, possible bindings for the multiplications
were restricted to enforce the assignment of subsequent multiplications onto the same
multiplier instance. This results in the minimization of the required copying as described
in Section 6.2.2.
The algorithms for point addition and doubling utilized in the prototype implementa-
tion were presented in Section 3.3, see Algorithm 3.7 and Algorithm 3.8. The data flow
graphs derived from these algorithms are depicted in Figure 7.18(a) and Figure 7.18(b),
respectively. Note that the use of a single value at both inputs of an operation is dis-
played as parallel arrows.
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Figure 7.18.: Data flow graphs for point addition and doubling
Multiplications are indicated by the light and dark gray symbols and the color shows,
on which of the parallel multipliers the particular multiplication is calculated. This is im-
portant, as the execution of subsequent multiplications on the same instance reduces the
need for copying. For example, the multiplications SQR1 and MULT2 in Figure 7.18(a)
are executed on the multiplier ModMultA, while SQR5 is executed on the multiplier
ModMultB.
Figure 7.19 shows the schedules for point addition generated with the hCDM-tool.
Figure 7.19(a) depicts the general case, while the case z1 = 1 may be seen in Fig-
ure 7.19(b). Note that actually z1 = R is checked, because the operations are calculated
in the Montgomery space, where R is the multiplicative neutral element.
Figure 7.20 shows the corresponding schedule for point doubling.
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Figure 7.19.: Schedules for point addition executed on two multipliers
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7.5.6. Realization details for PBC
For the additional implementation of PBC besides ECC and RSA, several new functions
were needed, whose code was modeled according to that from the PBC Library, see [68].
Nearly all new functions are needed for the actual pairing, except for the hash-to-point
operation.
The functions were realized relatively straight forward starting from their description
as found in Section 3.4.4 for the operations in the extension field and Section 4.4.6
for hash-to-point. Although schedules supporting two parallel multipliers had to be
generated for each function, the major effort lay in the creation of correct code, which
required extensive debugging. This is because the functions are usually short enough to
allow finding good schedules by hand.
An exception is the point doubling operation, which had to be realized again for PBC,
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because the Weierstraß-quotients are different than in the ECC realization. As described
in Section 3.4.3 the Weierstraß-quotients were set to a = 1 and b = 0 for PBC, while a
was set to −3 for ECC. The schedule for point doubling for PBC was generated using
the same approach as for ECC using the hCDM-tool.
7.6. Central core
According to the proposed architecture, the central core is responsible for the com-
munication with the host server and the supervision of the scheme controllers. In the
prototype implementation, however, former functionality is incorporated only rudimen-
tarily. The program for the PowerPC contains only code for testing the execution of the
different schemes on the MicroBlaze processors. Because of the proof-of-concept nature
of the prototype a true two-way communication allowing the host server to issue requests
was not implemented. Instead, only the results of the tests of the scheme controllers are
send to the host system via the UART-interface.
Because of its task of testing the scheme executions, the software for the PowerPC
contains mainly two types of functions: Those for checking correctness of the calculations
and those for measuring their execution time. The remaining functions mostly provide
functionality like initialization or pretty printing. Furthermore, for the testing of the
scheme controllers the code of the central core contains the parameter sets introduced
in Section 7.1.
The correctness of the realizations of the supported schemes is tested by, subsequently,
executing the complementary operations with some test data and checking, whether the
final result is equal to the original test data. For this, the test data is encrypted or signed
and the intermediate result of this function is then decrypted or verified, respectively.
If the result of the last operation is equal to the original test data, the implementation
of the scheme works correctly. Note that for ECC and PBC a new key is generated
before each encryption and signing operation, respectively, to introduce an element of
randomness. This is not possible for RSA, as described in Section 4.1.1.
For the measurement of the execution time, each scheme is executed 2000 times with
some test data. In this case, however, it is not checked, whether the result of the
operation is correct. To gain the average execution time of a single operation, the
overall execution time is divided by 2000. Note that this value does not only contain
the raw calculation time, but also the time needed for the communication between the
cores.
7.7. Inter-processor communication
The communication between the MicroBlaze processors and the PowerPC processor is
accomplished using the shared memory. Basically, the behavior to send some information
is the same for both parties. The data acting as parameters for an instruction or as
return values is written into predetermined memory locations. To actually trigger the
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communication, a bit code signifying the type of the communication is written to another
memory location, which is repeatedly read by the receiving party in a busy waiting
manner.
Busy waiting is usually avoided, because it wastes processor cycles, which could be
used for useful computations. Instead, an interrupt approach may be used, in which the
receiving party is notified about the message by means of an interrupt. After this, the
receiver copies the data to its memory, acknowledges the reception, and continues the
execution at that point of execution, at which it was interrupted.
In the prototype implementation, this approach was not adopted, because the proces-
sor, which is busy waiting for some information, usually has nothing else to do, thus,
no cycles are wasted. This is especially true, for the MicroBlaze processors, whose only
task is the execution of scheme calculations. The PowerPC, on the other hand, has to
communicate with multiple soft-cores and the host system. However, it is significantly
faster than the soft-cores and has a significantly smaller work load. Therefore, it is
waiting most of the time. Finally, because the operations, which are required to ac-
knowledge a scheme result and to issue the next one, are relatively small and because of
the proof-of-concept nature of the prototype, it was decided to accept this small delay.
Although the PowerPC could theoretically access the complete data memories of the
MicroBlaze processors, only a part of each is utilized as shared memory. The remainder
is used as normal data memory for the soft-cores. This is accomplished by instructing
the linker to leave some area unoccupied. Thus, the code of both processor types has
complete control over it. Therefore, it is also not initialized by compiler generated code,
but this is instead performed by the MicroBlaze processors, which fill this area with 0
at start up time.
As depicted in Figure 7.21, this initialization is followed by a handshake with the
PowerPC. This handshake provides each soft core with an unique processor ID and
guarantees the PowerPC that the MicroBlaze processors have entered the busy waiting
state, thus, commands to compute cryptographic schemes may be issued.
The flow of the inter-processor communication is depicted in Figure 7.22. As part of
the initialization described above, the MicroBlaze processor sets the memory locations
COMMAND and RESULT to their neutral values. In this context, COMMAND denotes
the location, into which the PowerPC may write commands for the soft-core. RESULT
may be used by the scheme controller to send replies for the central core. After this, the
MicroBlaze processor starts busy waiting for commands from the PowerPC. In contrast,
latter one interprets the setting of the neutral values as sign that the soft-core is ready
to receive commands and starts executing its own program.
The basic flow of one scheme execution is as follows: The PowerPC writes a new
opcode distinct from NOP, see Section 7.5.3, into COMMAND. This is observed by the
MicroBlaze processor, which subsequently starts executing the desired scheme. During
this time the central core is busy waiting for the reply from the scheme controller. This
reply – either SUCCESS or ERROR – is written into RESULT by the soft-core after the
completion of the scheme. After the PowerPC receives the reply, it acknowledges it by
setting both memory locations to their neutral values and continues with its program.
The soft-core, in turn, interprets this acknowledgment as signal to start busy waiting
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Figure 7.21.: Initialization of the shared memory
for new commands again.
The memory locations COMMAND and RESULT are both part of the second memory
location of the shared memory, see Table 7.13. This location has a length of 4 bytes and
its least significant byte is used by the PowerPC as COMMAND. The most significant
nibble of this location is utilized as RESULT.
The complete configuration of the shared memory is depicted in Table 7.13. The first
location contains the processor ID, which is set during start up. The second location is
utilized for the communication between the processors, as described above. The third
location is used to transfer the domain parameters for either RSA or ECC schemes.
Debug messages from the MicroBlaze processors may be written to the fourth location.
They are read by the PowerPC, whenever is notified about their presence using a special
value in the location RETURN. Then, the PowerPC sends the message on to the host
system via the UART interface. The message to be de-/encrypted or signed/verified is
108
7.8. Example: RSA encryption
Busy Waiting:
read opcode from COMMAND
until it is not NOP
Busy Waiting:
read return value from RESULT
until it is not 0
set COMMAND to NOP
set RESULT to 0
Initialization:
set COMMAND to NOP
set RESULT to 0
wait for completion of initialization
Busy Waiting:
Acknowledge return value:
wait until return value is acknowledged
write return value into RESULT
execute operation specified in COMMAND
wite opcode into COMMAND
Central
Core
Scheme
Controller
Shared
Memory
Figure 7.22.: Visualization of the inter-processor communication
conveyed in the fifth location, accompanied by its length in the sixth location. The last
memory location is utilized for parameters/replies only needed for the particular type
of the currently given command. For example, the private key is written in here by
the PowerPC for an ECDSA sign command and the MicroBlaze returns the computed
signature in this location as well.
7.8. Example: RSA encryption
In the following, the execution of an encryption using the RSAES-OAEP scheme is
presented in more detail as an example. The other schemes are executed similarly
according to the respective scheme algorithms given in Chapter 4.
• To execute an RSA encryption, the PowerPC issues the command RSA_RSAES_-
ENCRYPT to a MicroBlaze processor by, first, writing the message M and, then,
the command into the respective locations in the shared memory, see Table 7.13.
• The function Dispatch of the MicroBlaze receives this command and first checks
the length of M . If it is too long, the result ERROR is written into the shared
memory and the MicroBlaze starts busy waiting for the acknowledgment from the
PowerPC.
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Table 7.13.: Configuration of the shared memory
Length Content
1 Byte Processor ID
4 Byte COMMAND for/RESULT from soft-core
2512 Byte Parameters for RSA or ECC
64 Byte Memory for debug messages
1024 Byte Message
4 Byte Message length
768 Byte Additional parameters/replies
• If the message M is not too long, the function RSAES_OAEP_Encryption is exe-
cuted. It is given as parameters the message M , the label L, which is the empty
bit string, the bit-width, the modulus n, and the constants R and n′ for the Mont-
gomery multiplication. Latter three values must have been set beforehand by
issuing the command RSA_SET_PARAMETERS.
• The function RSAES_OAEP_Encryption starts with creating lHash by hashing the
label L. Then the OAEP encoding is executed according to Figure 4.3:
1. The concatenated value DB = lHash||000 . . . 01||M is build up.
2. A random number seed is generated.
3. Both these values are combined using the function MGF and the XOR-operation
resulting in the message representative m.
• After the OAEP encoding is finished, the function RSAEncrypt is called with n, R,
n′, and m as parameters. It calculates the basic RSA encryption operation c = me
mod n and writes the resulting chipertext c directly into the shared memory. Note
that the public exponent e = 216+1 was set by the prior execution of the command
RSA_SET_PARAMETERS, too.
• This ends the functions RSAEncrypt and RSAES_OAEP_Encryption and the func-
tion Dispatch writes the result SUCCESS into the shared memory. Then, it starts
busy waiting for the acknowledgment from the PowerPC.
Therefore, for the PowerPC the execution of the command RSA_RSAES_ENCRYPT
results either in the response ERROR or SUCCESS. In former case, the message was too
long and could not be encrypted. In latter case, the encryption was computed and the
resulting ciphertext c may be found in the last location of the shared memory, where it
was written to by the function RSAEncrypt.
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Results
This chapter presents the results of the prototype implementation introduced in the
previous chapter. Because the architecture allows a design space with different degrees
of parallelization, i.e., different amounts of pipeline stages and scheme controllers, four
different variants were instantiated on the Virtex-II Pro FPGA. The resulting resource
and timing figures are presented below. This is followed be a comparison with designs
from literature.
Note that an earlier version of this prototype implementation was presented in [62].
However, the design variants introduced in this work exhibit an optimized modular
multiplication and an improved program for the central core leading to better timing
values and lower resource usages.
8.1. Resource usage
The proposed co-processor architecture was instantiated in four different configurations.
The resource usage figures of these configurations are depicted in Table 8.1 together with
their respective number of scheme controllers and pipeline stages.
Table 8.1.: System resource usage
Variant #Scheme #Pipeline #Logic #BRAMsname controllers stages cells
4SC2ST 4 2 26344 117
3SC3ST 3 3 24142 105
3SC4ST 3 4 23666 105
2SC6ST 2 6 21818 61
The different design variants are denoted xSCyST, where x means the number of
scheme controllers and y stands for the amount of pipeline stages. For four and three
scheme controllers the synthesis of more than two and four stages, respectively, did not
succeed. It is likely that seven or more stages would have been possible for the variant
with two scheme controllers. However, because of the fact that the number of words must
be at least the double of the stage count, this would have prohibited further bit-widths
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for ECC. The usage of six stages already prohibits the computation with a bit-width of
160 and, thus, timing values for this case were not generated.
All four design variants were operated with a clock cycle frequency of 100MHz. The
amount of slices required for each design variant is half the number of logic cell. Those
are provided in the tables instead of slices to ease the comparison in Section 8.4.
Note that the design 3SC4ST requires less resource than 3SC3ST, although it features
more stages. This is, because the synthesis process is somewhat chaotic: Small changes
may have larger consequences. Thus, a small optimization may result in a significantly
larger design. Thus, the particular resource usage relation of 3SC3ST and 3SC4ST of
this work is valid only for these concrete design variants. For the slightly less optimized
design variants from [62], 3SC4ST needs more resources than 3SC3ST.
Table 8.2 depicts the resource usage of a single ModArith core. The first column refers
to the respective design variant, which determines the number of stages. The remaining
columns contain the required amounts of logic cells, dedicated word multipliers, and
block RAMs, respectively.
Table 8.2.: Resource usage of a single ModArith core
Variant #Logic cells #Word multipliers #BRAMs
4SC2ST 3524 4 4
3SC3ST 4406 6 4
3SC4ST 5292 8 4
2SC6ST 7168 12 4
Thus, it can be seen that for 2SC6ST the ModArith cores require the majority of
the instantiated resources, while for 4SC2ST the ModArith cores take up less than
half of the used logic cells. The other design variants are somewhere between these two
extremes. Note that these values will be interesting for the comparisons later on, because
most realizations from literature only comprise a module for the modular multiplier or
modular arithmetic, respectively.
8.2. Complete scheme operations
This section presents the timing figures gained from the four design variants of the
prototype implementation. Because the aim of the proposed co-processor architecture is
the calculation of complete cryptographic schemes, their execution time is measured by
the central core. Thus, the values also contain the time needed for communication via
the shared memory and the execution of the auxiliary functions. However, latter time
is not that significant, as the messages to be operated on were kept very short, i.e., only
strings with around 30 characters.
The timing figures are given as core latency and total operations per second. Both
values were gained by taking the average over 2000 scheme operations on each scheme
controller. The core latency denotes the average time one scheme operation takes on a
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single core. The total operations per second value quantifies the throughput, i.e., the
amount of scheme operations, which are executed in one second on all scheme controllers
in parallel.
For example, for the design variant 3SC3ST, 2000 scheme operations are executed
on each scheme controller, which results in a total of 6000 operations distributed by
the central core to the three scheme controllers in parallel. To get the core latency the
overall execution time is divided by 2000. In contrast, the operations per second figure
is computed as the reciprocal of the overall execution time divided by 6000.
The core latency and throughput values for complete scheme operations are shown in
Tables 8.3 to 8.6. Each table contains the values for core latency and operations per
second for the four operations encryption, decryption, signing, and verification, which
were presented in Section 7.1. The tested bit-widths are those from Section 7.1.
Table 8.3.: Results for variant 4SC2ST
Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
Bit- Core Total Core Total Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
1024 2.39 ms 1674.69 30.50 ms 131.16 30.36 ms 131.77 2.40 ms 1663.55
RSA 1536 5.03 ms 795.47 97.53 ms 41.01 97.17 ms 41.17 5.01 ms 797.852048 8.64 ms 462.83 225.03 ms 17.78 224.37 ms 17.83 8.59 ms 465.44
3072 18.79 ms 212.87 741.23 ms 5.40 739.87 ms 5.41 18.68 ms 214.13
160 18.75 ms 213.28 9.59 ms 416.91 10.02 ms 399.34 18.78 ms 212.96
ECC 192 29.47 ms 135.73 14.95 ms 267.50 15.74 ms 254.19 29.45 ms 135.84224 43.60 ms 91.74 21.94 ms 182.30 23.31 ms 171.61 43.60 ms 91.73
256 61.85 ms 64.68 31.32 ms 127.72 33.08 ms 120.92 61.62 ms 64.91
PBC 512 − − − − 266.51 ms 15.01 454.91 ms 8.79
Table 8.4.: Results for variant 3SC3ST
Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
Bit- Core Total Core Total Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
1024 1.76 ms 1702.61 21.80 ms 137.64 21.64 ms 138.63 1.78 ms 1688.24
RSA 1536 3.54 ms 847.70 66.91 ms 44.84 66.27 ms 45.27 3.52 ms 852.272048 6.05 ms 495.99 157.31 ms 19.07 156.45 ms 19.18 6.00 ms 500.00
3072 12.89 ms 232.72 499.26 ms 6.01 497.89 ms 6.03 12.78 ms 234.75
160 16.54 ms 181.37 8.46 ms 354.71 8.83 ms 339.92 16.26 ms 184.50
ECC 192 22.51 ms 133.29 11.44 ms 262.35 12.00 ms 250.00 22.52 ms 133.22224 34.22 ms 87.66 17.36 ms 172.78 18.28 ms 164.13 34.12 ms 87.93
256 49.70 ms 60.36 25.17 ms 119.20 26.57 ms 112.93 49.66 ms 60.41
PBC 512 − − − − 188.94 ms 15.88 324.86 ms 9.23
A graphical representation of the throughput values is provided in Figures 8.1 to 8.4,
which allow a better comparison between the same scheme operation on different design
variants and between the same scheme operation from different public key approaches.
Thus, the throughput values for the four operations encryption, decryption, signing, and
verification are each shown in one of the graphs. The schemes are compared to each
other based on the security level they provide in bits, see Section 7.1.
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Table 8.5.: Results for variant 3SC4ST
Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
Bit- Core Total Core Total Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
1024 1.39 ms 2162.16 16.68 ms 179.89 16.45 ms 182.33 1.40 ms 2142.86
RSA 1536 2.80 ms 1072.96 51.54 ms 58.21 50.90 ms 58.94 2.78 ms 1080.112048 4.69 ms 639.45 116.67 ms 25.71 115.81 ms 25.90 4.64 ms 646.41
3072 9.94 ms 301.72 378.41 ms 7.93 377.05 ms 7.96 9.83 ms 305.13
160 14.32 ms 209.48 7.34 ms 408.47 7.64 ms 392.90 14.19 ms 211.37
ECC 192 19.29 ms 155.49 9.83 ms 305.28 10.28 ms 291.96 19.19 ms 156.31224 29.85 ms 100.51 15.18 ms 197.61 15.93 ms 188.35 29.81 ms 100.63
256 37.55 ms 79.89 18.99 ms 157.95 20.05 ms 149.65 37.41 ms 80.20
PBC 512 − − − − 142.76 ms 21.01 247.46 ms 12.12
Table 8.6.: Results for variant 2SC6ST
Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
Bit- Core Total Core Total Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
1024 1.08 ms 1857.01 13.33 ms 150.08 13.12 ms 152.40 1.09 ms 1831.50
RSA 1536 2.05 ms 973.71 36.01 ms 55.54 35.68 ms 56.05 2.04 ms 981.112048 3.46 ms 578.29 82.65 ms 24.20 82.17 ms 24.34 3.65 ms 548.70
3072 7.00 ms 285.92 257.25 ms 7.77 256.52 ms 7.80 6.88 ms 290.59
192 16.62 ms 120.35 8.56 ms 233.63 8.84 ms 226.26 16.51 ms 121.12
ECC 224 26.10 ms 76.64 13.32 ms 150.11 13.91 ms 143.75 25.88 ms 77.27
256 32.53 ms 61.48 16.53 ms 120.97 17.37 ms 115.17 32.53 ms 61.48
PBC 512 − − − − 113.22 ms 17.67 197.93 ms 10.10
Note that for both RSA and ECC the timing values of encryption and verification and
the timing values for decryption and signing are similar. This is because of the similarity
of the cryptographic main operations of these schemes. Both encryption and verification
for RSA utilize the public key, which is set to e = 216 + 1. The private key required for
decryption and signing, in contrast, is an integer d with a large bit-width, thus, resulting
in a much longer modular exponentiation. For ECC, in both encryption and verification
two point multiplications are required each, while decryption and signing need just one
point multiplication each.
Remember that for 2SC6ST no results are provided for ECC with a bit-width of 160,
because the amount of 16 bit words must be at least the double of the number of pipeline
stages, i.e., must be at least 12. Furthermore, for PBC only the BLS signature scheme
was implemented, thus, results for PBC en-/decryption are omitted.
As can be seen from the graphs the design variant 3SC4ST is the most efficient for
nearly all schemes. The only exception is ECC with 160 bit, where the fastest variant is
4SC2ST. This is somewhat surprising, as 3SC4ST contains a total of 24 pipeline stages1,
while 4SC2ST features only 16 pipeline stages. Thus, for this short bit-width added
pipeline stages are not as beneficial as added parallel scheme executions.
Also interesting is the fact that while 3SC4ST, generally, is the best design variant,
the second best variant is different for the respective public key approaches. For RSA
1Three ModArith cores containing each two modular multipliers with four stages each: 3 · 2 · 4 = 24.
114
8.2. Complete scheme operations
80 96 112 128
Security level [bit]
0
1000
2000
To
ta
l o
ps
/s
ec
ECC 4SC2ST
ECC 3SC3ST
ECC 3SC4ST
ECC 2SC6ST
RSA 4SC2ST
RSA 3SC3ST
RSA 3SC4ST
RSA 2SC6ST
Figure 8.1.: Results for encryption schemes
and PBC with their rather long bit-widths the second-best variant is 2SC6ST. For ECC
with its relatively short bit-widths the second-best variant is 4SC2ST.
This, however, is not really surprising. RSA and PBC require calculations on numbers
with long bit-widths. Those benefit highly from the longer pipelines, as the overhead
in this case is smaller: The difference between the required bit-widths and the actual
computed bit-width2 is relatively smaller and the longer pipelines utilize all stages in
parallel for a longer amount of time3. In contrast, ECC features calculations with shorter
bit-widths, which are not able to take advantage of the long pipelines to the same extent.
Here, the higher parallelization of the scheme controllers in 4SC2ST contributes more
to the efficiency.
2Remember that the pipelined multipliers always calculate a multiple of the number of stages in words.
3Remember that the pipelines have to be filled stage-by-stage before all stages are working concurrently.
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Figure 8.2.: Results for decryption schemes
Thus, as it was to be expected, the design variants with longer pipelines are better
able to support calculations with larger bit-widths. The variants with shorter pipelines,
at the same time, are better suited for computations with smaller bit-widths, as they
parallelize the scheme execution to a higher degree. Further evidence for this relation
can be found in the results. So does the efficiency of the variant 2SC6ST decrease less
than that of 3SC3ST of ECC from 224 bit to 256 bit. Furthermore, while 4SC2ST is
better than 3SC3ST for all ECC operations, it performs worse than 3SC3ST for all RSA
and PBC operations.
This latter observation also leads to the conclusion that the important metric is not
so much the lengths of the pipelines, but rather the total amount of pipeline stages. As
3SC3ST contains a total of 18 pipeline stages it should be faster than 4SC2ST, which
contains only 16 pipeline stages. This advantage, however, asserts itself only for longer
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Figure 8.3.: Results for signing schemes
bit-widths. The variants 2SC6ST and 3SC4ST both contain a total of 24 pipeline stages.
Therefore, the relation between them – i.e., 3SC4ST is more efficient – stays basically
the same for all examined bit-widths.
Until now, it was not analyzed how the architecture scales with the number of scheme
controllers. This is important, because both the central core and the AES core each
exist just once. To examine this, all four design variants were tested with a different
program for the PowerPC utilizing only the first MicroBlaze processor. The remaining
soft-core processors were left unused.
The resulting timing values are depicted in Appendix B. Here, only the conclusions
from these values are presented. From the experiments it can be derived that the sharing
of both the central core and the AES core does, generally, not introduce any significant
overhead. The difference between the latencies of the implementation exploiting all
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Figure 8.4.: Results for verification schemes
scheme controllers and that exploiting only the first controller is 0.00 ms or 0.01 ms in
most cases, which is within the accuracy of measurement. There were, however, some
exceptions:
1. The RSA decryption operation using all soft-cores exhibits a longer latency than
that using just the first soft-core. Although the differences do not provide an
uniform picture, they increase with the utilized bit-width.
2. The latency of the RSA signature verification on 2SC6ST with a bit-width of 2048
is 0.24 ms faster on the implementation exploiting only a single scheme controller.
3. The ECC operations – including the point multiplication – exhibit relatively high
differences. In some cases the latency on the implementation using all scheme con-
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trollers is even smaller than that on the implementation using just one controller.
Furthermore, in contrast to RSA, the timing results are not deterministic, i.e., by
repeating a test it was possible to get slightly different values. The differences in
results were, usually, in the range of several 10 µs, but could increase up to several
hundred µs. Therefore, by executing several test runs, results could be generated
in many cases, which did not exhibit any difference between the implementations
using all or just one scheme controller.
Unfortunately, there is no obvious reason for these differences, because the execution
should be deterministic. Therefore, this area requires further study gaining insights in
the inner workings leading to this slightly indeterministic behavior.
8.3. Cryptographic main operations
This section presents the timing values for just the cryptographic main operations of
RSA and ECC without the execution of the other parts of the cryptographic schemes,
i.e., mainly the auxiliary functions. These values are not that useful on their own,
because a cryptographic main operation alone does not provide security. However, for
realizations from literature, usually, only the results of the cryptographic main operations
are provided. Thus, to ease the comparison with other designs in the next section, the
cryptographic main operations were also measured alone. Additionally, this provides
some clues to the execution time required for the auxiliary functions. Note that the
timing values contain the time needed for the communication via the shared memory,
because the scheme controllers are still operated by the central core.
Table 8.7.: Results of the cryptographic main operations for 4SC2ST and 3SC3ST
4SC2ST 3SC3ST
Bit- Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
Modular 1024 30.08 ms 132.96 21.37 ms 140.39
exponentiation 1536 96.78 ms 41.33 65.89 ms 45.53
(long exponent) 2048 223.88 ms 17.87 155.96 ms 19.243072 739.15 ms 5.41 497.16 ms 6.03
Modular 1024 2.11 ms 1894.84 1.48 ms 2020.88
exponentiation 1536 4.62 ms 866.08 3.13 ms 959.23
(short exponent) 2048 8.07 ms 495.39 5.48 ms 547.703072 17.94 ms 222.92 12.04 ms 249.11
160 8.69 ms 460.22 7.66 ms 391.57
Scalar 192 13.68 ms 292.48 10.38 ms 288.88
multiplication 224 20.26 ms 197.46 15.90 ms 188.72
256 28.73 ms 139.21 23.08 ms 129.98
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Table 8.8.: Results of the cryptographic main operations for 3SC4ST and 2SC6ST
3SC4ST 2SC6ST
Bit- Core Total Core Total
width latency ops/sec latency ops/sec
Modular 1024 16.18 ms 185.40 12.85 ms 155.61
exponentiation 1536 50.52 ms 59.39 35.30 ms 56.66
(long exponent) 2048 115.32 ms 26.02 81.68 ms 24.493072 376.33 ms 7.97 255.80 ms 7.82
Modular 1024 1.11 ms 2696.63 803 µs 2493.77
exponentiation 1536 2.38 ms 1257.86 1.64 ms 1216.55
(short exponent) 2048 4.12 ms 727.89 2.89 ms 691.923072 9.10 ms 329.85 6.15 ms 325.07
160 6.63 ms 452.52 − −
Scalar 192 8.85 ms 338.93 7.66 ms 261.23
multiplication 224 13.86 ms 216.46 12.11 ms 165.19
256 17.43 ms 172.16 15.10 ms 132.45
Table 8.7 shows the timing values for the variants 4SC2ST and 3SC3ST, while those
for 3SC4ST and 2SC6ST are depicted in Table 8.8. The content of the table is similar
to those in the previous section, although here the timings are for the modular expo-
nentiation or the point multiplication. Because in RSA the modular exponentiation is
exploited both with long/private and short/public exponent, the timings values for both
types of exponentiation are provided.
A graphic representation of the timing results of the Cryptographic Main Operations
can be found in Figures 8.5 and 8.6. They are structured similar to the graphs in the
previous section. In this context, ModExpLong denotes a modular exponentiation with
a long exponent, ModExpLong one with a short exponent, and PointMult stands for a
scalar multiplication.
8.4. Comparison with other designs
Table 8.9 shows the performance figures of designs from literature. The second column
contains the resource usage in terms of logic cells (LC) or logic elements (LE) for designs
on Xilinx or Altera FPGAs, respectively. In this context, LC and LE are roughly com-
parable to each other, as both contain one LUT and one flipflop. Note that because the
different references use different metrics to measure their resource usage, the conversion
into LC/LE may not be exact in all cases.
The bit-width and the type of operation are given in the third and fourth column of
Table 8.9, respectively. Unfortunately, only [38] provides values for complete scheme ex-
ecutions, while the remainder offers only the execution time for modular exponentiation
and/or point multiplication. In this context, Encryption and Decryption denote the ex-
ecution of a complete en-/decryption scheme. A modular exponentiation is named with
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Figure 8.5.: Results for modular exponentiation with long exponent and point multipli-
cation
ModExp (Encr) or ModExp (Decr), where Encr indicates the usage of a short/public
exponent and Decr that of a long/private exponent. PointMult, finally, stands for a
point multiplication with a scalar of the given bit-width.
The remaining columns provide the latency and the throughput of the respective
design. Values marked with ’*’ are estimated in this work, because the reference did
provide just the execution time for a single modular multiplication.
Note that most references contain only the resources necessary to execute the respec-
tive cryptographic main operation, thus, their LC/LE should not be compared to the
values from Table 8.1, but to those from Table 8.2. An exception are the single-chip
designs from [38] and [25]. [38] includes cores for AES, SHA-1, RSA, and ECC over
GF(2m). [25] incorporates resources for AES, SHA-512, RSA, and memory control.
Compared to [38], all design variants from this work exhibit better performance. The
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Figure 8.6.: Results for modular exponentiation with short exponent
higher throughput for the encryption in [38] stems most probably from the use of a
shorter public exponent (only 5 bits) and from a different scheme for the encryption
using other auxiliary functions. In comparison to [25], all design variants exhibit a
better throughput, too, even in light of the fact that [25] does provide timing values for
the modular exponentiations only.
Similar to this work, [26] tries to speed up RSA and ECC evenly on the same hardware.
However, in [26] this is done by combining several multipliers for ECC into a larger one
for RSA. Again, the design variants from this work exhibit better performance, perhaps
because of the exploitation of the dedicated multipliers on the FPGA.
More optimized designs for ECC and RSA can be found in [72, 75]. Both have
a considerable higher throughput than the variant 3SC4ST, see Table 8.8. However,
remember that in 3SC4ST only 15876 LC are used for the modular arithmetic, while [72,
75] do not contain resources allowing the execution of complete schemes. Furthermore,
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both designs do not consider the calculation on numbers of other bit-widths, thus, are
less flexible than the architecture from this work.
The realization from [117], which considers just RSA, employs two pipelined modular
multipliers in parallel. Thus, it is somewhat similar to the design of the lowest level
of the architecture proposed in this work. The values from [117] in Table 8.9 are from
a variant with 16 pipeline stages in each multiplier. In comparison, the throughput of
3SC4ST is higher, even if the lower resource usage of [117] is taken into account.
[112] presents a pipelined modular multiplier able to operate on numbers of arbitrary
bit-width. The values in Table 8.9 are from a variant with 16 pipeline stages exploiting
the dedicated multipliers on a Virtex-II FPGA. If one takes into account the lower
resource usage, it is faster than the prototype implementation. However, the design
from [112] exploits both more dedicated multipliers and – more critically – more memory
blocks, which were very scarce in the prototype implementation.
The design from [93] is a pure modular multiplication, too. It is realized as systolic
array, which may be instantiated with different bit-widths. Table 8.9 provides the values
for 256 and 1024 bit, respectively. For the given examples, both its size and timing values
are worse than those from this work. However, it is to be expected that for variants with
wider bit-widths the differences will get smaller, eventually reaching a point, where the
design form [93] becomes faster than the prototype from this work. But then resources
will stay unused for all multiplications on number with smaller bit-width, which will
decrease throughput per used resource. The same considerations hold for the designs
from [22, 21].
[8] presents a modular multiplier, which is able to operate on different bit-widths.
Although it was not realized on an FPGA and, thus, the results are not directly com-
parable, it is included, because it was presented in Chapter 2 as related work.
The design from [14], finally, is considerably faster than the design from this work.
However, like many other designs from literature, it only allows modular multiplication
with a single bit-width. Thus, it does not allow the execution of complete schemes and
is not able to operate on different bit-widths.
Unfortunately, a comparison of the PBC functionality of the design from this work is
not possible, because literature on this topic seems to concentrate on implementations
over GF(2m), which can for example be found in [98, 110, 11].
123
Chapter 8. Results
Table 8.9.: Performance figures of comparable designs
Ref LC/LE Bit-width Operation type Latency Ops/sec
[38] 28451 LE 1024 Encryption 0.25 ms 4000.00Decryption 31.93 ms 31.32
[25] 26880 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 20 ms 50.002048 ModExp (Decr) 80 ms 12.50
[26] 10534 LC 256 PointMult *26.50 ms *39.061033 ModExp (Decr) *35.76 ms *27.96
[72] 31510 LC 256 PointMult 3.86 ms 259.07
[75] 24324 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 3.829 ms 261.16
1024 ModExp (Encr) 7.8 ms 128.21
[117] 4112 LE ModExp (Decr) 39 ms 25.64
2048 ModExp (Encr) 31 ms 32.26ModExp (Decr) 222 ms 4.50
[112] 4768 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 8.17 ms 122.40
[93] 3096 LC 256 PointMult *35.41 ms *28.2411412 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) *49.41 ms *20.24
[22] 26604 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 27.25 ms 36.70
[21] 26836 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 27.36 ms 36.55
1024 ModExp (Decr) 15.2 ms 65.79
1536 ModExp (Decr) 35 ms 28.57
2048 ModExp (Decr) 60 ms 16.67
[8] 9094 gates 4096 ModExp (Decr) 234ms 4.27139 PointMult 3.1 ms 322.58
172 PointMult 4.7 ms 212.77
197 PointMult 6.1 ms 163.93
275 PointMult 6.7 ms 149.25
[14] 13266 LC 1024 ModExp (Encr) 0.22 ms 4545.4513652 LC 1024 ModExp (Decr) 3.10 ms 322.58
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Conclusion
The architecture proposed in this work is able to support servers shouldering the load
of secure communication with different client types using different cryptographic ap-
proaches. For this, the design exploits HW/SW co-design allowing the architecture to
be both highly efficient and flexible concerning its supported schemes. The flexibility,
which also allows relatively easy upgrades to new cryptographic schemes, aids long-term
security, too, because it allows to substitute insecure schemes with secure ones.
The focus on the server-side shifts the performance goal into the direction of high
throughput. This is in contrast to low latency, which is the usual metric in literature.
However, these two goals do not always lead to the same designs, as the aim for flexibility
and throughput limits the amount of parallelization and, thus, increases the latency.
The low degree of parallelization on lower levels, however, can be compensated for by
parallelization on higher levels.
These considerations led to the proposed flexible and efficient architecture for a cryp-
tographic co-processor for server-application. Its performance figures are comparable
to or better than those of designs from literature. Only highly optimized realizations
with a comparable resource usage geared for a single bit-width outperform the presented
prototype implementation. However, those do not offer the same flexibility and in their
presented form are not yet able to execute complete schemes.
Although the prototype implementation illustrates the important points of the pro-
posed architecture, it can not hide its proof-of-concept nature. For an usable version of
the co-processor, the following improvements must/should be included, approximately
in this order of importance.
• The complete functionality has to be executed on-chip to increase the security
and the reusability. For this, firstly, additional memory is needed as instruction
and data memory for the central core. Secondly, non-volatile memory is required
for on-chip key storage, as, otherwise, the private keys would have to be loaded
from the outside into the co-processor. Thirdly, the key generation for RSA must
be possible on-chip, too. This may be done by exploiting the modular inversion
according to the Extended Euclidean algorithm, which would have to be realized
additionally. Note that this modular inversion may then also be used to speed up
ECDSA.
• The communication with the host server should be realized using a faster bus, e.g.,
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Ethernet. For this, of course, the program for the central core would have to be
extended to actually receive commands from and send results to the host server.
• A further step to increase the usability of the implementation would be to allow
the symmetric en-/decryption and hashing of larger amounts of data. As this does
not concern data, which must be kept secret, off-chip memory may be used to
store the initial and the encrypted data. The actual operation could be executed
or controlled by the second PowerPC, which is left unused in the prototype im-
plementation. Then, the host server may load the data to be encrypted/signed
into the off-chip memory, from where the second PowerPC may read it. In case of
encryption it writes the results back to this memory.
• A further improvement may be introduced by partly decoupling the communi-
cation between the central core and the scheme controllers allowing it to become
asynchronous. If the size of the shared memory could be increased, the central core
may store the data for several cryptographic scheme executions inside it. Then,
the scheme controllers are able to operate more independently by looking whether
a new command for an operation is waiting in the shared memory and execute
it. This way, the respective parties do not have to wait for each other, which will
increase the efficiency.
However, there are also some possible improvements to the proposed architecture,
which were not considered in Chapter 6 for scope reasons.
• The modular arithmetic on the lowest level could be extended into a so called uni-
fied architecture, see [21, 31, 105], able to operate both in the finite fields GF(p)
and GF(2m). This is possible with a surprisingly small increase in resource usage,
as the main difference is the propagation of the carry. Although those additional
resources would not be useful for RSA, it would increase the flexibility of the archi-
tecture, which, then, would also be able to support ECC and PBC over GF(2m). It
is to be expected that those two approaches gain at least some acceptance, because
they may be implemented in hardware with a considerable higher speed than those
over GF(p).
• The modular multipliers in the ModArith core could also be extended according to
the suggestion from [92, 91], allowing the computation of the elementary operations
for the public key system NTRU, see [88]. Again, these additional resources could
not be used for the other public key approaches. But the increase in flexibility
may well be worth the expense.
• A different strategy for improvement would be the utilization of batch execution.
This means that a batch of the same cryptographic operations with different keys
and messages is calculated together allowing to exploit synergies between the sin-
gle operations of the batch. For example, one could verify a batch of signatures
together, which would then require only a fraction of the computational effort it
would take to verify the signatures one-by-one. Possible approaches are proposed
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in [33, 5] for RSA and in [18, 81] for an identity-based scheme, i.e., for PBC. How-
ever, for the implementation of this, the amount of memory needs to be increased.
• A further improvement requiring additional memory is the exploitation of precom-
putation. For this, certain intermediate values of the cryptographic main oper-
ations are calculated beforehand and used to speed up the actual cryptographic
main operation. This, however, is only useful, if the same precomputed values
may be used for two or more cryptographic main operation. For example, one
could precompute some multiples of the generator point of a curve, speeding up
all computations on this curve. A possible approach is the idea from [65]. As
mentioned above, however, this requires additional memory. Note that this may
likely be combined with batch execution.
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Appendix A.
Parameter set for Type A curves
The parameter set for the curve used in the prototype realization of PBC was taken from
the PBC library, see [68]. In this work, only the so called Type A Curves were used, see
[69] for details on the mathematical background. Below, the concrete parameter values
for the curve used in the prototype are depicted. The prime q, the order of the curve n,
the cofactor h, and the Weierstraß-coefficients a and b are part of the parameter set for
the Type A curves. The coordinates of the generator point G = (xG, yG) were generated
using the PBC library.
q = 0xA7A73868E95FBA886EDEF8CE96E7217E364BB946F5ED839628D1F80010940622
A7AFDAF9B049744A459E54DAB7BA5BE92539E8FF9B4F30A3CF6230C28E284D97
h = 0x14F4E70D1D2BF601BF6B0D47137CC83915F505F0E85050F93A6344777E2CD28F
= F9B4F30A3CF6230C28E284D98
n = 0x8000000000000800000000000000000000000001
= 2159 + 2107 + 1
a = 0x01
b = 0x00
xG = 0x558639227C7254475195B4F6024AF058FDB2DD9F38F2A7DD2254642372196330
C700B7E9B1087B7B3E4F9112711516080C22BD0ED29AC8E76880F764430BDA9A
yG = 0x1B1D50976285DA33ADB0BA961B398AB7A39B0BA39FEC42184A37C616465CE47A
861D442092D215A5885D61AF1E11902F96551FFB5F739C64520694007E4A2DC8
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Appendix B.
Timing values exploiting just one
scheme controller
This chapter provides timing results similar to those in Chapter 8, but this time exploit-
ing just one scheme controller. This means that the hardware of the designs was not
changed. Only the program of the central core was modified in such a way that just the
first scheme controller was issued the respective commands. This allows to compare the
core latencies in the two cases that all or just one scheme controller is utilized. Thus, it
can be observed how well the architecture scales with the number of scheme controllers,
although it contains only one central core and only one AES core.
Note that the discussion on how well the architecture scales is part of Section 8.2.
Here, only the concerned values are given. The timing results of complete scheme ex-
ecutions are provided in Tables B.1 to B.4. Table B.5 contains the timing values for
the cryptographic main operations only. The structure of the tables is similar to that
utilized in Chapter 8. However, the throughput values are omitted, because only the
latency is of interest for considerations on the overhead.
Table B.1.: Latencies for 4SC2ST exploiting just one scheme controller
Bit- Latency
width Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
1024 2.39 ms 30.39 ms 30.35 ms 2.40 ms
RSA 1536 5.03 ms 97.23 ms 97.16 ms 5.01 ms2048 8.64 ms 224.45 ms 224.37 ms 8.59 ms
3072 18.79 ms 740.04 ms 739.87 ms 18.67 ms
160 18.75 ms 9.52 ms 10.01 ms 18.56 ms
ECC 192 29.46 ms 14.84 ms 15.73 ms 29.02 ms224 43.59 ms 22.01 ms 23.30 ms 43.50 ms
256 61.84 ms 31.17 ms 33.06 ms 61.94 ms
PBC 512 − − 266.50 ms 454.91 ms
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Table B.2.: Latencies for 3SC3ST exploiting just one scheme controller
Bit- Latency
width Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
1024 1.76 ms 21.68 ms 21.64 ms 1.78 ms
RSA 1536 3.54 ms 66.34 ms 66.27 ms 3.52 ms2048 6.05 ms 156.57 ms 156.45 ms 6.00 ms
3072 12.89 ms 498.07 ms 497.89 ms 12.78 ms
160 16.53 ms 8.40 ms 8.83 ms 16.35 ms
ECC 192 22.50 ms 11.41 ms 12.00 ms 22.52 ms224 34.22 ms 17.23 ms 18.27 ms 34.13 ms
256 49.68 ms 25.07 ms 26.53 ms 49.75 ms
PBC 512 − − 188.94 ms 324.86 ms
Table B.3.: Latencies for 3SC4ST exploiting just one scheme controller
Bit- Latency
width Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
1024 1.39 ms 16.49 ms 16.45 ms 1.40 ms
RSA 1536 2.79 ms 50.97 ms 50.90 ms 2.78 ms2048 4.69 ms 115.93 ms 115.81 ms 4.64 ms
3072 9.94 ms 377.23 ms 377.05 ms 9.83 ms
160 14.31 ms 7.29 ms 7.64 ms 14.15 ms
ECC 192 19.29 ms 9.79 ms 10.28 ms 19.29 ms224 29.84 ms 15.04 ms 15.92 ms 29.76 ms
256 37.53 ms 18.96 ms 20.02 ms 37.55 ms
PBC 512 − − 142.76 ms 247.46 ms
Table B.4.: Latencies for 2SC6ST exploiting just one scheme controller
Bit- Latency
width Encryption Decryption Signing Verification
1024 1.08 ms 13.16 ms 13.12 ms 1.09 ms
RSA 1536 2.05 ms 35.76 ms 35.68 ms 2.04 ms2048 3.46 ms 82.28 ms 82.17 ms 3.41 ms
3072 6.99 ms 256.71 ms 256.52 ms 6.88 ms
192 16.62 ms 8.45 ms 8.84 ms 16.55 ms
ECC 224 26.09 ms 13.15 ms 13.91 ms 26.11 ms
256 32.53 ms 16.45 ms 17.34 ms 32.35 ms
PBC 512 − − 113.21 ms 197.92 ms
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Table B.5.: Latencies for the cryptographic main operations exploiting just one scheme
controller
Bit- Latency
width 4SC2ST 3SC3ST 3SC4ST 2SC6ST
Modular 1024 30.08 ms 21.37 ms 16.18 ms 12.85 ms
exponentiation 1536 96.78 ms 65.89 ms 50.51 ms 35.30 ms
(long exponent) 2048 223.88 ms 155.96 ms 115.32 ms 81.68 ms3072 739.15 ms 497.17 ms 376.33 ms 255.80 ms
Modular 1024 2.11 ms 1.49 ms 1.11 ms 802 µs
exponentiation 1536 4.62 ms 3.13 ms 2.38 ms 1.64 ms
(short exponent) 2048 8.07 ms 5.48 ms 4.12 ms 2.89 ms3072 17.94 ms 12.04 ms 9.10 ms 6.15 ms
160 8.48 ms 7.66 ms 6.63 ms −
Scalar 192 13.68 ms 10.39 ms 8.90 ms 7.61 ms
multiplication 224 20.26 ms 15.75 ms 13.73 ms 12.11 ms
256 28.74 ms 23.00 ms 17.36 ms 15.03 ms
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List of publications
1. Stephan Klaus, Ralf Laue, and Sorin A. Huss, Design Space Exploration of in-
completely specified Embedded Systems by Genetic Algorithms, GI/ITG/GMM
Workshop "Methoden und Beschreibungssprachen zur Modellierung und Verifika-
tion von Schaltungen und Systemen" April 5-7, 2005, München, Germany
2. Michael Jung, Ralf Laue, and Sorin A. Huss, A Case Study on Partial Evaluation
in Embedded Software Design, 3rd IEEE Workshop on Software Technologies for
Future Embedded & Ubiquitous Systems (SEUS), May 2005, Seattle, WA, ISBN
0-7695-2357-9
3. Rainer Blümel, Ralf Laue, and Sorin A. Huss, A highly efficient modular Multi-
plication Algorithm for Finite Field Arithmetic in GF(P), ECRYPT Workshop,
CRyptographic Advances in Secure Hardware, September 6-7, 2005, Leuven, Bel-
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tion für GF(P), 3. Krypto-Tag – Workshop über Kryptologie, September 15, 2005,
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sel, Germany
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on Field Programmable Technology (FPT), December 13 - 15, 2006, Bangkok,
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7. Abdulhadi Shoufan, Ralf Laue, and Sorin A. Huss, Secure Multicast Rekeying:
A Case Study for HW/SW-Codesign, GI/ITG/GMM Workshop "Methoden und
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Systemen", pages 171-180, ISBN 978-3-8322-5956-3, Fraunhofer-Institut für In-
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sium on Embedded Computing (SEC), May 21, 2007, Niagara Falls, Canada, pages
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